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This thesis examines Christian identity in the early second century though the texts of 
Justin Martyr. It argues that his is a project of defining what it is to be a follower of 
Jesus and worshiper of God and that in doing so he is making a deliberate but subtle 
counter claim to Marcion’s theology of Jesus. The thesis argues that Marcion features 
much more than the few direct instances to him in Justin’s texts and much more than 
has commonly been recognised. By close examination of the context of Justin’s writing 
and the topics his spends the most time debating a pattern emerges whose determinate 
shape looks particularly contra-Marcionite.  
The first part of the thesis places Justin and Marcion in the context of the time and 
highlights the significant issues around what constitutes Jewish and Christian identity in 
the period. This is central to the thesis. Because both of these identities are so unsettled 
and negotiable in the period a project aiming at clarification and definition of who and 
what Christians are was particularly pertinent. The success of Marcion in attracting 
followers with a theological story quite different to what became orthodox Christianity 
made this task all the more urgent. 
The main body of the thesis will look closely at Justin’s two major surviving works, the 
First Apology and the Dialogue with Trypho the Jew, and demonstrate the ways that by 
reading between the lines the spectre of Marcion can be seen to be a motivating factor 
of Justin’s address. These two texts are very different to one another and it is 
notoriously difficult to be sure of the audiences each is addressed to. However this 
thesis will demonstrate that both in equal measure, though in different ways, clearly 
form part of a contra-Marcionite project in which Justin seeks to rule Marcion and his 
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As far back as 1977 Jon Nilson wrote: 
‘Increasing awareness of these contacts [between Jews and Christians] has prompted a 
new appreciation of Judaism as a forceful influence upon the evolution of early 
Christianity. Despite the disappointing paucity of certitudes, a more accurate grasp of 
the Sitz im Leben of much early Christian literature is emerging. This creates the 
possibility that hitherto familiar documents might be read in a new light and so take on 
a renewed utility in the effort to understand the historical and theological dimensions of 
the development of early Christianity.’1  
Thirty seven years on, new and revealing ways of reading the familiar documents of 
early Christianity are still being found. The most recent development has been the 
confluence of Jewish, New Testament, and Patristic scholarship working together to 
learn from one another and better map the emergence of both Christianity and Judaism, 
even the terms are unhelpfully polarising in this period, as we have come to know them. 
The research of this thesis cannot help but be influenced by some of the key scholars 
and works within the relevant body of literature, and shares the aim for a clearer 
understanding of the early Christian period. It does this by considering Justin Martyr’s 
relationship with the arch-heretic Marcion. Why Justin? Because Justin is one of our 
earliest witnesses, the first to attempt to advise the rulers as to the merits of Christianity, 
and the first to explicitly deal with Marcion. As Sara Parvis and Paul Foster note, Justin 
‘is a veritable mine of information about mid-second-century Christian and even Jewish 
and Roman theology, attitudes and practices.’2 It is well known that Justin commented 
on Marcion in his first apology, but it is the original claim of this thesis that Marcion is 
relevant to a great deal more of Justin’s work, than the few mentions that are obvious. 
This thesis will argue that Justin is concerned with in a great deal of what he says by the 
spectre of Marcion, and that much of what he says makes more sense against the 
background of an influential Marcionite theology. The core thesis is that Justin’s 
                                                          
1
 J. Nilson, ‘To Whom is Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho Addressed?’ (1977), 538. 
2
 S. Parvis and P. Foster, ‘Introduction: Justin Martyr and His Worlds’ (2007), 1. 
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approach to theology is deeply, although not wholly, motivated by an effort to 
distinguish true ‘Christianity’ from the Marcionite tradition, at a time when the two are 
not easily distinguishable. Many of the distinctions that come to be recognised are the 
fruits of Justin’s labour.  
This thesis does not argue for any greater achievements on Marcion’s part than the 
traditional claims. The relationship of Marcion to the cannon is not a topic Justin 
discusses, and it is not one this thesis will take up. This dissertation takes Justin as its 
primary topic, and assumes the portrayal of Marcion, as told by Justin and the other 
witness in close proximity to him, is relatively accurate, although always in need of 
careful critical analysis. Below I will sketch the picture of Marcion which will be 
assumed throughout the thesis. The main is to explore what Christian identity is for 
Justin and the way in his views are to some extent a response to the crisis Marcion 
represents. His Christian identity takes a more definitive shape because of the threat 
Marcion presents. As Reed as put it: 
‘When we examine these works together [the Dial and the Apologies], the contours of a 
wider project begin to emerge. Polemical and apologetic concerns may occasion each 
of his works, but in the process Justin begins to articulate a distinctly Christian identity, 
the borders of which are defined against three different categories of “others”: pagans, 
Jews, and heretics.’3 
Nilson articulates above precisely what this thesis will demonstrate; that it is Justin in 
the mid second-century who rises to the political challenge of being on the fringes of the 
Jewish community, but not obviously or necessarily part of it and its protections, whilst 
at the same time being linked with Christians who follow Marcion and seek to drag 
Christians away from this same community. The way Justin attempts to deal with these 
challenges is to define and make known what it is to be Christian. Specifically, he 
addresses the relationship between Christians and Israel and its god and considers the 
ways Christianity is both within and without that community. In doing so, prompted by 
the attempts of Marcion to pull Christians out of the Jewish community, Justin forms a 
distinctive and clear Christian identity for the first time. It goes without saying that this 
process does not end with Justin, and nor does engagement and argument with 
Marcionism: both continue for many centuries. Nonetheless, Justin takes the first steps, 
                                                          
3
 A.Y. Reed, ‘Fallen Angels (2004), 154.  
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and those who contribute to the task after him (Irenaeus and Tertullian initially) are in 
his debt. 
Chapter two will introduce Justin’s texts as intimately bound to the question of 
Christian identity and specifically as exercises in defining what it is follow Jesus when 
there was no clear answer to this question. Marcion represents the strongest, although 
not the only, alternative proposal for what is to follow Christ. Before progressing to the 
relevance of Marcion however, the second chapter will set the scene for the 
simultaneously Jewish and Graeco-Roman ‘religio-political’ world they both inhabit.  
On this last point, chapter two will proceed to demonstrate how there is no way of 
explaining what a Christian is at this stage without some reference to Judaism; even 
Marcion’s theology is definitively shaped by the Jewish tradition. It is not clear if 
Christians are distinguished from Jews by the Romans, nor is it clear that they seek to 
transcend ethno-racial Jewish ties. The Jewish story is an essential one for the Christian 
story. Justin’s tales of Jewish persecution of Christians, which we can assume hold 
some truth, nonetheless rhetorically recast Christians as the genuine exponents of the 
Jewish tradition, as the true Israel.  
Having established the irreducible relevance and complexity of the Christian relation to 
Judaism chapter three will go on to consider the particular use of the term ‘Christian’ in 
Justin texts and what it reveals about who or what Christians are. At this time, Christian 
is a shame name, mainly used by others to describe the followers of Jesus. The 
application of this term is itself evidence of perceived dishonour. This is slowly 
changing as Christians like Justin claim the term for themselves, in a similar manner to 
which members of ethnic minority groups sometimes adopt and invert the meaning of 
derogatory names for their group. Furthermore, beyond the derogatory tone of this term, 
it is largely devoid of meaning when used by non-Christians, as precisely who and what 
Christians are and do is not clear to them. What is most important, however, is that this 
usage indicates the dynamic that motivates Justin’s text: to clarify and define what it 
means to be Christian. The nature of this project entails that there can be only one, or 
only one centrally agreed understanding, of this and thus we find the beginnings of the 
making of Orthodoxy. In defining and clarifying what a Christian is Justin cannot allow 
beliefs that contradict the true understanding of who Christ is, such as those of Marcion, 
to stand.  
12 
 
In order to make this clear, chapter two will draw attention to how Justin defines what it 
is to follow Christ, i.e. what it is to be a pupil of his philosophy, as opposed to other 
philosophies, doctrines and teachers. Only those who follow Christ and his own 
teaching directly can be thought of as Christians. This entails some central Christian 
dogma, which Marcion would find repugnant. By framing the debate thus, Justin is able 
to expose Marcion as a follower of his own doctrines, rather than those of Christ, 
whatever he and his followers claim. The central question then is one of Christian 
identity; who has the right to be called Christian and what does this mean? This is what 
Justin is trying to deal with in the Dialogue with Trypho the Jew (Dial) and the First 
Apology (1A). This endeavour necessarily involves Marcion and does so beyond the few 
places Marcion is specifically mentioned in these texts. Rather, the whole structure of 
the project is designed to rule out Marcion, and others like him. Philosophy is an 
immensely powerful analogy for Justin because it is readily understood by all in the 
Graeco-Roman world and draws attention to the lineage of teaching, which is precisely 
what Justin wants to secure for his group and expose as a failing in others. The 
conclusion drawn in this section is that Justin displays evidence for a highly disputed 
and emerging ‘Christianity’ which, being so diverse, cannot be understood by Romans. 
This is the heart of Justin’s philosophy, to define and establish the true Christianity and 
rule out pretenders, rather than to mollify or convert the Graeco-Roman authorities. 
Chapter three continues to examine this theme, this time with detailed examination of 
the Dial. This chapter focuses on the Dial and draws out the significance of Justin’s 
presentation of the following of Christ as philosophy. The first half of chapter three 
builds on Van Winden, who successfully challenged the notion that the early, 
‘philosophical’, part of the Dial is at odds with the rest of the piece. The eleven chapters 
are taken to constitute an introduction to the whole piece, establishing the major themes 
that will occur in the rest of the discussion. These themes, it is argued, which are 
presented by Justin in the form of a philosophical debate with a great Christian teacher, 
are noticeably contra-Marcionite. The opening section lays down a series of markers for 
what Justin, and Christians, deny or do not deny. The crucial point about this section is 
that Trypho and his friends do not know Justin is a Christian until late in this section. 
They think of him as a philosopher and listen without prejudice. Only once they have 
discovered he is a Christian, can the piece segue into the rest of the discussion about the 
claims of Christians and the interpretation of scripture. Yet Justin never ceases to see 
himself as philosopher; he sees himself as a representative of the teaching of Christ. 
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This understanding was outlined initially in the philosophical introduction, and the 
themes and teachings outlined there continue to run through the whole course of the 
debate between Justin and Trypho. The second half of this chapter traces these themes 
(particularly the number of gods, providence, justice and righteousness and prophecy) 
as they reappear at various points in the text and considers the ways they are suggestive 
of a contra-Marcionite agenda.  The second part of chapter three concludes with 
analyses of two sections of the Dial with clear relevance to Marcion: 35 and 80. These 
two sections are where Justin draws out the function of philosophy established in his 
introduction and uses it to rule out those who claim to be Christians, but do not share 
the true Christian teaching that he has from Christ. Marcion or Marcionites cannot be 
considered the only group to whom this material is germane but it will be argued that 
several features suggest that Marcion is foremost in Justin’s mind. Chapter three 
concludes that philosophy is central for Justin because it upholds standards and 
regulates dissemination of teaching, which is precisely what Justin is trying to achieve 
in clarifying what it is to be Christian and who can be considered Christian.  
Chapter four turns attention to the Apologies (mainly the First Apology). Justin’s 
Apology is ostensibly an appeal to the rulers to end the persecution of Christians. Jews 
and Judaism feature much less in this text and the tone is more judicious and political. 
This chapter will argue that whilst 1A is what appears to be (i.e. an appeal to the rulers 
to stop the persecution of Christians), it is not a stable form of apologetics from a settled 
Christian position but is rather, as with the Dial, a claim for what and who is Christian. 
It is only a slight exaggeration to say that Justin is not looking to stop persecution from 
the rulers in this piece, but only to clarify who ought to be punished as a Christian and 
who ought to be punished as something else. Despite the different form of the piece, 1A 
is no less a part of an attempt to define and clarify what it means to follow Christ (and 
to exclude Marcion from this) than Dial.
4
 To this end, Justin is appealing to the rulers to 
put Christians under more scrutiny not less, for them to be subject to more probing 
investigation rather than to be left alone to worship their god in peace. The reason for 
this is that the probing investigation, which will examine who is Christian on the 
grounds Justin himself suggests, will vindicate Justin’s Christianity at the expense the 
also popular Marcionite movement.  For example, the criteria Justin lays down for the 
authentic way of Christ is defended against atheism and demonology. This exposes 
Marcionites to these charges because the defence Justin adopts would be untenable in a 
                                                          
4
 The relevance and form of 2A is discussed in the appendix to this thesis. 
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Marcionite theology. Further, Justin presents Christians as reliable and dutiful citizens. 
His predicates for this are assuredly Judeo-Christian, mainly adherence and worship of 
the omnipotent and just one true god. By implication, this excludes Marcionites, since 
they do not worship this god and thereby suggests they are less than good citizens.  
The final third of Chapter four returns to the theme of recognised teaching. No less in 
1A than in Dial does Justin emphasise the importance of the source of one’s doctrines, 
which for him must be Christ and the prophets. It will be shown that he expends a great 
amount of energy in 1A to demonstrate this. In doing so, he aims to expose Marcion and 
his followers as teaching something other than the way of Christ or divine philosophy, 
and thus demonstrate that they are not Christians and should be punished as non-
Christians. Chapter four makes clear that Justin places Marcion not only outside of the 
Christian philosophy, but into the tutelage or possession of the demons. The demons 
offer a metanarrative for all that conceals truth and is evil, and Justin places Marcion 
right in the centre of this. By doing so, he identifies Marcion as the clear and present 
contemporary danger: not only not Christian, but in fact anti-Christian. In this way, 
Marcion is part of the wider story which includes earlier ‘heretics’ (as they would come 
to be known) and future ones.  
Marcion is not the overt subject of Justin’s work, but clarification of what is genuinely 
Christian is one of the main thrusts and it is this which pushes contra-Marcionite claims 
to the fore. Therefore, before proceeding to chapter two and the main argument, it is 
necessary to offer an account of Marcion’s beliefs as recent scholarship has defined 
them so as they can be accurately identified in Justin’s text. Therefore the following 
section will offer a prelude to the thesis by way of a short sketch of the Marcion who 
Justin was reacting to. 
2 Whose Marcion? 
Before we begin an investigation into the influence or relevance of Marcion as 
background to much of what Justin had to say about defining a ‘true Christian’, we must 
pay attention to the question whose Marcion we are talking about. That is, we have a 
number of witnesses to him whose claims are not always transparent or in agreement. 
Furthermore, we have a series of early fathers with a polemical purpose, whose 
testimony must be taken seriously, but critically. As well as Justin, the main exponents 
here are Irenaeus and Tertullian. In the field of modern scholarship, the name of Adolf 
von Harnack stands above all others for defining who Marcion was. In recent years (as 
15 
 
well as at the time of his own writing), however, von Harnack’s Marcion has attracted 
criticism and review. Sebastian Moll has presented an important recent portrait, and 
Markus Vinzent has also been engaged with understanding who Marcion was.  
The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that Marcion features in Justin’s texts as more 
than an occasional heretical nuisance character and in a much more subtle manner, 
helping to shape much of Justin’s project as a whole. This chapter will lay out a 
working understanding of Marcion that seems reasonable from the primary source 
material and recent secondary engagement with the subject. It is not exhaustive, but 
sufficient for understanding the context and theology of a man who was a successful 
evangelist and whose theology was considered the most dangerous of contemporary 
theologies and which continued to be engaged with by church fathers for centuries after 
his death. The number of engagements, as well as their length, is testament itself to his 
importance in the early patristic period.
5
 Adolf von Harnack took Marcion very 
seriously and sought to show the true Marcion behind all the polemical renderings.  
Understanding what Marcion believed, as much as the sources allow us to, is essential 
to this attempt. That said, there are issues relating to Marcion that this thesis will not 
attempt to elucidate. Sebastian Moll, at the beginning of his excellent book on Marcion, 
identifies two levels of portrait about Marcion. The first of these is Marcion himself and 
his relation to his world and time. The second is his relationship to the development of 
the New Testament, as we know it. This thesis requires an interest in the first of these 
but not the second. It matters greatly what Marcion believed, because traces of this are 
what this thesis claims motivated and drove much of what Justin says in his texts as a 
form of indirect refutation. His relationship to the formation of the New Testament is 
not an irrelevant question, but is another research project, which is outside the bounds 
of this thesis.
6
 This thesis can proceed quite normally, simply on the understanding that 
Marcion had a distinctive understanding of the New Testament scriptures without 
pushing this question any further.  
                                                          
5
 D.T. Roth,  ‘Marcion and Marcionites’ in Roger Bagnal et al (eds) Encyclopaedia of Ancient History 12 
vols (Oxford, 2012 ), accessed 27 June 2014 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah05110/pdf 
6
 Questions in this area have recently come to the fore once more and are being intensely debated by 
contemporary scholars, yet no consensus has yet emerged. See Dieter T. Roth, ‘Marcion’s Gospel and 
Luke: The History of Research in Current Debate’, (2008), 513–27 and ‘Marcion’s Gospel: Relevance, 
Contested Issues, Reconstruction’, (2010), 287–94, and Markus Vinzent, Marcion and the Dating of the 
Synoptic Gospels (2014), 15.  
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Why Marcion, then, and not Valentinus or Basilides? After all, the followers of 
Valentinus and Basilides, both of whose teachings are harder to reconstruct than 
Marcion’s, are mentioned along with Marcionites in Dial.35.6. There is therefore a 
question over the extent to which the arguments Justin makes have particular reference 
to Marcion and his followers as opposed to other heretical groups However, even if 
some of his arguments can be applied to other groups, the argument of this thesis is that 
his texts nonetheless read as if the danger presented by Marcionite theology has 
particular import that other ‘heresies’ do not.7 Relating to this kind of difficulty, Moll 
has said: 
‘When Origen explains the allegorical meaning of the battles of Joshua for instance, he 
explicitly addresses Marcion, Valentinus and Basilides. Thus, these other heretics could 
also be envisaged in the elder’s preaching.’8 
Moll here is pointing out the difficulty of isolating theological views at this time, 
although here he is particularly concerned with the case of entirely unnamed heresies in 
an Ireanean text. Although I will argue that points made by Justin, which have not 
usually been discussed as part of a wider contra-Marcionite project by Justin, are 
evocative of Marcion, I acknowledge the possibility that other heretical groups named 
by Justin, may share in parts. Though their followers are mentioned in Dial 35.6 (as are 
Marcionites) these two Gnostics do not feature personally in 1A 26 or 58 where 
Marcion himself appears as the successor to previous heretical leaders (Simon Magnus 
and Menander). Marcion not only appears more often, but as a contemporary of Justin,
9
 
he is a real and present danger. Furthermore, we know Justin wrote a text specifically to 
Marcion (pro.j Marki,wna). All of these points are suggestive of his particular relevance 
to |Justin.
10
 Furthermore, Marcion is also said by Justin to have influenced all peoples; 
there is no province where his teaching is not known,
11
 and Marcionite ‘Christians’ are 
known to have formed the majority of ‘Christians’ in Syria in the time of Justin and his 
                                                          
7
 Charles E. Hill has argued similarly that the central arguments of the letter to Florinus, although not 
solely anti-Marcionite in argument, reveal an anti-Marcionite agenda. The thesis here is the same in 
relation to Justin. Although not all of his arguments can be specifically tied to Marcion, many are 
suggestive of Marcion and, more importantly, Marcion seems to form the background picture that 
provokes the response, which goes on to include other related heresies. See Charles E. Hill, From the Lost 
Teaching of Polycarp: identifying Irenaeus' apostolic presbyter and the author of Ad Diognetum (2006).  
8
 S. Moll. The Arch-Heretic Marcion (2010), 18. 
9
 Valentinus (100-160) would have also been a contemporary of Justin’s but Justin does not name him as 
such, as he does pointedly on two occasions concerning Marcion, but only his followers. Basilides could 
have been a contemporary but was probably dead (138) by the time of Justin’s conversion.  
10
 M. Vinzent, ‘Dating of the Gospels’ (2014), 15.   
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 This is therefore a power and influence reserved only for Marcion 
among the ‘heretics’ Justin mentions. As Lampe bluntly puts it: ‘One can conclude that 
Marcion in his lifetime undoubtedly surpassed all other heretics in effectiveness.’13 
Also, it is salient to point out that the knowledge of, or of the primary engagement with, 
Valentinus and Basilides is dwarfed by that of Marcion. Marcion simply seems to be a 
bigger deal and many of the particular arguments Justin makes to distinguish his group, 
the Christians, from the Marcionites, which this thesis aims to present, do not seem to 
pertain to followers of Valentinus and Basilides as easily. That said, the influence of 
these other heretics cannot be discounted completely, and nor can Simon Magus, 
Menander (who appears for a quite particular reason which I demonstrate in chapter 
four) and Cerdo (who does not appear but the tradition closely associates him with 
Marcion as his teacher). However, in order to make this argument, it is important to be 
clear about what Marcion believed, so there can be clarity about issues that are 
particularly redolent of Marcion’s spectre and those who may be more widely 
applicable among heresies insofar as Justin knew them. 
To begin this short but necessary explication, Sebastian Moll has a concise and helpful 
list concerning what Justin reports about Marcion: 
1. He has many followers all around the world; 
2. His followers revere him; 
3. He believes in a god who did not create the universe and who is superior to the 
Demiurge; 
4. He believes in a son of this superior god, who is not the Christ predicted by the 
prophets; and 
5. His teaching is a[logoj -irrational  and without avpo,deixij - proof.14 
Obviously this list does not only concern what Marcion believed as such, but also what 
Justin believed about Marcion’s project. For our current purposes, the most relevant of 
Moll’s five points are points three, four and five because they identify key differences 
between Justin and Marcion’s theologies. Point three establishes Marcion’s belief in 
another, hitherto unknown god. Point four’s reference to the prophets should alert the 
reader that the distance between Justin and Marcion on the issue of prophecy and the 
god it comes from; the god of the Jews. This might seem obvious but it ought to be 
                                                          
12
 H. Drijvers, ‘Syrian Christianity and Judaism’ (1992), 130. 
13
 P. Lampe, ‘Paul’ (2003), 251. 
14
 S. Moll, ‘Justin  and the Pontic Wolf’ (2007), 149.  
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explicitly stated. Marcion’s demiurge could in fact have been Platonic, or of almost any 
tradition other than Judaism. That he is not is significant. Quite why Marcion is so 
opposed to this god has not been easy to establish. Bauer postulated that a hatred of the 
Jews was in part a motivating factor, but Moll has shown that there is no evidence for 
this.
15
 ‘But what else could have made him believe that this evil deity, which he detests 
so much, was the god of the Jews? The answer is almost anticlimactic: because the Old 
Testament says so.’16 Moll has correctly identified that Marcion had a strong aversion to 
the created order as such, and that he believed that the creator was the god of the Jews 
because this was what the scriptures told him.
17
 Marcion was an avowed Biblicist and 
was probably brought up in a tradition that valued the scriptures highly so it ought to be 
no surprise that this is the god he rejects.
18
 If he came from an entirely different pagan 
tradition, it would certainly seem arbitrary to pick on the god of the Jews. Marcion does 
not deny the existence of the god of the Jews then nor does he hate the Jews. Rather he 
believes in a superior god to whom Christ belongs rather than the creator god of the 
scriptures. For him the god of the Jews is the god of the Jews alone and Christians are 
those who follow the Christ of the superior god.
19
 
Point five is particularly important; For Justin Marcion’s teaching is without proof 
because prophecy is the criteria for evidence. Justin dedicates vast stretches of text to 
the prophets. Justification for this does not necessarily require attention to Marcion but 
if the notion that one of Justin’s main aims in his texts is to clarify and distinguish his 
theology and practice from the Marcionite alternatives, then the volume of this material 
takes on another dimension; so his project comes to be seen as careful exposition of the 
evidence from prophecy for the true theology over against the indemonstrable claims of 
Marcion.  
                                                          
15
 S. Moll, ‘Arch-Heretic’ (2010), 60. Moll’s argument is that whilst Marcion did not hate the Jews and 
respected the integrity of their tradition and the expectation of a messiah to come on the basis of 
prophesy, he was not positive about, or an advocate of, Judaism. For Marcion, their god is a deceiver and 
they are a trapped people.  There is evidence to suggest that the Jews understandably responded to this by 
defending their traditions against Marcion. This suggests that his threat was not just to Christians, like 
Justin, but extended to non-Christian Jews also. See J. Lieu, Image and Reality: The Jews in the World of 
the Christians in the Second Century (1996),  265 -270. 
16
 S. Moll, ‘Arch-Heretic’ (2010), 61. 
17
 J. B. Tyson has also recently come to the same conclusion. J. B. Tyson, ‘Anti-Judaism in Marcion and 
His Opponents’ (2005-2006), 201.  
18
 Moll believes it likely that Marcion was raised in a Christian home and carried over Christian patterns 
into his new Church. See S. Moll, ‘Arch-Heretic’ (2010), 27.  Harnack believed he was more likely to 
have been raised in a consciously Jewish community. See A.  Harnack, Marcion: The Gospel of the Alien 
God, (1990), 15. Either way the Old Testament scriptures would have been central to his experience. 
Vinzent has recently revisited this issue. See M. Vinzent ‘Marcion the Jew’ (2013) 159-201. 
19
 In Adv. Marc.IV.33,4. Tertullian asks how the Creator could be alien to the pharises when, as Marcion 
says, this god is ‘the particular god of the Jewish nation’: proprius deus Iudaicae gentis. 
19 
 
Witnesses after Justin to Marcion are numerous and say a great deal more but it would 
be unreasonable to assume that the above table represents all Justin knew of Marcion; at 
least because they lived in the same city where the population of ‘Christians’ of any 
kind would not have been huge at the time and were known to dispute among 
themselves.
20
 Furthermore, they were educated Christians, hardly a common breed, and 
Marcion was at least a prominent leader, as Justin himself attests.
21
 Even if Justin had 
not met Marcion personally, he would, however, surely have met quite a few first phase 
Marcionites in a Christian community as small as Rome’s in the early second century. 
We also know of at least one text, and potentially two, that Justin wrote where Marcion 
was the main topic. Furthermore Irenaeus, who reveals a great deal about what Marcion 
believed, is well attested to have been familiar with Justin’s texts and perhaps even a 
young member of Justin’s own school.22 This being the case, much of what Irenaeus 
knew of Marcion was most likely taught to him by Justin as well his own experience, 
which would have been contemporary with Justin’s also. Irenaeus is therefore also an 
important source in establishing what Marcion believed; as all who comment on 
Marcion will agree. The next nearest contemporary who wrote greatly on Marcion is 
Tertullian, without whose witness, most studies on Marcion would prove impossible to 
sustain. By the time of Tertullian’s Against Marcion, it is increasingly less certain what 
refers to Marcion himself and what refers to Marcionites. Nonetheless, he clearly had 
Marcion’s writings and this has to be taken seriously, always remembering the 
polemical purpose, as a witness to what the man and his school believed. 
The beliefs of Marcion which inform this reading of Marcion in Justin from Irenaeus 
and Tertullian include: 
1. That the other son Justin mentions Marcion to believe in is Jesus Christ which is 
obviously what Justin has in mind when he speaks of those who claim to be 
Christians but are not which at least includes Marcionites. 
2. That Marcion sees a radical separation between the scriptures of the Jews and 
the New Testament; i.e. that they come from different gods and do not interact 
any way other than antithetically. 
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3. That Marcion understands the god of the Jews to be a tyrannical judge in 
contrast to the welcoming superior god. 
The final point is particularly important to us because this is a topic upon which Justin 
expends a lot of time and energy. The precise nature of Marcion’s view of the god of 
the Jews as a judge are not straight forward. Winrich Löhr has recently challenged the 
received (Harnackian) wisdom on this and his views must be taken, albeit briefly, into 
account. The central issue here is that both Justin and Marcion agree that the god of the 
Jews is a judge, but disagree on how this is understood and the extent to which he can 
care for his creation whilst being a judge.
23
 For Justin, the one god, providence, justice 
and righteousness all go together in the only divine being. For Marcion, these 
characteristics are not virtues and his new divinity does not partake in them. The second 
issue, which is not isolated from the first, is scripture or prophecy. This concerns the 
demonstration of the character of the one true god and who Jesus is. These are the main 
spheres of engagement and they are by no means limited to the two chapters of 1A 
where Marcion is named, nor the appearance of Marcionites at Dial 35.6. These topics 
divide Justin and Marcion and dominate much of the discussion Justin’s 1A and Dial.24 
The task of the rest of this chapter then is to explicate, what we can know of Marcion’s 
views on these two issues. In particular, it considers his understanding of the cruel, 
judgemental, uncaring, god of the Jews, the relationship between his own higher god 
and Christ, and his approach to the Jewish scriptures as antithetical material to the 
testimony of his other god.  
2.1 Marcion’s dualism 
Although the earliest contemporary sources
25
 describe Marcion’s theology as dualistic, 
the precise nature of this dualism has come to be disputed.
26
 It had been generally 
accepted, following the testimony of Harnack, that Marcion distinguished between a 
just god (the god of the Jews) and a good god (his supreme non-creator god). Löhr’s 
engagement with the topic challenges this view. Specifically, Löhr believes that 
Marcion is more likely to have distinguished between a good god and an evil god rather 
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Moll takes Ptolemy’s Letter to Flora to identify and target a Marcionite position. The 
key quotation says: ‘For some say that it [the Law] was given by God the Father, while 
others turn the opposite way and insist that it was given by the adversary, the devil who 
causes perdition, just as they attribute to him the fashioning of the world, saying that he 
is the father and maker of the universe.’28 Moll notes that a reference to the justice of 
the creator is conspicuous by its absence; the creator is plainly identified as evil alone in 
terms of characterisation. More directly, Löhr brings forth explicit evidence for 
Marcion’s belief in the evil nature of the creator from Irenaeus: ‘He [Marcion] uttered 
the impudent blasphemy that the God who was proclaimed by the law and the prophets 
was the author of evil, and desirous of war.’29 In III 12.12 Irenaeus also calls him bad 
(malus) although in III 25.2 the picture is complicated somewhat by the ascription of the 
distinction between the good and the judge: ‘Again, in order that they might take away 
from the Father the power of reproving and of judging, thinking that it is unworthy of 
God, and believing they have found a god who is good and free from anger, they 
asserted that one god judges and the other saves.’30  This begins to sound again a little 
like the classic distinction between the just and the good god. 
III 25. 3 describes the former god mentioned above as judicial by saying there is one 
good god and one of the court (alterum bonum et alterum iudicalem dicens).
31
 Moll, 
however, points out that iudicalem not iustum is employed by Irenaeus here and that in 
Greek judge (kri,thj) and just (di,kaioj) are not etymologically related.32 Irenaeus could 
call this god a judge without implying he is a just or righteous judge. This description 
can mean more proscially that there is a good god and a lower god who handles legal 
matters without the dense moral overtones of righteousness. Judgement itself rather than 
judgement qualified by the adjective righteous or just, is the problem for Marcion that 
Irenaeus can be seen to describe. This is in fact exactly what Löhr thinks Irenaeus is 
trying to demonstrate: ‘A judge reprehends and shows anger- but not the true God. 
Marcion therefore allotted these characteristics of a judge to a different, lower god. If 
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Irenaeus is right, Marcion did not so much distinguish between a just god and a good 
god as rather between a god who is a severe and angry judge and a good god.’33So, 
rather than there being degrees or qualities of judgement, the concept itself is out of the 
question for Marcion when it comes to his supreme god; any god who practices 
judgement must be therefore a lower sort of god, and not the father of Jesus. As 
Harnack said ‘Marcion proclaimed with a splendid assurance that the loving will of 
Jesus (and, that is, of God) does not judge, but comes to our aid, and he intends that 
nothing else at all be said of him.’34  In Irenaeus, then, we do not find convincing 
evidence that Marcion distinguished between a good god and just god but rather an 
angry or bad judge and a good god. If Ptolemy is accepted as witness this is consistent 
with his view of Marcion having an evil god and a good god in mind.  
Tertullian ostensibly presents counter evidence that Marcion believed in a good and a 
just god when he appears to argue against interlocutors who confidently assert a good 
and a just god in book two of Adversus Marcionem, however Löhr argues that things are 
not as they seem here either. 
Löhr understands that Tertullian can be seen to have developed Irenaeus’ critique in 
which Marcion was mistaken in his view that judicial emotions in the creator god were 
unpalatable and so to be denied in the father of Jesus Christ.
35
 Adv. Marc I.25.2 is a key 
text here: ‘So our next subject of discussion rightly is whether a god is to be accounted 
such by virtue of goodness alone, to the exclusion of those other adjuncts, those feelings 
and affections, which the Marcionites deny to their god and attach to the Creator, but 
which we recognize in the Creator as no dishonour to God.’36Above Tertullian 
introduces the discussion about what is proper to god and what is not in contrast to 
Marcionites. As Löhr presents it however, what Tertullian does not deny is that justice 
is an attribute of god rather he denies that his god is not good in contrast to the 
Marcionite god. His main objection is to deny the attribution of cruel judgement to god: 
‘In II.11.1 Tertullian starts his argument by reminding his readers that for the 
Marcionites the creator is a severe and cruel judge. Tertullian first argues that the 
saevitia [severity] of the divine judge is something essentially secondary, a reaction to 
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the Fall. God is primarily the good and benevolent creator. Then, as a second step, 
Tertullian wishes to demonstrate that justice and goodness belong together. God the 
creator is good and just right from the beginning: ‘His goodness constructed the world, 
his justice regulated it…’. As a third step, Tertullian demonstrates that the justice and 
goodness of the one God do not only cooperate in creating the world but also in 
punishing evil men afterwards. Severity is not a problem for Tertullian then…If one 
analyses Tertullian’s argument more closely, it becomes quite clear that in this section 
of Book II he argues against a Marcionite position that wishes to distinguish the patient 
goodness of the highest god and father from the severity and cruelty of the second god, 
the creator, legislator and punishing judge. There is no indication whatsoever that 
Tertullian argues against a Marcionite distinction between a good god and a just god… 
Even if Marcion had indeed designated the god of the Old Testament as ‘just’, it would 
have been only an abbreviation for his being a severe and cruel judge, a petty-minded 
and self-contradictory legislator…Not merely an invention but a later development in 
the school.’37 
All this being the case, Moll sums up the most important aspect quite succinctly:  
‘For even although it must be doubted that Marcion ever thought of the God of the Old 
Testament as a just, he certainly saw him as a judge, and from what has been said 
about his role as Creator and Lawgiver so far, it can hardly be surprising that Marcion 
considered him to be a particularly cruel one. The Old Testament God created man as a 
compulsive transgressor, gave him the Law which was too feeble to obey, and now 
judges him for his transgressions. Obviously this God is playing a very cruel game with 
his subjects.’38  
Marcion saw the god of the Jews as cruel and against his people; as limited and 
petulant. This is a stark contrast to the position of Justin and those like him in the claims 
they are compelled to make from scripture about the universality of the creator god and 
agency of humankind. 
Still it is important that we have carefully established that it is likely that Marcion 
distinguished between a good god and a god who was an evil and angry judge because 
this governs how we read the spectre of Marcion in Justin’s texts. The old distinction 
(between a good god and a just god) would have drawn attention to those moments 
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where Justin calls god just, and seen these as indicative of a deliberate or necessary 
distinction from Marcion. Enrico Norelli makes a subtle argument that can preserve 
something of the former distinction between just and good, whilst at the same time 
acknowledging the evil nature of the creator god. Norelli does this by arguing that, for 
Marcion, the creator god is as much a victim of the law as his human subjects.
39
 He is 
angry but not primarily so. Primarily, he is a rational god locked in to a logic of 
transgression and repayment, necessitates formal justice. To Marcion, however, formal 
justice can been seen as nothing but injustice and injustice as nothing but evil:
40
  
‘It is not possible for evil to be repaid, without at the same time repaying this justice, 
moreover: one must eliminate all justice grounded on the repayment principle, for all 
who repay evil with evil cannot escape the devilish logic of evil. Therefore Marcion 
rejects justice and judgement by the good God. This God is not only fully indifferent to 
any violation of the law of the creator, he sets absolutely no new law at all.’41  
This creator god has created and perpetuates evil by giving a law, which himself cannot 
escape, that causes evil and suffering. Noting that Marcion saw the god of the Jews as 
the cause of evil and as involved in judgement means that instances where Justin argues 
contrary to this, especially to Trypho who should not need convincing that this is not so, 
there is potential to see Justin’s points as constitutive of a counter argument against 
Marcion concerning emerging where god’s mercy, providence and sovereignty even 
where Marcion is not directly under discussion in the text. Below, in chapter three 
chiefly, attention will be paid to the instances and overall flow of Justin’s claims for 
god’s goodness and judgement to assess the footprint of Marcion as an interlocutor. 
Before moving on, we must also consider Marcion’s distinctive perspective on the 
Jewish scriptures, because only then can we understand quite how much Justin’s use is 
contrary to Marcion’s. 
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2.2 Biblicism  
Marcion was a Biblicist. That is, his theology was informed by a very literal reading of 
the Old Testament texts.
42
 Consequently, Marcion is not considered a philosopher or 
systematic theologian, rather more of a ‘biblical theologian’, who took for granted what 
the text reported.
43
 In this regard, his attitude was uncritical and accepting.  Marcion did 
not employ allegory in his interpretations and was suspicious of those who did. His 
approach in this regard drew the attention of Tertullian, who criticises him for it.
44
 For 
the time, such a suspicion was very unusual, at least among Christians. That said, his 
contemporary and countryman
45
 Aquila, took a similar literal approach to the scriptures 
in his translation.
46
 If Marcion’s background were Jewish then a close relationship 
between the two might be relatively likely but the fact that the Marcion’s attitude, in 
seeing the god of the Jews as a cruel tyrant, casts doubt that he could have a close 
relationship to an otherwise orthodox Jewish exegete. Therefore, it seems unlikely that 
the views of one man shaped the views of the other.  Furthermore it does not seem to be 
the case that Marcion’s opponents objected as such to his literal methodology. Moll has 
pointed out that although Marcion was very literal in his interpretations, this only seems 
to cause conflict with regards to the messianic prophecies with reference to Christ who 
has come. Tertullian, when countering Marcion’s views on the creator, does not employ 
allegorical interpretation but argues that Marcion has misread what the text means in a 
simple sense. Neither does Justin argue allegorically for anything other than the 
messianic prophecies.
47
 The rest, including the creator’s character, he simply states in a 
way which is contrary to Marcion’s understanding without exegeting it. The balance of 
understanding about the character of the god of the Jews is different between Justin and 
Marcion but it is only with relevance to Christ’s relationship to this god that the former 
is allegorical and the later introduces a new antithetical tradition. 
It is important to note that Marcion does not reject or discredit the Old Testament as 
such. He does not assume or suggest interpolations or corruptions in the text but rather 
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regards it as a trustworthy historical account of and for the Jews.
48
 Indeed, far from 
rejecting it, the Old Testament is vital to Marcion’s theological position as the antithesis 
of his other, good, god. It is for him ‘the book of the less-worthy Jewish god.’49 Despite 
what past scholars have maintained, it is neither the Old Testament nor that Jewish 
people that are rejected, but rather their god. He takes scripture to be divinely inspired, 
accurate and authoritative and at the same time as irrelevant for Christians.
50
 This 
contrasts to his contemporary Pagan philosopher Celsus who considered the entire 
tradition to be an invention and saw Christians and Jews as foolish.  
The understanding Marcion had of the Old Testament is completely consistent with his 
theological position of two gods. Put simply, he believes the Old Testament to be a 
document, record and prophecy of and for the Jews. This is to be contrasted with the 
new covenant of Christ, which is from a different god and does not include the Jews. As 
Harnack has argued:  
‘Marcion wanted to free Christianity from the Old Testament, but the church preserved 
it. He did not forbid his followers to pick up the book but even recognized that it 
contained material that was useful for reading. But he saw in it a spirit different from 
that of the gospel, and he wanted nothing to do with two different spirits in religion.’51  
These spirits were so antithetical that one did not know the other; the prophets of the 
creator god did not and could not know and predict the Christ from Marcion’s god.52  It 
was essential to Marcion that the god of this covenant was completely unknown and 
hidden before Jesus appeared and revealed him.
53
 In fact, not only was this Jesus 
unknown in the world he, and his father the second god, was unknown to the creator 
god. Therefore, he was unable to prophecy about him in the scriptures of his people. In 
this way, Marcion did not believe the Old Testament to predict Jesus.
54
 Consequently, 
the Church for Marcion does not, and cannot, have any notion of being Israel or of 
being in relation to the god of the Jews, and cannot expect that the prophecy of the Old 
Testament to have anything to do with them or their Christ.  
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To recap Marcion believes: 
1. In a god who did not create the universe and who is superior to the Demiurge; 
2. That the god of the Jews is a cruel judge who toys with his own people; 
3. In a son of this superior god, who is not the Christ predicted by the prophets; 
4. That the Old Testament is accurate and complete for the Jews but that it does not 
concern Christians. 
Anything in Justin’s texts that denies any of these claims has the potential to be part of a 
project of differentiation and clarification concerning what is and is not Christian. Thus, 
when we find Justin’s heavy insistences that there is only one god, the creator, that the 
Church is Israel and that the prophets announce Jesus Christ Lord of all we have to ask 
the question whether this is likely to have a particular relation to Marcion. The thesis 
that follows will argue that instances such as these coalesce to suggest Justin has 
Marcion in mind throughout far more of his work than has previously been believed. 
Not that he is targeting or attaching Marcion as such but that he is trying to rule out 
positions that would count as Marcionite in the definition of what counts as Christian.  
Chapter 2: Who are the ‘Christians’? 
This chapter will demonstrate the provisional nature of Christian identity and argue that 
Justin attempts to usurp and correct the contemporary use of ‘Christian’ as a shame 
name employed by non-Christians:  
‘A Christian? What’s That? I can do no more than attempt to describe some 
phenomena; some of them may appeal to us, others may not. A quick glance at the early 
church, even if we break off very suddenly and very artificially in Theodosian times, will 
reveal that our question about ‘the Christian’ is a question about diversity… Let us 
confuse things still more: In addition to that kaleidoscope of perspectives – I do not call 
them objective perspectives because they are only internal to Christian historiography – 
there are further perspectives quite different from these internal ones. We can also meet 
a variety of external views, where the contemporaries of antiquity, whether they were 
Jews or so-called pagans, knew that certain individuals were Christians. I think they 
simply knew it from living in the same city or village, in the same street or insula-block. 
They knew it even though it did not normally interest them too much… Diversity 
prevails even if the nomen Christianum and the unitas ecclesiae are not unknown but 
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(as I would like to think) a common term for the surrounding world, at least if we follow 
the records of Roman administration and the fiction of Lucian.’55 
Although Wischmeyer ignores Justin and starts his study with Tertullian, this 
characterisation of the challenge of early Christianity is extremely pertinent to this 
study. Specifically, ‘what’ a Christian is, rather than simply who, (and by extension 
who are ‘Christians’) is of paramount importance to Justin beyond a superficial reading 
of him as an apologist for apologetics’ sake. Before one can know who counts as 
‘Christian’ one needs to know what a ‘Christian’ is. Even if the name Christian is 
known and used, which Justin’s presentation suggests it is,56 it is by no means clear that 
what a Christian is understood either by non-Christians or indeed by the claimants of 
the term themselves. This is Justin’s challenge: to make it known, definitively, what a 
Christian is and to demonstrate the true Christianity, which he believes comes from 
Christ, the apostles and the spirit of prophecy. The task of the historian and theologian 
is to reconstruct Justin’s questions, the motivations that led him to shape his account of 
what it is to follow Christ in the ways in which he did. As R.M. Grant has noted this 
cannot be done with giving due attention to the political and social struggles of the time. 
Justin’s, and other ancient texts, are not theological vacuums but the products of precise 





The political and social struggles of the time shape how and what Justin says. The social 
struggle is one of identity: Who the Christians are (or who is Christian) is one of the 
central questions of all of Justin’s texts. In particular, are they ‘Jews’,58 or are they 
something else? Boyarin has also drawn attention to the issue of self-definition as a 
central plank of the Dial with particular reference to ‘Jews’. However he has also noted 
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that many of arguments Justin deploys against ‘Jews’ and the identity claim can also be 
applied to heretics, as two sides of one coin, so a much wider debate about who the 
people of god are is discernible in the text.
59
  There is a political struggle that follows 
from this. If they are ‘Jews’ then they are due a certain tolerance. However ‘Jews’ were 
particularly unpopular with the Roman rulers following the latest revolt lead by Simon 
Bar Kokhba, so very close association with the ‘Jewish’ body politic may not have been 
desirable. This is a multi-dimensional question. The argument of this chapter will be 
that ‘Christian’ identity has no fixed form in Justin’s period and that this is one of the 
key issues that motivates and drives his addresses to non-‘Christians’. This involves the 
origins of ‘Christians’ and their relationship to ‘Judaism’. As Buell has argued, the 
distinction between these two groups was by no means obvious in this period and 
identity is always negotiable and open to revision according to particular needs:  
‘The complex dynamism within and overlap between Christianness and Jewishness in 
Justin’s rhetoric make sense if we think of the mid-second century as a time when these 
identities are neither uniform nor wholly distinct. Justin is staking out a distinct domain 
and meaning for Christianness when these are murky and contested.’60  
 
Staking a claim for ‘Christian’ identity is indeed exactly what Justin is doing, but not 
only in relation to ‘Jews’. His claims concern the wider Graeco-Roman population also. 
The political implications of being ‘Jewish’ or not, or being some other group in 
categories recognisable to Graeco-Romans or not, were great. How one presented 
oneself and was understood could mean the difference between life and death.  
Presentation of identity is a subtle art, and one at which Justin was a master. Indeed, it 
was not just ‘Jews’ and ‘Christians’ who were engaged in deliberate, and unavoidable, 
self-presentation, Greeks and Romans were just as invested in this phenomenon: 
 
‘Most identifiable perceptions of ethnicity were not passive, erudite, or antiquarian but 
self-aware and aimed at being meaningful and convincing. In attempting a response to 
the question “Who is a Greek” [most ancient writers] would play with acceptable 
conventions, choosing to emphasize particular aspects or even invent new ones. Greek 
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ethnicity appears to have been something that was always both traditional and 
negotiable.’61   
 
Similar can be said of Romans, Egyptians, Lydians and Aphrodisians: each has to 
‘invent’ themselves, or give an account of themselves, that reflects and creates, how 
they see themselves. Justin is presenting an account of what a ‘Christian’ is but his 
account is not the only one. Consequently, he has to do so in such a way that is most 
credible to his audience and that undermines the credibility of alternative visions, 
particularly that of Marcion. That there are disputed claimants to Christ is the root of all 
the problems Justin is trying to address.  
A central claim of this thesis is that the term ‘Christian’ is not an obvious marker of 
identity as we would take it to be in modern times, or as it became at least as early as 
the legalisation of ‘Christianity’. K.H. Rengstorf in the New International Dictionary of 
New Testament Theology characterises the term thus: 
‘The identification of the messiah with Jesus of Nazareth brought the disciples the name 
Christianoi. Compared with other names for the followers of Jesus, like disciple or 
believer, the word is quite rare in the NT. By its whole formation it is a word which 
defines the one to whom it is applied as belonging to the party of a certain Christos, 
very much as Herodianos is a technical term for the followers of Herod (Mk 3:6; 12:13; 
Matt 22:16). Its use also presupposes that for the Greek environment of developing 
Christianity Christos had taken on the meaning of a proper name, a process which 
would have been facilitated by the resemblance to the name of Chrestos, pronounced 
Christos. According to Acts 11:26, Christianos was first used for Christians in Syrian 
Antioch. This passage, like the two others in which the word occurs in the NT (Acts 
26:28; 1 Pet 4:16), leads us to suppose that, being applied to Christians by outsiders, it 
contained an element of ridicule and that in this it did not differ from the description 
Nazarenos or Nazoraios. Like it and like many other names formed in the same way, it 
soon clearly became a name which those called by it felt honoured to bear.’62 
This definition, short as it necessarily is for its context, matches to some extent what we 
will find in Justin.
63
 In agreement with Rengstorf, I argue that for Justin, the term 
‘Christian’ (Cristiao,j) functions very much like ‘Herodian’ and that this is indeed the 
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beginning of bearing this name as an honour. Beyond this, I argue and that Justin has 
very particular motivations, both theological and political, for doing so.  
The NT usage is, as Rengstorf states, extremely rare (two mentions coming from the 
same book) and should not be taken as representative of the experience of ‘Christians’ 
everywhere within the empire. I agree that it functions as a term of ridicule primarily 
employed by outsiders. I will show that both Justin’s texts and external Roman sources 
support this view and suggest that it has become, or is becoming more, widely known 
and used.  
The crucial difference which Rengstorf’s definition doesn’t get to is that, unlike the 
Jesuits, there are contestable claims. There were not more or less loosely connected 
groups of Jesuits with different understandings of Ignatius Loyola’s vision. The 
application of the term Jesuit, albeit as reproach, was to a clearly identifiable and self-
organised society. ‘Christians’ in Justin’s period have yet to fully become such an 
organisation and the adoption of the term, transitioning from pejorative to honorific, is 
part of this slow and contested transformation.
64
 That is, Justin is staking a claim for the 
identity of followers of Christ, staking a claim against alternative positions (of which 
Marcion’s is the most significant for Justin’s purposes), and taking this term along with 
it. Sebastian Moll has said: ‘His [Justin’s] mission is to clear the Christian name.’65 One 
of the implications of this thesis is that the apologetics in this period need to be thought 
of as an attempt to create clarity and definition as much as, and probably more so than, 
defence and presentation of a defined faith.
66
  
The ‘Christian’ name that Justin is trying to clear is first and foremost the name of 
Jesus, the Christ, and only by extension is it the title of those who follow him. It is only 
becoming a proper title internally and many who claim to follow Jesus and are 
considered ‘Christians’, (not by Justin but by Romans and probably ‘Jews’, and some 
other ‘Christians’) abuse the name of Christ by their association with it. Buell points out 
that ‘other texts studied as early Christian do not use the name “Christian”, however, 
opting instead for other collective terms of self-identification (for example, the elect, 
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Hebrews, etc.). This is worth noting since it suggests that the importance of the name 
“Christian” does not apply to every individual or group in the second and third 
centuries that might now be classified by scholars as “early Christian”.67 Justin is right 
in the middle of this diversity of purpose and understanding. We shall see that Justin 
uses the term ‘Christian’ in different ways at different points in his argument. We shall 
see examples of Justin speaking of ‘us’ ‘Christians’ (Dial 78.10; 110.2) where he is 
claiming the identity in order to define it, but we shall also see that he often prefers to 
talk about Christ directly and of those taught by him or who follow his teaching. 
Furthermore, often Justin’s use seems to reflect a pejorative label used by outsiders 
(such as Romans) or potential insiders who do not wish to be associated with this group 
(such as other ‘Jews’). In this way, a comparison can be made with the name Jesuit, an 
anglicized version of the latin Jesuita, which originated as a pejorative term for 
members of the Society of Jesus and later came to be adopted by those members as a 
term that makes sense apart from the derogatory overtones.
68
 Peter Tomson’s work on 
the development of the term the term ‘Jew’ (Ioudaioj) in the Graeco-Roman period is 
also instructive here. He sees it is a designation belonging primarily to non-‘Jews’.69  
He qualifies this saying:  
‘In every language, albeit to varying degrees, particular speech forms are used when 
addressing persons of either sex, of a specific age or of other social distinction. Speech 
differs according to the relative social status of speaker and listener. More specifically: 
such speech differentiation signals social identity. Naturally, group names such as 
ethnic appellations are strong signifiers of social identity. Speaking in these terms, 'Jew' 
and 'Israel' signal different social identities: an 'outside' identity as a Jew in regard to 
the ancient world of nations, or alternatively, an 'inside' identity as one belonging to the 
'people of Israel'…An even closer parallel [than the distinction between ‘Dutch’ and 
‘Hollander’ and similar] is found in the Gypsies. While their 'outside' appellations are 
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Gypsy, Bohemien, Gitano or Zigeuner, they call themselves Rom, and their 'inside' 
language Romany.’70 
For Tomson, the term ‘Israel’, as an internal designation, is to be contrasted with ‘Jew’:  
the two names have distinct social functions. A ‘Jewish’ speaker refers to 'Jews' in 
speech addressing or quoting non-‘Jews’, but when communicating with fellow-‘Jews’ 
calls them 'Israel'. It will be argued below that this is precisely what Justin is doing 
when he uses the term ‘Israel’ to refer to ‘Christians’ rather than to the ethnically 
uniform claimants to the title whom he calls ‘Jews’.71 Tomson argues that this 
distinction is well established and observable across all three of the major languages 
spoken by ‘Jews’ in the Graeco-Roman period and is thus not just a geo-linguistic 
variant.
72
 In the context of an argument for the anachronistic nature of the scholarly 
term ‘Christian Judaism’, Boyarin suggests something similar when he says ‘non- 
Christian Jews rarely (at best) called themselves Ioudaioi, and … Christian Jews 
seemed to have used the term for someone other than themselves.’73 When Boyarin says 
‘rarely’ he seems to mean only that, whereas Tomson goes further citing numerous 
examples of the term ‘Jew’ as a term which projects an external objectivity onto the 
community across five categories in the Graeco-Roman period, including influential 
figures close in time to Justin, for example in Philo and Josephus.
74
 Margaret Williams, 
however, has argued that Tomson overstates the case because counter examples can be 
found. Nonetheless, she recognises that Tomson has identified one of the legitimate 
‘range of connotations’ of a term not easily defined in the period.75 Something similar 
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can be said of ‘Christian’  in Justin’s time: He does use the name in a way that suggest 
internal ‘Christian’ identification but also in ways which suggest that it is a term whose 
meaning is supplied by outsiders and is primarily general and pejorative. Tacitus, in his 
report on Nero’s fire (Annals XV.44.4), identifies ‘Christians’ as ‘called Christians by 
the populace’ (vulgus Christianos appellabat) rather than as ‘Christians’ so the 
emphasis is on external application of the title.
76
 Furthermore, we shall see, that this 
pejorative usage frequently lacks any specific content concerning the practices and 
beliefs of these so-called ‘Christians’; that it can function as a criminal charge apart 
from any seemingly obvious criminal content is a scandalous facet of the messy identity 
confusion that Justin is trying to address. Buell, using the example of a contemporary of 
Justin engaged in a similar struggle in another part of the Empire, clearly and succinctly 
summarises the issues:  
‘Athenagoras and other apologists give the appearance that accusations using the name 
“Christian” are scandalous and not sparked by anything but the name. Yet even if 
Christians might have been called to public attention for illegal deeds rather than by 
(or for) their name alone, Athenagoras and many other early Christian writers seek to 
gain recognition and rights as “Christians”; that is, the name is actually central to 
their aims.’77 
Regardless of how the name, and themselves, come to be known, the task is, as Lieu 
says, to ‘reject the power of others to determine the meaning of the name.’78 Justin, and 
other like him such as Aristides, Athenagoras and Theophilus of Antioch, mean to take 
control of this name in order to redefine it with changing its meaning entirely.
79
 The aim 
is to gain rights and recognition: aims which can only be achieved where their identity 
can be seen to function, within tolerable limits, with coherent practices and beliefs. This 
is beginning of the formal recognition of heresy and orthodoxy, where what really 
counts as genuinely ‘Christian’ is being claimed and tested. Before moving the 
discussion on another important proviso is required. Having already noted that ‘Jew’ 
(VIoudai,oij) is a complicated and loaded term when focusing on late antiquity, it is 
important to mark how Justin uses this term and how we shall employ it.  
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In the Dial Justin seldom uses the term at all. It occurs only six times in the space of 
three chapters.
80
 This is perhaps because in the Dial Justin is articulating an internal 
debate and wishes to promote the idea that he is not discussing a group completely 
separate from his own. His argument in the Dial centres on the common project of the 
Hebrews and the ‘Christians’ and so Israel (VIsrah,l) is the preferred (and the more 
scriptural) term. Though Justin is highly critical of the customs practiced by ‘Jews’ and 
their lack of recognition of Jesus, in his eyes the responsibility for these faults usually 
rests at the feet of their teachers, who form a category that we shall see is very 
important for Justin.
81
 In this way, ‘Jews’ are understood as erring brethren under the 
influence of the wrong teachers rather than a separate people, religion or ethnicity.  
 
In 1A Justin refers to ‘Jews’ in a more external fashion with far greater frequency than 
he does in the Dial.
82
 In 1A Justin is, ostensibly at least, addressing Graeco-Roman 
pagans. As Tomson noted, ‘Jew’ is in many ways their term, so Justin’s use of it reflects 
whom he is speaking to and their understanding of whom he speaks about. Furthermore, 
perhaps because of this Justin mainly avoids the term in Dial where he is address a 
‘Jew’ because his primary target in that text is the teachers the teachers who pull the 
strings and control what ‘Judaism’ is and who constitutes it rather than ordinary ‘Jews’ 
like Trypho.
83
 In this regard, Horner goes as far to say that Justin views the ‘Jewish’ 
people as victims rather than as his main competition and, though this is not always 
obvious in the text, it does appear to be the general pattern.
84
 Therefore, in 1A it is more 
than possible that the frequent naming and criticising of ‘Jews’ functions in the same 
way as the treatment of the teachers in the Dial; namely, at the level of summary for 
outsiders.  
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An important feature of Justin’s claiming of ‘Christian’ identity is the story he tells of 
its misrepresentation and persecution. This, as Justin describes it, proceeds in stages. In 
the first stage is persecution at the hands of the/fellow ‘Jews’ in which ‘Christians’ 
come to be labelled as different. Often this is connected with the Bar Kokhba revolt but 
this is not always explicit. The second step, as we shall see in the Graeco-Roman 
treatment of ‘Christians’, is that by virtue of this process, this identity has become more 
widely known and, because of the political threat it might pose to ‘Judaism’s’ already 
fragile position in the aftermath of the Bar Kokhba revolt, opposed by the ‘Jewish’ 
teachers beyond the time of Bar Kokhba. The third step is that ‘Christians’ like Justin 
adopting this identity as their own and beginning to understand themselves as a new 
genos, leading them to take control of this identity and attempt to define and police it – 
with similar intentions to the ‘Jewish’ treatment of themselves. This first section (1 -
1.4) will deal with the persecution by ‘Jew’s and the other two points will be taken in 
turn thereafter in the sections which follow. 
Justin presents the persecution of ‘Christians’ by ‘Jews’ first and foremost as a 
misrepresentation, a recasting, of who ‘Christians’ are. In Dial, ‘Christians’ are a class 
of people hated by the ‘Jews’ (e.g. Trypho’s teachers).85 These people have singled 
‘Christians’ out and publicised their opinions about them. In doing so they have 
attempted to define ‘Christians’ in pejorative terms. The significance of this 
presentation is that it suggests a close relationship between ‘Jews’ and ‘Christians’ at 
this time that non-‘Christian’ ‘Jews’ wish to end or distinguish themselves from. Dial 
17.1-2 offers us an introduction to this theme: 
 “The other nations have not inflicted on us and on Christ injustice to such an extent as 
you have, who in very deed are the instigators of the evil prejudice against the Just One, 
and us who hold by Him. After that you had crucified Him, the only blameless and 
righteous Man, – through whose wounds those who approach the Father through Him 
are healed, and when you understood that He had risen from the dead and ascended to 
heaven, as the prophets foretold He would, you not only did not repent of the evilness, 
but you selected and sent out from Jerusalem to all lands, certain men to tell that the 
godless heresy of the Christians had sprung up, and to publish those things which all 
they who do not know us say against us. So that you cause not only of your own 
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unrighteousness, but in fact of that of all others. And Isaiah cries justly: 'By reason of 
you, My name is blasphemed among the Gentiles.'
86
 
We should note straight away that Justin does not say that other nations have not 
inflicted as much on ‘Christians’, but rather that they have not inflicted as much ‘on us 
and Christ’. Justin does not use the term ‘Christian’ (Cristianw/n) here but refers to the 
person of Christ and his own group. The first time the word ‘Christian’ appears in the 
Dial it is present in reported speech from the mouths of non-‘Christians’ where it is 
paired with the word heresy (ai[resin) and used in propaganda against followers of 
Christ, The very first time the word ‘Christian’ appears it is therefore to be understood 
as the shame name attributed to followers of Christ by a group of people external to, or 
who rather wish to be considered as external to, that group.  The term ‘Christian’ is not 
a given here, nor is the group identity. Instead, the term is a pointer, synonymous with 
shame and depravity, and it is Justin’s task to capture and redefine it. This will be our 
main thesis for the present chapter. First though it is necessary to consider more closely 
the content of Justin’s claims that ‘Jews’, more than other nations, are shaming 
followers of Christ and are the originators of this prejudice. 
‘Christians’ here are introduced as a ‘godless heresy’. Bearing in mind that heresy can 
mean just school or opinion at this time, having not yet taken on its later formal 
meaning, it is the term ‘godlessness’ (a]qeoj) that is truly the operative word.87 The 
god(s) that one worships, and the manner in which one worships, are fundamental 
factors affecting one’s standing at this time. As godlessness would certainly limit their 
authentic ‘Jewishness’, portraying ‘Christians’ as a ‘godless heresy’ has to be taken as 
casting them as ‘non-Jewish’.88 ‘Christians’ must have been difficult to distinguish from 
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‘Jews’ (if it occurred to one to try do so), but, according to Justin, ‘Jews’ embarked on 
their clarification mission to achieve just this by casting the ones they called 
‘Christians’ as atheists.  
 
Boyarin has convincingly built on Le Boulluec’s classic monograph to argue that the 
nascent nature of heresy is not only emerging at this time, but is being created 
dialectically by ‘Christians’ and ‘Jews’ ruling each other in and out and forming new 
standards of belonging in the process. Boyarin’s thesis is not that these two groups 
witness to one another’s existence, but rather that, in the course of their conversation, 
they invent one another. They are not two religions,
89
 or obvious diametric poles of one, 
but differing strands, wide and varied, with different points of overlap in different 
places. Rhetorical recastings and claims for identity become rarefied and separate 
bodies form. This is a process that he sees as beginning in approximately the mid 
second century.
90
 Nina E. Livesey has put this even more starkly by saying:  
 
‘What we see in the Dialogue, then, is not just the beginning of orthodoxy and heresy—
a theological enterprise that determines who is in and who is out—but also the advent 
of understanding Jews and Christians as split selves, as theological beings in 
distinction from social ones.’91  
 
The relationship between ‘Christians’ and ‘Jews’ at this time is very much a 
complicated and socially negotiated one. There is much evidence that ‘Christians’ and 
‘Jews’ have a lot to do with one another for a long time to come after Justin, with many 
‘Christian’ texts preserving fears about interaction and confusion of the groups.92 But 
even this evidence can be construed in overly deterministic ways. As Andrew Jacobs 
has argued, it is important we avoid insouciant claims for boundaries and difference. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
one Jesus, a Galilaean deceiver’ (wj` proei/pon( a;ndraj ceirotonh,santej evklektou.j eivj pa/san th.n 
oivkoume,nhn evpe,myate( khru,ssontaj o[ti ai[resi,j tij a;qeoj kai. a;nomoj evxh,gertai avpo. VIhsou/ 
tinoj Galilai,ou pla,nou)) 
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Getting away from assumptions about boundaries means recognising their provisional 
and rhetorically negotiated nature:  
 
‘The textualization of religious difference may lie not in logical resolution, but in 
dialogical irresolution: the problems of difference (and similarity) are not resolved, but 
rather enacted, creating the sense of a boundary (between speaker and interlocutor) 
without finite closure.’93   
This is to say that not only ‘heresy’, but ‘Christianity’ and ‘Judaism’ are coming into 
existence in this period, and coming into existence by mutual and multifaceted 
exclusion. Indeed, it is not until a number of centuries later that it becomes possible 
firmly to identify a ‘Christianity’ which is uniformly not ‘Jewish’ or a ‘Judaism’ which 
hierarchically excludes all ‘Christians’ from its orthodoxy. Many voices, agreeing and 
differing, at different points and places, but not different sides make this distinction over 
time. Justin is part of this process, of which his interaction with Marcion is an 
exemplary element as well as his explicit debate with Trypho.   
 
Justin reiterates the point that the ‘Jews’ are the cause of ‘Christians’ being maligned at 
Dial 108.2: 
‘As I stated, you chose certain men by vote and sent them throughout the whole civilized 
world, proclaiming that a godless and lawless sect has been started by a deceiver, one 
Jesus of Galilee, whom we nailed to the cross, but whose body, after it was taken down 
from the cross, was stolen at night from the tomb by his disciples, who now try to 
deceive men by affirming that he has arisen from the dead and has ascended into 
heaven. And you accuse him of having taught those irreverent, riotous, and wicked 
things, of which you everywhere accuse all those who look up to and acknowledge him 
as their Christ, their Teacher, and Son of God.’94  
Here the ‘Jews’ have sent certain men, appointed for a task and that is the sense here. 
This was a particular and specially planned mission, not just a knee-jerk reaction. Here 
the ‘Jews’ are displayed as taking full responsibility for the death of Jesus, ‘whom we 
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 Kai. ouv mo,non ouv metenoh,sate( maqo,ntej auvto.n avnasta,nta evk nekrw/n( avllV( w`j proei/pon( a;ndraj 
ceirotonhs,antej evklektou.j eivj pa/san th.n oivkoume,nhn evpe,myate( khru,ssontaj o]ti ai]resij tij a;qeoj kai. 
a;nomoj evxh,gertai avpo. VIhsou/ tinoj Galilai,ou pla,nou( o[n staurwsa,ntwn h`mw/n( oi` maqhtai. auvtou/ 
kle,yantej auvto.n avpo. tou/ mnh,matoj nukto,j( o,po,qen katete,qh avfhlwqei.j avpo. tou/ staurou/( planw/si tou.j 
avnqrw,pouj le,gontej evxhge,rqai auvto.n evk nekrw/n kai. eivj ouvrano.n avnelhluqe,nai kateipo,ntej dedidace,nai 
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avnqrw,pwn a;qea kai. a;noma kai. avno,sia le,gete) 
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crucified’ and as countering the claims of Jesus’ followers and slandering Jesus himself 
in order to cut them off from ‘Jewishness’. Atheism, deception,95 and lawlessness are on 
the agenda. All of these are socially and politically sensitive charges: To move 
somebody from being ‘Jewish’ to being an atheist is pushing the person outside the 
legal realm, set by the Romans for ‘Jews’, and to oppose Roman society; deception 
suggests hidden agendas and threatening behaviour; and lawlessness intimates apostasy 
from ‘Judaism’, and rebellion towards Romans.  
1.1 Bar Kokhba 
1A 31.5-6 further develops our understanding of the manner in which, for Justin, the 
‘Jews’ distinguish between themselves and the followers of Christ by demonising them. 
For Justin ‘Christians’ are to be understood as abiding by the prophets whilst the ‘Jews’ 
kill them (as they killed the prophets of old)
 
: 
And after this [the legend of the origins of the Septuagint] the rolls remained among the 
Egyptians until now, and are also present everywhere to all the Jews, who, even though 
they read them, do not understand what has been said, but consider us to be enemies 
and adversaries. And, like you, they destroy and punish us whenever they are able, as 
you are able to learn. For even in the recent Jewish war, Bar Kokhba, the leader of the 
rebellion of the Jews, ordered only Christians to be led away to fearsome torments, if 
they would not deny Jesus as the Christ and blaspheme him.
96
 
Why did Bar Kokhba target only ‘Christians’ and force them to deny and blaspheme 
Jesus as Messiah? This may have been because he himself was seen either by himself or 
at least by some as a Messiah-figure. The title ‘Christians’, here again is used by Justin, 
in order to make ‘Jews’ (here Bar Kokhba) distinguish followers of Christ from 
themselves. According to him, Bar Kokhba had separated these ‘Christians’ who did not 
deny Jesus as the Christ and did not blaspheme him from the body of ‘Jewish’ people, a 
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 In chapter four we will note that those who deceive (evxapath,swsin) are usually connected with the 
work of the demons, as Simon, Menader and Marcion are in 1A, and that Justin’s demonology is of 
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 kai. tou,tou genome,nou e;,meinan ai` bi,bloi kai. parV Aivgupti,oij me,cri tou. deu/ro( kai. pantacou/ para. 
pa/si,n eivsin VIoudai,oij( oi] kai. avnaginw,skontej ouv sunia/si ta. eirvhme,na( avllV evcqrou.j h`ma/j kai. 
polemi,ouj h`gou/ntai( o`moi,wj u`mi/n avnairou/ntej kai. kola,zontej h`ma/j o`po,tan du,nwntai( w`j kai. peisqh/nai 
du,nasqe) kai. ga.r evn tw/| nu/n gegenhme,nw| ivoudai?kw/| pole,mw|( Barcwce,baj( o` th/j VIoudai,wn avposta,sewj 
avrchge,thj( Cristianou.j mo,nouj eivj timwri,aj deina.j eiv mh. avrnoi.nto VIhsou/n to.n Cristo.n kai. 
Blasfhmoi/en evke,leuen avpa,gesqai) 
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claim that is supported by Eusebius.
97
 It is interesting that this claim is occurs only in 
1A. The war or its affects are alluded six times in the Dial and three times in 1A,
98
 but 
this is the only point at which Justin suggests any strong or direct link between the 
campaign of Bar Kokhba and the slander of those who follow Christ. This singling out 
strongly suggests that ‘Christians’ at this time were sufficiently part of ‘Jewish’ society 
in Palestine such that they could be meaningfully targeted and separated from it by Bar 
Kokhba. Singling out ‘Christians’ in this way identifies them as disloyal and not truly 
belonging. As Justin does not seem to fabricating this account the plausibility of such a 
development must be investigated. 
Peter Schäfer notes that ‘Shirkers’ are recorded in the letter from Bar Kokhba to 
Yehonatan Bar Ba’ayan and Masabala Bar Shimon, military commanders at Ein Gedi, 
found in the Judean desert.
99
 These are the men of Tekoa. Punishment for these and any 
harbouring them is severe.
100
 We see here that the rebels were more than prepared to 
enforce their authority on the ‘Jewish’ people and make examples of them. Schäfer puts 
the coarse tone of much the Bar Kokhba letters down to his character and the 
increasingly desperate situation towards the end of the revolt. Bar Kokhba was 
presumably not successful in asserting his authority if such letters were necessary.
101
  
This further suggests that not all ‘Jews’ were supporters of Bar Kokhba and those who 
did not ally themselves with the war effort could expect to be attacked. We know then 
that Justin’s comment has the air of plausibility even if this singling out was not 
necessarily exclusively reserved for ‘Christians’, and even then only those who 
maintained their allegiance to Jesus as Christ. This restriction is perhaps the reason why 
Justin reserves this claim for 1A rather than presenting it in the Dial since in the latter he 
speaks about Trypho and ‘Jews’ who were certainly not singled out  by Bar Kokhba, but 
still might have known the situation and known that ‘Christians’ did not necessarily 
suffer alone. 
Further evidence of that Bar Kokhba singled out ‘Christians’ can be found in Richard 
Bauckham’s reading of the Apocalypse of Peter as an early ‘Jewish’ Christian text 
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contemporary with the second revolt that warns Christians to avoid the false messiah.
102
 
As he claims many scholars agree, Bauckham takes this ‘false messiah’ to be Bar 
Kokhba, which again displays persecution of Christians.
103
 Justin does not tell us why 
Bar Kokhba singled ‘Christians’ out during the revolt. He is, however, clear that this 
happens during the revolt. This suggests that resources would have been diverted away 
from fighting the true enemy in order to target ‘Christians’, and that there must, 
therefore, have been a compelling reason for doing so. Bauckham posits such a reason 
by holding that the aim of rebuilding the temple was not shared by ‘Jewish’ ‘Christians’ 
who understood Jesus to be the spiritual and final temple. This comes out in the 
narrative of Peter declaring who Jesus is.
104
 This being the case, ‘Christians’ may be 
denying the messianic ambitions of the regime – the extent to which this existed as an 
explicit mythos is unclear
105
 – but also standing in opposition to an imminent and 
nationally important practical agenda which causes ‘Christians’ to become 
conscientious objectors and vulnerable to attack as disloyal and cowardly. Furthermore, 
Cassius Dio’s testimony that ‘many outside nations, too, were joining them [the ‘Jews’] 
through eagerness for gain’ only sharpens the contrast between loyal participant and 
disloyal non-conformist.
106
 For Hannah Cotton, this explains the supposed Nabataean 
involvement suggested by P.Yadin 52.
 107 
Cotton believes that the revolt may have 
spread into other regions, such as Syria and Arabia, and been successfully put down 
there earlier.
108
 Further, she argues that the Nabataeans involved may have been 
refugees from the revolutionaries’ activities in neighbouring provinces.109 If this were 
so, and if ‘Christians’ really abstained from the revolt, then ‘Christians’ would have 
looked strikingly aloof at a time when even non-‘Jews’ were prepared to join in to 
challenge the Romans and the evidence suggests that Bar Kokhba did not look kindly 
on those who did not follow the party line. This being the case it seems that we must 
take Justin seriously in this claim that ‘Christian’ persecution by ‘Jews’ was rooted in 
the Bar Kokhba war. 
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Though Justin does not assert that ‘Christians’ were singled out by Bar Kokhba in the 
Dial he does repeat the claim that Bar Kokhba suppressed them in Dial 9.1,3: 
‘If you will agree to hear our account of him, how we have not been deceived by false 
teachings, and how we shall not cease to profess our faith in him (even though men 
thereby persecute us, and the most cruel tyrant tries to force us to deny him)…Two of 
his friends, joking and making fun of our earnestness, went their way. When we came to 
that part of the stadium where there were stones seats on both sides, Trypho’s other 
companions went to sit on the one side after one of them had made a remark about the 
war wages in Judea, they spoke of it.’110 This passages features at the conclusion of 
Justin’s long account of his conversion just after the point that Trypho and his followers 
have discovered that he is a follower of Christ. At this point Trypho’s friends become 
indignant and laugh at Justin and cast a seemingly throw away and incongruous 
comment about the Bar Kokhba revolt, after he had spoken of a ‘terrible tyrant’ who 
compelled them to deny (o` deino,tatoj avpiopei/n avnagka,zh| tu,rannoj|) Jesus. As this 
description is  close to what we have read before in 1A 31.6 where Bar Kokhba used 
fearsome torments to attempt to force ‘Christians’ to deny Christ it seems Justin is 
mined of Bar Kokhba here also. This sense is increased by the fact that the war is 
mentioned in the same passage. Why do the friends make this comment? This is hard to 
establish. What it does suggest, though, is that the link between the revolt and 
‘Christians’ seems to reflect fresh and real experience.111  
Justin’s speech immediately following this gives us a further clue as to meaning of this 
comment: 
‘My friends, is there any accusation you have against us other than this, that we do not 
observe the Law, nor circumcise the flesh as your forefathers did, nor observe the 
Sabbath as you do? Or do you condemn our customs and morals?’112 (Dial 10.1)  
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 Eiv de. bou,loio tou,tou pe,ri de,xasqai lo,gon( w`j ouv peplanh,meqa ouvde. pauso,meqa om`ologou/ntej 
tou/ton( ka;n ta. evx avnqrw,pwn h`mi/n evpife,rwntai ovnei,dh( ka;n o` deino,tatoj avpeipei/n avnagka,zh| 
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 Mh. a;llo ti, evstin o] evpime,mfesqe h`ma/j( a;ndrej fi,loi( h; tou/to o[ti ouv kata. to.n no,mon biou/men( ouvde 
o`moi,wj toi/j progo,noij u`mw/n peritemno,meqa th.n sa,rka( ouvde w`j u`mei/j sabbati,zomen ;  ;H kai. o` bi,oj 
h`mw/n kai. to. h=qoj diabe,blhtai parV u`mi/n *  
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The reply comes back in the negative. There is no suspicion of corruption from Trypho 
but only incredulity at Justin’s claim to be one of god’s children and yet not to keep his 
commandments. Justin’s ‘Jewish’ ‘friends’ are not necessarily questioning his non-
‘Jewishness’ here, but the non-‘Jewish’ behaviour of people who they supposed were 
bound by or ought to be bound to the same standards and practices as they themselves 
were. That is, it is possible then they see themselves as talking to fellow ‘Jews’ who had 
been persecuted as ‘Christian’ by Bar Kokhba. That this is what they were supposing 
makes good sense in light of Trypho’s demand that ‘Christians’ should follow the law 
and be circumcised. Nonetheless, Trypho is aware of their claim to follow their own 
god, and he is also familiar with their alternative commandments, which suggests both, 
close proximity, but also a form of distinction. A further point of connection and 
simultaneous distinction comes at Trypho’s friends remark about the war as they depart. 
Though it is only conjecture that Trypho’s friends snigger at ‘Christian’ non-
participation in the war, it is clear that the war is an issue between ‘Jews’ and followers 
of Christ or else it would be strange that Justin chose to record this detail. This furthers 
suggests close links between ‘Christians’ and ‘Jews’, and provides plausible credibility 
to Justin’s claims for the singling out of ‘Christians’ by ‘Jews’. 
Further evidence, as far as Justin is concerned, of the singling out of ‘Christians’ can be 
found in Dial 110.5-6: 
‘For the words, her that is afflicted and cast out (that is, from the world), indicate that, 
whenever you and all other men have the power, you cast out every Christian, not only 
from his own property but even from the whole world, for you allow no Christian live. 
You object that this same fate has befallen your people. But since you have been cast 
out after defeat in battle, such sufferings are your just desserts, as all the Scriptures 
testify. We, on the contrary, who are guilty of no such crime after we knew the divine 
truth, are assured by God that we are to be taken from the earth together with the most 
just and immaculate and sinless Christ.’113 
In this example, those who follow Christ are being signalled out and forcibly separated 
from their own property and their ‘whole world’. Here we have an explicit claim that 
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 Th.n ga.r evkteqlimme,nhn kai. evxwsme,nhn( toute,stin avpo. tou/ ko,smou( o]son evfV u`mi/n kai. toi/j a;lloij 
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grafai. pa/sai marturou/sin \ h`mei/j de,( ouvde.n toiou/ton pra,xantej meta. to. evpignw/nai th.n avlh,qeian tou/ 
qeou/( marturou,meqa u`po. tou/ qeou/( su.n tw/| dikaiota,tw| kai. mo,nw| avspi,lw| kai. avnamarth,tw| Cristw| o[ti 
avpo. gh/j ai,ro,meqa) 
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‘Christians’ are not permitted to live which can be seen as an extension of the killing of 
the righteous Christ, spotless and sinless, it seems as if ‘Jews’ are seen as the 
perpetrators of such killing. With the proviso that Justin has a rhetorical axe to grind 
when it comes to the position of ‘Jews’ as a rebellious people who persecute their 
prophets and the followers of Christ as heirs to that prophetic tradition through Christ, it 
seems that Justin believes he is accurately reporting the singling out of followers of 
Christ by Jews. However the claim that the same ‘has befallen’ Trypho’s ‘own nation’ 
complicates the matter. This being the case, it must be either that Bar Kokhba also 
attacked and killed ‘Jews’ other than ‘Christians’ or that this is referred to the Romans 
driving the ‘Jews’ out of Jerusalem after the revolt. This is confirmed by Justin’s claim 
that the suffering upon Trypho’s kind is the just and legitimate result of defeat ‘in 
battle’ but that ‘Christians’, having taken no part in such evil acts, have suffered them 
unjustly. Justin then is claiming that the main thrust of persecution towards ‘Christians’ 
has come, at least primarily, from other ‘Jews’. The suffering of ‘Christians’ under the 
Romans during the war was a result of them being caught in the cross fire and 
presumably not noted as different from other ‘Jews’ by the Romans. And this was the 
case despite ‘Christians’ distinguishing themselves by not rebelling and also are singled 
out as separate by other ‘Jews’, Bar Kokhba’s sympathizers, because of it. 
 
1.2 Contemporary relations in the time of Justin 
This story of the singling out of ‘Christians is, according to Justin, not only a historical 
one or one of the recent past. He also presents contemporary ‘Jewish’ leaders as 
persisting with the isolation of ‘Christians’. This suggests that even during the time of 
him writing, ‘Christians’ were in close relationship to ‘Judaism’. For example, in Dial 
38.1 Trypho reveals that ‘Jewish’ leaders have banned ‘Jews’ from speaking with 
‘Christians’.  
 ‘And Trypho said, "Sir, it were good for us if we obeyed our teachers, who laid down a 
law that we should not discuss these subjects nor converse with any of you for you made 
many blasphemies, in seeking to persuade us that this crucified man was with Moses 
and Aaron, and spoke to them in the pillar of the cloud; then   became man, was 
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crucified, and ascended up to heaven, and comes again to earth, and ought to be 
worshipped.’"114  
 ‘Christians’, then, are presently and actively isolated from ‘Jews’. Trypho mentions 
that their teachers had prescribed them neither to mix with nor to have  any 
communication  with ‘Christians’  on these questions which implies that even on such 
controversial dogmatic issues ‘Christians’ and ‘Jews’ were in fact talking when the 
‘Jewish’ leaders wished them to be separate. Yet, such an exchange suggests that 
‘Christians’ were still not entirely separated from the ‘Jews’ and that they were having 
discussions like the one that is reported in Justin’s Dial, here with the point of 
disagreement being the equation of the ‘crucified’ with the Lord. However formally one 
takes this, as a decreed ban or a less centralized recommendation, it reads as an act of 




It is not only that ‘Christians’ may have been singled out during the Bar Kokhba revolt 
and that ‘Jews’ may have come out of Jerusalem on propaganda missions against them. 
Up to the time of Justin’s writing, followers of Christ were being shunned by ‘Jewish’ 
brothers and sisters.
116
  This is seen as an act of ‘Jewish’ teachers, rather than as a long-
standing policy or attitude typical  of people like Trypho and his companions. As such, 
Justin believes that all that is necessary for Trypho and other ‘Jews’ like him to come to 
recognise Christ is that they abandon these ‘Jewish’ teachers.117 Justin also encourages 
Trypho and his friends to ignore their teachers, who are consistently portrayed as 
foolish, ignorant and malicious, on numerous matters:  
‘Unless, therefore, you detest the doctrines of those proud teachers who aspire to be 
called Rabbi, and apply yourself with such persistence and intelligence to the words of 
the prophets that you suffer the same indignities from the hands of your people as the 
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  Kai. o `Tru,fwn ei-pen) =W a;nqrwpe( kalo.n h=n peisqe,ntaj h`ma/j toi/j didaska,loisj( nomoqeth,sasi 
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prophets did, you cannot derive any benefit from the prophetic writings.’’118 (Dial 
112.5) 
Further on, in Dial 137.2, Justin urges the group to give their assent to (sumfa,menoi) and 
not to rail against or slander (loidorh/te) the Son of god and instead to ‘ignore your 
Pharisaic teachers, and do? not scorn  the King of Israel, (as the chiefs of your 
synagogues instruct you to do after prayers).’
119
 In such passages, Justin is warning 
Trypho as a concerned brother because it is Trypho’s particular teachers, who are 
sectarian and lack the wisdom and authority of the presbutoi that translated the LXX, 
who keep them from the truth of Christ.
120
 Trypho himself had apparently not listened 
too closely to these teachers as he does not obey their segregational laws and does not 
seem to fear reprisal from them.
121
. Furthermore, these teachers must not have kept their 
own rules as they admit to having interrogated the ‘Jewish’ teachers frequently in Dial 
94. Regardless, the idea that segregation is plausible and desirable is enough to sow the 
idea that ‘Christians’ are not to be trusted and that no right thinking ‘Jew’ should be 
hospitable to them, indulge their conversation or interact with them in any way. 
According to Justin, followers of Christ therefore appear to have been, at least in recent 
history and living memory, ‘Jews’ pushed out of the ‘Jewish’ polity by internal slander 
and violence. Furthermore, this slander has been deliberately propagated by ‘Jews’ in 
order that ‘Christians’ may been known as shameful and have no peace elsewhere. 
Justin says that ‘death is the lot of the Christians’ (Dial 44.1). They are, in his eyes, a 
persecuted minority of true Israelites, worshipers of god, banished by god’s own people. 
This banishment has caused them to become involuntarily labelled as a separate people 
(‘Christians’) when they really ought only to be considered followers of the god of 
Israel via the teaching of Christ. Christ was, in the prophetic mould, calling the ‘Jews’ 
and gentiles back to god. For Justin ‘Christians’ should not then be seen as separate 
people but as ‘true Israel’. The difference between Justin and his companions and 
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pa,qhte u`po. tw/n u`mete,rwn avnqrw,pwn a] kai. auvtoi. oi` profh/tai e;paqon( ouv du,nasqe o[lwj ouvde.n avpo. tw/n 
proftikw/n wvfe,limon labei/n) 
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 mhde. farisai,oij peiqo,menoi didaka,loij to.n basile,a tou/ VIsrah.l evpiskw,yhte, pote( o`poi/a 
dida,skousin oi` avrcisuna,gwgoi u`mw/n( meta. th.n proseuch,n)  
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Trypho and his is that the former practice their ‘Jewishness’ (i.e. the faith of Israel) 
spiritually, whereas the latter do so physically.  
Justin’s ‘true Israel’, is not wholly distinct then from the physical practising of the 
‘Jewish’ law at that time. ‘Christians’ are still mixed up with and involved with what 
appear to be family squabbles with ‘Jews’ who should not be considered a uniform 
body either. Indeed, Jacobs argues that the unresolved nature of the Dial, lacking as it 
does a triumphant conversion like The Dialogue between Jason and Papiscus the Jew, 
can be taken as evidence of the ambiguous give and take of the period.
122
 One does not 
win over or erase the other and the core arguments ultimately fail to force a break where 
the two cannot share the same space: ‘In a text whose fundamental purpose would seem 
to be the articulation of the difference between Judaism and Christianity, absolute 
difference from the Jew is deferred.’123 This is because Justin’s position, the position of 
‘Christians’ as he sees it is nuanced. Justin, unlike Marcion, does not seek a total 
separation from ‘Judaism’ but rather continuity with it, albeit in a new way. 
1.3 The Christian Race 
Before moving on to how the name ‘Christian’ functioned as shame name for Graeco-
Romans as well as ‘Jews’ it is pertinent to pause and consider further the relationship 
between ‘Christianity’ and ‘Judaism’ that Justin envisions. The break is not clean and 
simple. 
Justin presents ‘Jews’ as exiling ‘Christians’ and rejecting their renewal and reformation 
of god’s way of living, according to god’s commands. Consequently, it is clear that 
what defines one’s identity is how one lives, what one practices, the commands and 
doctrines one follows. ‘Christian’ identity is for Trypho is neither recognisably 
‘Jewish’, nor clearly distinguishable from the other nations:  
‘But this is what we are most puzzled about, that you who claim to be pious and believe 
yourselves to be different from the others do not segregate yourselves from them, nor do 
you observe a manner of life different from that of the Gentiles, for you do not keep the 
feasts or Sabbaths, nor do you practice the rite of circumcision. You place your hope in 
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a crucified man, and still expect to receive favours from God when you disregard his 
commandments.
124
 (Dial 10.3) 
As Boyarin has pointed out, Trypho’s speech here is an articulation of the ‘Christian’ 
identity crisis. It is this crisis that Justin is trying to settle and it is this that forms the 
justification for the Dial itself as an account of what distinguishes Gentile 
‘Christianity.125 From a ‘Jewish’ perspective, ‘Christians’ are not recognisably different 
from other nations. This has frequently been expressed in modern scholarship by view 
that ‘Christianity’ is a universal phenomenon in contrast to a fixed ethno-racial tradition 
(such as ‘Judaism’).126 Yet, the claim from Trypho still expects obligations for 
‘Christians’ before the law and expects  that they ought to have a different ‘mode of 
living from the nations’, and thus still involved in ethno-religious practices. The 
discussion about ‘Christian’ identity from Trypho’s perspective is not about living in 
contrast to ‘Jewish’ customs, as free universal people, but about living similarly to 
gentiles by not obeying god’s commandments, while ‘expecting to obtain some good 
thing’ from this same god . A further question for Trypho is how people can rest their 
hopes in the crucified one, if they expect good from god of the ‘Jews’. From the 
previous quote it becomes clear: To Trypho, ‘Christians’ are bound up, or supposed to 
be bound up, in the same enterprise as ‘Jews’ and they  run the danger of becoming 
indistinguishable from the non-‘Jews’ by not following god’s commandments . 
‘Christians’ appear as though they were something different to ‘Jews’, but they should 
not. For Trypho there is only one way to be a child of god, not to be an ancestor 
according to the flesh as Justin presents the ‘Jewish’ position to be, but to keep the 
commandments. If one can keep the commandments then one is of god and therefore in 
the genos and ethnos of the ‘Jewish’ people. This is why followers of Christ who do not 
keep these commandments are so vexing to Trypho: they simply don’t seem to meet the 
necessary criteria necessary of keeping the commandments. Justin, in contrast, reports 
this debate in order to reject this criterion by introducing the new Law and route to god 
through Christ. In doing so, however,  he does not go as far as the writer of the Letter to 
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Diognetus which is more succinct on the same point, and self-consciously separates 
‘Christians’ from ‘Jews’:  
 ‘So I suppose that you have learned enough about the general silliness and deceit, 
officiousness and arrogance of Jews… For Christians are not distinguishable from 
other people either by country, language or custom. For nowhere do they live in their 
own cities, speak some unusual dialect, or practice an uncommon lifestyle. This 
teaching of their’s has not been discovered by the consideration or reflection of 
inventive people, nor like some people do they endorse a human doctrine. Yet while 
living in both Greek and barbarian cities according to each one’s lot and following 
local customs with respect to clothing and food and the rest of life, they illustrate the 
admirable and admittedly unusual character of their own citizenship.’ 127 
Justin shares with the author of this letter the belief that ‘Christianity’ is not bound by 
particular ethnic boundaries (unlike the followers of the law) but open to all, regardless 
of background. That is, conversion to ‘Christianity’ is understood as a freeing and 
transcending of race and ethnicity on to a universal non-ethnoracial ‘Christian’ plane.128 
Even eminent scholars of great subtly are content to make this claim plainly. Laura 
Nasrallah, in an article arguing the complexities of identity in the second sophists, 
claims that Justin characterises ‘Christians’ as transcending the bounds of ethnos.129 
This would be misleading if left unqualified by Justin and many other early ‘Christian’ 
texts that speak of ‘Christians’ as a people (the new Israel) constituted by practices such 
as Baptism, Prayer, abstinence and martyrdom.
130
 As for Trypho the ‘Jewish’ people are 
not defined according to an ethnoracial linage that Justin applies to them, but by their 
religious practices that constituted them as the unified people of god despite their 
geographical dispersion .
131
 ‘Christians’, as far as Trypho is concerned cannot be 
successful candidates for followers of god, unless they follow his ways, the religious 
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practices of the ‘Jews’. The point is not that ‘Christians’ are not or do not claim to be 
‘universal’, they do. Rather, as Buell notes, this does not rule out that they continue to 
see themselves as a race.
132
 This race is the race of Israel, more widely defined but no 
less specific a people.
133
  
That the ‘Christian’ community of this time would not have had a singular ethnic 
makeup and would have been a diverse mix of peoples mirrors the mixed constitution of 
‘Judaism’ at this time. As ‘Jews’ were of different countries, cultures, languages and 
traditions, so too were the followers and pupils of Christ. When Arthur J. Droge tries to 
make a point by differentiating ‘Christians’ from ‘Jews’ with respect to ‘nation’ and 
‘race’, he overlooks that ‘Christians’, as seen in Justin, see themselves as ‘true Israel’ 
precisely rooted in the grand narrative of the Davidic story.
134
 Early ‘Christians’, Justin 
included, did in fact often write in such a way as to deliberately portray themselves as a 
genos or ethnos, as a genuine people comparable to others.
135
 Despite claiming 
‘Christians’ to be a race, however, Justin does not yet describe ‘Christians’ as a third 
race.  To him ‘Christians’ are a genuine people, not by physical ancestry, as Christians 
do not follow a physical, but a spiritual law hence, he defines ‘Christians’ rather by faith 
and its practices.
136
 Justin exemplifies this in the later portions of the Dial where he 
feels free to speak of ‘Christians’ as a race Furthermore ‘Christians’ do not just claim to 
be any people, they claim to be nothing less than the new and true Israel.
137
 As Tomson 
points via Josephus, who frequently uses genos Hebraios and Israelitai, that such 
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appeals to language were designed to connote antiquity and respect.
138
 By calling 
themselves Israel, ‘Christians’ are therefore claiming ‘Jewish’ ancestry by a different 
means than ‘Jews’ (who do so according to the flesh as Justin presents it). As such, they 
are not claiming to be a new people, but rather the true form of an ancient and venerable 
people. As discussed above, Tomson believed that ‘Jews’ in the Graeco-Roman period 
used the term Israel as an insider’s appellation and ‘Jew’ when giving an outsiders 
perspective If Israel is the bona fide term for the children of god then Justin is using the 
same term as an insider. To say ‘Christians’ are the true Israel can be read as though 
Justin is claiming an identity that is his own. It is certainly a claim that presents itself 
from within the Israelite tradition.
139
  
A salient point with reference to Justin’s claim that Christians are the ‘true Israel’ is his 
proximity to and his upbringing in Samaria where he will have been aware of 
Samaritans who also claim to be the ‘true Israel’. Justin calls himself an uncircumcised 
gentile, neither a ‘Jewish’ proselyte nor a Samaritan, but he claims the ‘Abrahamic’, 
and the prophetic, tradition for himself in order to claim to be member of the ‘true 
Israel’. Furthermore, the question of Justin’s relationship to the Samaritan tradition 
should not be too hastily dismissed. Admittedly, Justin has a father with a Greek name 
and does not practice Samaritan customs, but this does not necessarily mean he was not 
intimately aware of the tradition or attached to it in some way.
140
 After all, in Dial 120.6 
he describes the Samaritans as his own people and claims to be ‘Israel’ despite 
practising none of the ‘Abrahamic’ customs. Furthermore, the claim for Justin’s 
distance from the Samaritans is closely related to the view that Justin did not know the 
scriptures until the presbutes revealed them to him as recorded in introduction to the 
Dial and therefore he could not have known the Samaritan traditions prior to this. 
Revealed is the operative word because it does not seem that the presbutes is presenting 
new information in Dial 7.1. Justin has asked him if it is worth having a teacher and the 
presbutes reveals the prophets as teachers. Further, he presents this as though Justin 
does not already know it. Grace, as we shall see below, is the gift of right instruction 
that comes from Christ and his followers. Without this, the scriptures cannot be 
understood. This grace is what the presbutes has and what Justin and the ‘Jews’ (as he 
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Justin casts them) lack. While, Justin may not be ignorant of the scriptures he is 
nonetheless coming to see them as they truly are for the first time. This is consistent 
with the conversion moment that follows which appears as a moment of instant 
revelation and epiphany rather than interest in new information. It is also commonly 
thought that Justin’s philosophical journey happens outside of Palestine. As Skarsaune 
correctly notes, however, at this time this learning could have taken place at any point 
along the coastline from Palestine to Rome and need not demand removal from the 
Samaritan culture.
141
 It is quite possible, therefore, that Justin’s claims to be ‘true Israel’ 
are not completely innovatively ‘Christian’ but are the product of a wide understanding 
of, and stake in, an older ‘Abrahamic’ debate about who has the right to be called Israel. 
 
Though ‘Christians’ are not born into their ancestry in becoming ‘Christians’ they join a 
common ancestry from Abraham, Jacob and Jesus. More than a birth rite,  this is an 
ancestry of faith, the same faith that Abraham had. That Justin describes ‘Christians’ 
this way in the Dial but not in 1A demonstrates the different agendas that dictate the 
vocabulary Justin operates with. The early part of the Dial, as the following chapter will 
demonstrate, is chiefly dedicated to marking out what ‘Christian’ faith is in a 
clandestine manner without Trypho knowing he is talking with a ‘Christian’. This is 
done in order to circumvent Trypho’s prejudices as a ‘Jew’, given that Justin presents 
the ‘Jews’ as enemies and oppressors of ‘Christians’. Once Justin reveals that he is a 
‘Christian’ much of the groundwork is already done. Trypho’s questions concerning the 
status of the ‘Jews’ prompt answers about ‘Christians’ being the true Israelite race and 
promised people of god.
142
 In Dial 135 Justin quotes from assorted passages from Isaiah 
(42.1-6, 65.9-12, 2.5-6) in order to assert that because they have lived in disobedience 
and must therefore be unacceptable to god, Trypho’s people cannot be the promised 
seed of Jacob and to reinforce the point that ‘Christians’ are the true Israel. Even so, at 
the very end of the passage he says: ‘it is necessary for us here to observe that there are 
two seeds of Judah, and two races, as there are two houses of Jacob: the one begotten 
by blood and flesh, the other by faith and the Spirit.’ (Dial 135.6). In this way, even 
when claiming to be the true inheritors of the promises of god, Justin is prepared to 
acknowledge the linage of Trypho’s people. This serves as a way of reconnecting 
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‘Jews’ with ‘Christians’ and demonstrating that the ‘Christians’ were predicted as god’s 
people from within the ‘Jews’ own tradition. 
 
The political advantage of re-enforcing the relationship between ‘Christians’ and ‘Jew’s 
is that it counters the some ‘Jewish’ factions’ desire to attempt to separate ‘Christians’ 
from the ‘Jewish’ body politic. Further, being more closely associated with ‘Jews’ goes 
some way to establishing that ‘Christians’ are not a novelty of human opinion (a new 
Superstitio as Pliny saw them) but rather an ancient and venerable people to be tolerated 
just as the ‘Jews’ are. Indeed, as 1A will argue, ‘Christians’ should be respected even 
more than ‘Jews’ because they are more trustworthy and less volatile. Justin displays a 
further advantage to understanding ‘Christians’ as an Israelite people: Peoples have 
borders. A simple collection of different peoples united under Christ may not have been 
recognisable and interpretable to Romans. Furthermore, speaking of ‘Christians’ as a 
race allows ‘Christians’ to place reasonable limits on the tradition. ‘Christians’ are 
united by their trust in Christ but only those who trust truly are genuinely united and 
constitute Christ’s people, who are simultaneously god’s people, the new Israel. ‘Jews’ 
who do not follow Christ obviously do not meet this criteria and nor do many of those 
called ‘Christians’, as Justin will go on to argue. Nationhood is a key part of ‘Christian’ 
identity for Justin then, even if it is not the only formulation of this identity by him. 
 
The language of peoplehood that Justin and other early ‘Christians’ employ is not 
contradictory with the universal nature of ‘Christianity’, nor are they two poles of an 
argument.  Rather, they aim at the same point: Anyone can be called ‘Christian’, but 
being ‘Christian’ is joining a definitive people:  
‘Christian Self-definition as a people was not mutually exclusive with universalism. By 
locating themselves in a historical narrative whose trajectory moved in an arc from one 
kind of human (either unified or internally composite) to many kinds of humans 
Christians could claim to represent the future reunification or perfection of the entire 
human race. This argument sought its authority in the past and was especially 
elaborated in terms of peoplehood.’143  
Christians’ unite themselves with a history, a single, ancient and true history. One 
which builds on ‘Judaism’ whilst at the same time making claims for Christ which 
reject this history. We shall see below that the Romans may not have known 
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‘Christians’ as a people – yet – probably because they could not clearly tell them apart 
from ‘Jews’ – despite the efforts of the ‘Jews’ as Justin describes them. Nonetheless in 
Justin’s presentation of ‘what’ ‘Christians’ are, it is inescapable that they are a 
definitive people, predicated on a ‘Jewish’ history but not bound by its practices. 
Compared to those who practice God’s law physically, the spiritual law obeyers are a 
new race. Even if the Romans can’t discern this, Justin wants the true Israelites to be 
thought of as a people with a history, the Jewish history, but not as irascible, dull-
minded (his insults for ‘Jews’ can be seen as means of undermining their credibility 
whilst rescuing their history, thus making it credible to worship God by dissociating 
himself from this volatile people) ‘Jews’.  
1.4 Persecuted Prophetic Motif 
It’s pertinent to ask why ‘Jews’ might want to exile ‘Christians’ or clarify their 
relationship to them. Why would the ‘Jews’ persecute ‘Christians’ more than any other 
nation as Justin has claimed them do? This is, in fact, an extremely important question 
because Paula Fredriksen has argued that claims such as Justin’s, not uncommon among 
early ‘Christians’, for widespread persecution by ‘Jews’ are difficult to sustain in light 
of evidence of much ordinary social interaction.
144
 Livesey has gone even further than 
Fredriksen to say that the story Justin tells is more or less implausible: ‘I conclude that 
Justin’s constructions are theological and do not correspond with the contemporary 
social situation among Christians and Jews. These theological distinctions would serve 
to create divisions where no such distance between these groups otherwise existed.’145 
If Justin is making stronger social distinctions than may have existed, then why? The 
story of ‘Jewish’ persecution is recurrent in the Dial and we ought not think this is 
something Justin has fabricated on a whim. It seems he really believes this account but 
it is also shaped into a powerful rhetoric that repays closer inspection. 
First of all it is salient to note that Justin has claimed that the ‘Jews’ persecute 
‘Christians’ and that they do so more than any other people. More importantly he says 
they persecute Christ and his followers. It is not ‘Christians’, in a straight forward sense 
as a people, who are persecuted. Rather it is Christ himself who is persecuted and 
blasphemed and those who stand by him share in this. ‘Christians’ confess to being his 
followers and suffer the same suffering he did in the present time. In Dial 26.1 we see 
evidence of this: 
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‘And I replied, "I didn’t say that [that none of Trypho’s kind shall inherit from God] but 
I do say that those who have persecuted Christ in the past and still do, and do not 
repent, shall not inherit anything on the holy mountain, unless they repent.’146  
As in the above quoted Dial 17, Christ is the one persecuted here and it is the ‘Jews’ 
who are prejudiced against him and those who hold by him. ‘Christians’ as a persecuted 
body are secondary to Christ. Why might it be significant for Justin that the ‘Jews’ 
persecute Christ? Because Christ is Israel, the one against whom Jacob was wrestling, 
but who overcame Jacob and executed god’s will:  
 
 ‘And the name Israel means, a man who overcomes power; for Isra is a man 
overcoming, and El is power. That Christ would do this when He became man was 
foretold by the mystery of Jacob's wrestling with Him who appeared to him, in that He 
ministered to the will of the Father… But His name from the beginning was Israel, the 
name which he gave to the blessed Jacob when He blessed him with His own name, 
proclaiming thereby that all who through Him have fled for refuge to the Father, are 
blessed Israel. But you have not understood any of this, and not being prepared to 
attempt to understand, expect assuredly to be saved because you are the children of 
Jacob according to the flesh. But in such matters you deceive yourselves, I have shown 
by many words.’147 (Dial 125.3, 5) 
Christ being called Israel, having been so forever and foretold in scripture, demonstrates 
his credentials as not only a figure genuinely part of this tradition but also its source and 
fulfilment. Being associated with Christ is to be associated with the true and original 
Israel. In Dial 123.9 Justin makes this point clearly:‘As therefore from that one Jacob, 
who was named Israel, the whole your race was named Jacob and Israel; thus we also 
because of our being born into of  Christ we are born into God, we are true children of 
God just like Jacob and Israel and Judah, and David, and who keep the commandments 
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of Christ.’148 Trypho’s nation may well have been called Israel but they are only called 
so because of Christ; Christ overcame Jacob in the wrestling match and renamed them 
as his own. So ‘Christians’, for Justin, are the true Israel because they are directly from 
Christ. If ‘Christians’ are the true Israel then the persecution of Christ and of 
‘Christians’ is the persecution of Israel. Consequently, those who engage in this 
persecution betray themselves as not Israel, as outside of god’s holy people. To further 
show that ‘Christians’ are truly Israel in contrast to ‘Jews’ Justin utilises the motif of the 
persecuted prophets of Israel. Christ is the victim, he is the hated prophet who is 
murdered in ‘Jewish’ tradition like his prophets before him (Dial 16.4), and ‘Christians’ 
share in this office; they participate in his name and victimhood.  This is significant 
because Justin continues to employ this strategy frequently in the Dial. He claims the 
prophets as witnesses to Christ and in doing so casts ‘Christians’ as the righteous truth 
speaking prophets the established ‘Jewish’ tradition that the prophets addressed the 
people’s disobedience in the hope to bring them to repentance but were hated for it. In 
this model, Christ and his followers are heirs of the prophets in the tradition of Isaiah 
and Jeremiah calling the people to repentance, while the ‘Jews’ take the role of those 
who disbelieved the prophets and hate them while continuing in disobedience.
149
Again, 
at Dial 117.3, Justin casts blame on to the ‘Jews’, this time their leaders specifically, for 
how ‘Christians’ are treated:  
 
‘...whereby the passion which the Son of God endured for us is commemorated. But 
your high priests and teachers have caused his name to be profaned and blasphemed 
throughout the whole world. But those filthy garments, which you have placed upon on 
all who have become ‘Christians’ by the name of Jesus, God will show will be taken 
from us when he raises all up from the dead.’150 
As before, the name ‘Christians’ with reference to Jesus is seen as ‘filthy garments’ 
which Jesus’ his followers have not taken upon themselves but have been put on them 
by outsiders. The action against Christ is always primary and the action against 
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‘Christians’ is only by extension. In this way, Christ is an example of the persecuted 
profit motif that, according to Judith Lieu, Justin relies greatly on in his arguments 
concerning the ‘Jews’ pointing out that 1A 35 clearly fulfils this function through an 
extended discussion in which Zechariah 9:9
151
 Isaiah 9:6, and Psalm 22 are used in 
combination to prove the culpability of the ‘Jews’ in the death of Jesus: 
‘The Jews are thus killing their prophets still, Jesus and now his followers, and since 
they can be demonstrated to be his prophets, words foretold from God, then they are 
true and of God. The Jewish misunderstanding of prophecy serves as a fulfilment of 
prophecy as their hostility to Jesus and his followers proves that they have not 
understood their own tradition and are unrepentant sinners in the face of a true 
revelation from God.’152  
Justin is clearly convinced of the enmity that ‘Jews’153 have towards ‘Christians’ and 
this ought to be taken seriously. However, as we proceed we must keep in mind that 
casting the ‘Jews’ in this light also does significant work for his argument by making 
‘Christians’ appear as the true Israel, the persecuted truth speaking children of god. 
Further evidence that Justin believes the ‘Jews’ persecute and single out ‘Christians’ 
can be seen in Dial 96.1-2: 
For the statement in the law, 'Cursed is every one that hangs on a tree,' confirms our 
hope which depends on the crucified Christ, not because He who has been crucified is 
cursed by God, but because God foretold that which would be done by you all, and by 
those like you, who do not know that this is He who existed before all, who is the eternal 
Priest of God, and King, and Christ. And now you clearly see that this has happened. 
For you curse in your synagogues all those who are called Christians through Him, and 
other nations carry out the curse, killing those who only confess themselves to be 
Christians; to all of whom we say, You are our brothers; recognise the truth of God.’154 
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Here again the prophesy of the ‘Jews’ themselves has foretold of the death of Christ 
which they did not see nor repent of. They curse Christ and his followers failing to see 
what their god has done in and through him. Precisely what form and significance this 
cursing took is difficult to tell. Scholarship is littered with examples of those who have 
seen this as an example of the famous birkath hamminim.
155
 However, as Boyarin point 
out, this conclusion is weak since the birkath hamminim is not attested from a ‘Jewish’ 
source until the Tosefta dating from the mid third century and there are good reasons to 
doubt the historicity of the council at Yavneh founding such a curse.
156
 There is no 
reason to assume that Justin is fabricating his account but caution is to be advised before 
interpreting Justin as referring to an established, uniform and formalised rabbinic policy 
rather than reflecting a more general disharmony among ‘Jews’, or their teachers, 
towards ‘Christians’.  
Beyond this, it is interesting that Justin here refers to his ‘Jewish’ interlocutors as 
brothers (adelfoi) and appeals that they recognise the truth of god that is Christ. This 
suggests Justin considers ‘Jews’ as family, further evidence that they are all part of the 
Israelite tradition. As family they share the same genos to which he himself belongs. 
Even if ‘Jews’ are erring they share the same god and, as Justin will go on to claim, 
common ancestors.  In other words, Justin is saying “The (who are ours as well as 
yours) prophets were right, recognise that and come back to god.” As the boundaries 
between ‘Jewish’ and ‘Christian’, at least rhetorically, are not fixed157 and Justin can in 
this way included ‘Jews’ as part of the same tradition whilst criticising them for failing 
it. This is another instance of the strategy we saw above of portraying followers of 
Christ as those who follow god and who are god’s own people, Israel. As we shall see, 
this extends to the claim that ‘Christians’ have a correct/inspired understanding of the 
scriptures, whilst the ‘Jews’ choose to remain in rebellion against God and persecute the 
true tellers, the prophets. 
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In explaining ‘Jewish’ persecution of ‘Christians’ this way, Justin is able to emphasise 
the rightful status of ‘Christians’ as Israel. Justin makes this claim from a theological 
conviction to worship this God. ‘Christian’ is a shame name but Israel carries antiquity 
and honour. ‘Christians’ are to distinguished from ‘Jews’ however because they are 
more truly Israel by virtue of truly keeping god’s commandments. ‘Jews’ are presented 
as a rebellious people, less than Israel, who have been habitually disobedient to their 
God and whom the rulers will not have forgotten as having been involved in a series of 
major revolts against Rome. Bar Kokhba, which was only the most recent in a series of 
failed revolts, had singled out ‘Christians’ as of questionable ‘Jewishness’ and their 
increasingly gentile composition could make them vulnerable to appearing as coverts  
from pagan ancestry, which would contravene Roman law, who worship another failed 
messianic martyr. Given the recent history, any messianic strands within ‘Judaism’ 
posed a potential threat. The persecution of ‘Christians’ by ‘Jews’  allows Justin to 
speak of ‘Christians’ as the truly reliable and honest ancient people who are protected 
by Roman law, while ‘Jews’ are belligerent and rebellious. If this kind of explanation 
could be in anyway influential – and there is no evidence to suggest any Roman rulers 
would have been impressed by it – then it would be quite understandable why some 
fellow ‘Jews’ would want to halt the spread of ‘Christians’ be they gentile or ethnically 
Hebrew. Justin may be rhetorically spinning the persecution of ‘Christians’ but there is 
no reason to assume it is fiction. Yet, the use he puts it to suits his end to define ‘what’ 
‘Christians’ are; in summary not just followers of Christ, but true Israelites, no new 
thing, no fresh or foreign superstition, but the genealogical heirs of old. 
2 Graeco-Roman perspectives 
We have established not only that ‘Christians’ are shamed by and because of ‘Jews’, as 
Justin presents it, and that they wish to be seen as genuine people, rather than an entity 
beyond peoplehood as historians and theologians have often explained early 
Christianity.
158
 Furthermore since we have seen that ‘Christians’ wish to be seen as a 
truer Israelite race, the ground is laid to consider Justin’s testimony regarding how 
Graeco-Romans (and the Roman rulers in particular) seemed to view them. It is clear 
what Justin thinks ‘Christians’ means but to what extent are the Graeco-Romans aware 
of ‘Christians’ and what do they think they are according to Justin? Understanding the 
perspectives of those Justin addressees is important because it their understanding is 
part of what Justin is responding to in his attempt to define ‘Christian’ identity. 
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Furthermore the prejudices of his addressees can also provide ammunition for defining 
and distinguishing true followers of Christ from false ones like the followers of 
Marcion. 
The question of whether Graeco-Roman pagans, either rulers or populace, could easily 
tell the difference between ‘Christians’ and ‘Jews’ is a pertinent and difficult one. There 
is much evidence to suggest that the both the rulers and the populace had difficulties in 
neatly distinguishing ‘Jews’ and 'Christians'. As we will see, the sources testify that 
Romans knew the name ‘Christians’ and, considered them criminal, but that in itself 
should not be taken as evidence that they understood them to be a separate entity from 
‘Jews’.159 Benjamin Isaac has suggested that in Roman literature ‘Christians’ were at 
best called ‘a sort of men’ (genus hominum) whereas ‘Jews’ were always called ‘a 
people’ (gens). While this could suggest a clear distinction between the two,160 Isaac 
does not make this claim directly. Regardless of what ‘Christians’ called themselves, 
the Romans would only have called them ‘a people’ if they saw them as distinct from 
the ‘Jewish’ people. To call them a ‘kind of men’ is to recognise their entity without 
necessarily removing them from ‘Jewishness’.161 In the fifth book of Tacitus’ lost work, 
the Historiae recorded by Sulpicius Severus (Chronica 2.30.7), Tacitus reports 
concerning Titus who desired that: 'The religion of the Jews and the Christians be 
destroyed completely: For although these religions are conflicting, they nevertheless 
developed from the same origins. The Christians arose from the Jews: With the root 
removed, the branch is easily killed.'
162
 Here, Tacitus speaks first of one religion, then 
of two conflicting religions, and ends by calling ‘Christians’ a branch of ‘the Jews’, 
suggesting both togetherness and separation.  As such, this account does not represent 
clarity and suggests anything but a clean distinction between ‘Christians’ and ‘Jews’. 
All it does testify is that they are closely related with ‘Christians’ being in some way 
part of ‘Jews’. Titus reigned in the late first century, meaning this report would reflect 
quite an early stage of ‘Christianity’. Tacitus died in 117AD and was recording his 
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report somewhere in the early second century. Crucially though, this was pre-Bar 
Kokhba by fifteen years (though roughly contemporary with the Kitos War), meaning 
that even if this were a reflection of his time of writing as much as that of Titus it would 
still pre-date the time that Justin marks out as the pivotal moment. By Justin’s time it 
seems that ‘Christianity’ is branching out further from ‘Judaism’, or, following Justin’s 
presentation, had been further subject to a programme of expulsion begun under Bar 
Kokhba.  
 
Pliny’s letter to Trajan will be discussed in detail in chapter four, but it is pertinent to 
note here that it reveals that in his long career in Roman leadership, as an advocate, 
judge and assessor, he has not come across a problem such as the ‘Christians’. This 
suggests that if similar trials had occurred previously, they would have been very rare, 
and, furthermore, that within the empire, up to high levels of governance, there existed 
confusion as to exactly what kind of thing ‘Christians’ were. An illustration of this is 
clearly seen in Pliny’s words: ‘For I was in no doubt that, whatever it might be that they 
were admitting to, their stubbornness and unyielding obstinacy certainly ought to be 
punished.’163 (96.3) Putting this into context, Pliny has asked those under investigation 
if they are ‘Christians’ and they, in the knowledge that the penalty is death, proceed to 
confess this numerous times but he does not understand the content of what they are 
claiming to be. This becomes even clearer when Pliny reports that he tortured
164
 two 
deaconesses (ministrae) in order to gain a clearer a picture of what ‘Christians’ are 
following a series of confusing testimonies.  
 
It is worth bearing in mind that Pliny wrote from Bythinia which had a large ‘Jewish’ 
population, and yet he does not mention ‘Jews’ anywhere in his letters. This could 
suggest that he, unlike Titus, was not aware (or not concerned) that those charged and 
that he investigated were not ‘Jews’. In not understanding what ‘Christians’ believe or 
‘are’ it is not necessarily the case that Pliny understands them to be a non-‘Jewish’ or 
counter-‘Jewish’ group. Pliny remarks that he observes ‘depraved and excessive 
superstition’ (superstitionem pravam, immodicam) among those he investigated.165 This 
might suggest a new, non-traditional, potentially non-‘Jewish’ group, but this need not 
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necessarily be the case.  The term Superstitio has a shifting history and its usage varies 
greatly from Cicero, the earliest use of the noun, to Diocletian.
166
 As Rives notes, it is a 
term better defined by what it is not than by what it is and which can applied in different 
ways and with different force to the rational religious practices of the Graeco-Roman 
elite.
167
  Buell outlines it well:  
 
‘In the late republican period, Romans increasingly attempt to differentiate “religion” 
from nonreligion. “Nonreligion” was a moving target but was most commonly 
embraced by concepts of superstitio and atheism. Superstitio in particular comes to 
function both as a term for improper religious worship by Romans and for foreignness. 
Thus, religion could be used to highlight differences within an ethnos or genos or to 
locate apparent insiders as outsiders…The meaning and application of the term 
superstitio shifted over time. Where the label superstitio had previously connoted 
improper or excessive religious practices, including Roman cults, by the second century 
C.E. its primary connotation shifted to participation in non-Roman cults that were 
deemed improper of excessive in their practice. Thus superstitio, as the converse of 
religio, shifts from having as its primary meaning something Romans risk doing by 
improper or excessive religious observances of Roman deities to a characteristic of 
non-Romans.’ 168 
The term then refers to internal Roman irrationalities or to external foreign practices. 
Superstitio is what the poor, uneducated or barbarian practiced in contrast to the Roman 
elites.  Therefore clear that when Pliny says he only found superstition it need not mean 
a new group but could simply mean distasteful or excessive religious practice of a 
foreign nature.
169
 This term, then, does not clearly mark out what he has discovered as 
non-‘Jewish’, which would also be foreign, though the term can be used to in 
connection with non-native or non-ancestral and novel religious ideas which would not 
be tolerated by Rome. It is not completely clear that Pliny understands ‘Christians’ to be 
                                                          
166
 R. Gordon, ‘Superstitio’ (2008), 77-78.  
167
 J.B. Rives, Religion in the Roman Empire (Oxford, 2007), 184. 
168
 D.K. Buell, Why This New Race (2005), 49. 
169
 Beard, North, and Price make the point that this general shift from superstitio towards foreign practice 
began in the late republic and was well established by the early second century. They note that Tacitus 
refers to the Druidic prophecy of the fall of Rome at the hands of the Gaul’s as ‘an empty superstitio’, as 
he did for various Jewish and Egyptian rituals (Histories IV.54.4). Further, they relate Tacitus’ claim that 
the people of Alexandria are ‘subject to superstitions’ and the Jews are a people ‘prone to superstition, 
and opposed to religious [meaning well ordered] practices (Histories IV.81.2; V.13.1). They elaborate 
that for Tacitus such an understanding of foreign ‘religious’ practices as superstitio also led them to cast 
those practices as possible routes of political subversion to be feared. See M. Beard, J. North, and S. 
Price, Religions of Rome (1998), 221 -222. 
64 
 
independent superstition rather than another form of ‘Jewish’ excess religion, which 
could also be foreign superstition.  
Being a contemporary of Tacitus, Pliny also predates Bar Kokhba, which as we have 
seen features in a pivotal fashion Justin’s story of the rejection of Christ by the ‘Jews’. 
Rejection of followers of Christ by extension would make for more isolated and 
obvious ‘Christians’, but would not provide absolute clarity as to ‘what’ they are. Justin 
sees himself as a non-‘Jewish’, gentile, member of Israel, but not a proselyte to 
‘Judaism’. This is quite a complicated position to present to the pagans who are familiar 
with the term ‘Christian’, and its negative implications, but little else. 
Another Graeco-Roman view about ‘Christians’ that Justin details is that they were 
considered to be atheists (aqeoi). Specifically, In 1A 6.1 and 46.3 Justin notes 
‘Christians’ were described as atheists and Crescens makes the same accusation in 2A 
3.2. Justin denies the accusation in 1A 13.1: ‘What sensible man will not grant that we 
are not atheists, we who worship the Creator of this world; we whosay, as we have been 
taught, that he does not need blood, and libations, and incense.’170 The accusation of 
atheism was also commonly made against ‘Jews’ in the Roman world.171 Perhaps 
‘Christians’ are not being distinguished from ‘Jews’ here, or from gentile proselytes to 
‘Judaism’, since, as Justin claims 1A 53.5 the majority of ‘Christians’ by this time are 
gentiles living in the midst of the pagan empire. In making this denial, Justin has 
claimed the one true god (i.e. the god of the ‘Jews’) as the god worshipped by 
‘Christians’ and has also denied the need for cultic practice that gives Roman ‘religion’ 
its cohesion. Such a denial represents a challenge to any thinking that understands 
‘Christians’ to be a rival cult or superstition. Given how important cultic acts were to 
Roman society pre-Constantine this move should not be underestimated. Croix 
characterises the issue well:  
‘By far the most important of these [differences between ancient and modern religion] was 
that pagan religion was a matter of performing cult acts rather than of belief, or ethics…No 
compulsion was necessary, because until the advent of Christianity no one ever had any 
reason for refusing to take part in the ceremonies which others observed -except of 
course the Jews, and they were a special case, a unique exception. The gods 
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would forgive the inexplicable monotheism of the Jews, who were, so to speak, licensed 
atheists. The Jews of course would not sacrifice to the emperor or his gods, but they 
were quite willing, while the Temple still stood, to sacrifice to their own god for the 
well-being of the emperor; and Augustus, if we may believe a happy compromise not 
only accepted this but himself paid for the sacrifice.’172 
‘Jews’, though aloof, were not opposed to sacrifice as such and, though they kept their 
own laws, they were happy, at least before the fall of the temple, to support the empire 
and pay lip service to its system. In the same way, neither were ‘Christians’ necessarily 
opposed to the empire and Justin is keen to demonstrate ‘Christians’ have no designs to 
be a rival to Rome (1A 11) Though understood by the authorities as atheists, ‘Jews’ 
were tolerated legally because of the antiquity of their traditions. Following this, there is 
no reason to assume that ‘Christians’ were necessarily seen as a separate body of 
atheists rather than as another form of ‘Jews’ who were just as irreligious as and just as 
unwilling to make to sacrifices to the Roman gods. In 1A 6.1, Justin is forthright in his 
confession of atheism insofar as the gods of Rome are concerned: So that we are called 
atheists, and we confess that we are atheists of such being considered gods, but not 
towards the most true God, the Father of righteousness and temperance and the other 
virtues, who is unalloyed with evil.
173
Justin, therefore, aligns himself with the ‘Jewish’ 
god, and only admits a non-compliance with the multitude of gods, something he had in 
common with ‘Jews’. No less than the ‘Jews’, true ‘Christians’ will not acknowledge 
the pagan gods at all. The same can be seen from 1A 16.5-7:  
‘And about not swearing at all, but at all and always speaking the trth he commanded 
thus: “Do not swear at all, but let your yes be yes and your no be no. More than this is 
from the evil one”. And that one must worship God alone he entreated in these words: 
“The greatest commandment is: you shall worship the ord your God, and him aone, the 
Lord who made you shall you sere with all your heart and all your strength.” And when 
someone approached him and said, “Good teacher”, he replied: “No one is good 
expect God alone, who made all things.”’174 
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The statement Justin relies on here comes from Jesus concerning the rejection of 
swearing in principle the same as the Shema Israel that was becoming formalized in the 
morning prayer of the synagogues of Justin’s period.175 Thus ‘Christians’, Justin’s 
community, openly subscribed to the ‘Jewish’ rejection of worship of the Roman gods. 
This is quite important. Both ‘Jews’ and ‘Christians’ can be considered a non-sacrificial 
people in this period (though Justin treats Trypho and those like him as if they were still 
maintaining or seeking the old sacrificial system regardless of their practice), and both 
develop new ways of being sacrificial which would be unrecognisable or 
uninterpretable to Romans. The new expressions of sacrifice were the rabbinical 
interpretation of prayer for the ‘Jews’ and the eucharist for ‘Christians’176 These would 
mean little to the Romans to whom both ‘Christians’ and ‘Jews’ would appear 
recalcitrant non-respecters of the Graeco-Roman cults. However, we have already seen 
that Justin reports that his interlocutors teachers have spread propaganda against them 
and that they have been cut off since bar Kokhba. We know ‘Christian’ is a shame name 
and that ‘Christians’ are isolatable as a group if not separate from the rest of the 
‘Jewish’ body poltic. As there has been an internal ‘Jewish’ attempt to separate 
‘Christians’ from the rest of the body, the threat to ‘Christians’, whether apparent or 
real, is that they will be denied the conventional status of ‘tolerable exceptions’ enjoyed 
by the ‘Jews’, and considered instead as atheists, as outside of the ancient Abrahamic 
tradition.  
It is unclear to what extent the Romans would have seen ‘Christians’ this way, but the 
‘Jewish’ propaganda and the theological extremism of a sect like Marcionism (which 
would have appeared atheist and inventing new deities to Roman eyes) makes the case 
against ‘Christians’ being atheists an important one for Justin. As part of his strategy to 
address this, Justin shows that others, within the Graeco-Roman tradition itself, reject 
the gods. Most notably, he finds evidence of this in the works of the venerable 
philosophers.
177
 Justin’s argument is that philosophers are not decried as criminal or 
offensive for having said things that could be deemed atheist. Hence, if ‘Christians’ are 
no longer seen (and protected) as ‘Jews’, they should instead be treated as philosophers. 
Consequently, they should have the freedom of speech that philosophers enjoy, or 
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should at least be similarly tolerated on artistic license, rather than being seen as a 
‘nationalistic’ enterprise that poses a threat to the Empire. In this way, as we see in 1A 
4.8-9, Justin is seeking to establish parity with other schools: 
‘For, indeed, some assume the name and appearance of philosophers who behave in no 
way worthily of their profession. And you know that among the men of ancient times 
those who contradicted one another in their thought and teaching are nevertheless 
called by the one name of philosopher. Some of them in their teaching denied the gods 
and those of them who were poets proclaimed the promiscuity of Zeus as well as of his 
sons, and you do not bad?? performers who take up their teaching. Rather, you give 
prizes and rewards for those who are in good voice when they offer insult to them.’178 
Of course, as Croix points out, ‘the vital difference [between ‘Christians’ and 
philosophers] was, of course, that the philosophers, whatever they might believe, and 
even write down for circulation among educated folk, would have been perfectly willing 
to perform any cult act required of them and that was what mattered.’179 Bizarre views 
may well be tolerated from philosophers, but Justin’s attempt to cite hypocrisy on these 
grounds is not likely to work. This is because philosophical speculation is not equal to 
atheism for the Romans. The philosophers may say and do what they like but, as Croix 
points out, they will still make offerings to the gods. ‘Christians’ are non-conformists 
and threaten the communal spiritual life that sustains Roman society. On these grounds 
at least, they distinguish themselves a little more even than ‘Jews’ in the ordinary sense. 
Though it is still possible that they might have been seen as an excessive superstition 
among ‘Judaism’ rather than another tradition entirely.  
Another difficulty for ‘Christians’ in their Graeco-Roman perception is well 
documented, to the point that Buell calls it a ‘modern scholarly cliché’180: the Romans 
disparaged novelty and valued tradition, ancient and ancestral. Gibbon encapsulated the 
common view when he said ‘The Jews were a people which followed, the Christians a 
sect which deserted, the religion of their fathers.’181 However this does not seem to fit 
the evidence of the early apologists. Specifically, ‘Christians’ including Autolycus and 
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 Ouvk ovrqw/j me.n ouvde. tou/to pra,ttetai) kai. ga,r toi filosofi,aj o;noma kai. sch/ma evpigra,fontai, tinej 
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Athenagoras in the 10th century, as well as Justin in the second century, defend faith in 
Christ according to the past with the aim of demonstrating continuity. In this sense, they 
rejected radical novelty, as proposed by Marcion.  The claim that ‘Christians’ are 
wholly outside of ‘Judaism’ is a risk for ‘Christians’ before the Empire and this is why, 
as we have seen above, Justin is keen to show this not to be true. Pliny and Tacitus were 
not necessarily clear about this. Tertullian stated in his Apologeticus 18.4 that 
‘Christians’ were made not born (Fiunt, non nascuntur Christiani), that is, that they are not 
naturally part of the folk by birth rite like ‘Jews’, but join the community by personal 
choice
182
. By Tertullian’s time, the description of Gibbon therefore finds support. In 
Justin’s time, however, ‘Christians’ aren’t readily and naturally distinguishable from the 
‘Jews’. Yet the composition of the ‘Christian’ community is increasingly non-‘Jewish’. 
It is incumbent on Justin then to demonstrate the continuity of the ‘Christian’ 
community with Israel – which of course Marcion actively sought to deny.  
As noted, Roman authorities mistrust novelty and value tradition. Alongside this is a 
suspicion of conversion and proselytism and as such the risk of appearing as a convert 
to ‘Judaism’ is a real one. The issue of proselytism is one of great significance to 
Justin’s studies. The famous rescript of Hadrian has often been thought to be rescinding 
a full ban on circumcision. Ra’anan Abusch has convincingly argued that, however, that 
a full ban never existed, rather only a general policy against conversion.
183
 Rather, 
‘Jews’ could circumcise their own sons according to custom but no others. This is to 
say, ‘Jews’ can be ‘Jews’ but no one else is to be added to the number; no one born a 
pagan ought to become a ‘Jew’. By this logic, anyone born ‘Christian’ could remain one 
but no one could convert.
184
 However this would only be the case if ‘Christianity’ was a 
recognised ancient tradition and afforded the associated privileges (which is of course 
why Justin and other apologists emphasise so greatly their continuity with Israel).  
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As we have seen, as far as the Graeco-Romans are concerned, ‘Christians’, who are 
even more atheistic than ‘Jews’, ought not to be ‘Christians’ in the first place but remain 
pagans as they were born. Justin is quite up front about this in Dial 63.5: 
‘They further show that the Word of God speaks to those who believe in him (who are of 
one soul and one synagogue and one church) as to a daughter, namely, to the church, 
which arisen from and participates in his name (for we are all called Christians). That 
this is the case and that we are taught to forget our ancestral customs is proclaimed in 
the following words: 'Hearken, O daughter, and behold, and incline thine ear; forget 
thy people and the house of thy father, and the King shall desire thy beauty: because He 
is thy Lord, and thou shalt worship Him.'
185
 
Justin is saying here that the church of Christ teaches them to ‘forget old ancestral 
customs’. This, combined with quoting Psalm 45, may make ‘Christians’ look more like 
‘Jewish’ proselytes – and claiming at the same time to be ‘one church and one 
synagogue’ further confuses matters. In some ways the status of ‘Christians’, 
increasingly of gentile composition, is similar to the gentile friends of Trypho who wish 
to become ‘Jewish’ proselytes – though we know Justin and his group do not count 
themselves as one with these people, though a competitive distinction would also 
perhaps be too strong as the terms of distinction vary, even within Justin’s texts, as well 
other second century ‘Christian’ literature. Being a converted people must also have 
been a reason for persecution then and as Justin’s text makes plain by his approach, 
‘Christians’ mostly were exactly this, a people who looked to make converts. There are 
two ways to see the conversion of ‘Christians’ as illegal. Firstly, it would be illegal if 
they were understood as pagans who have given up the worship of their ancestral gods 
and become ‘Christians’, regardless of whether or nor ‘Christians’ were considered a 
kind of ‘Jew’. Secondly, it would be illegal if they were understood as ‘Jews’ who have 
given up their ancestral practices and worship of god in favour of a new tradition, as is 
the perspective of Trypho.  
In the eyes of ‘Jews’, as far as Justin is concerned, ‘Christian’ is a shame name on 
account of the ‘Christian’ identifying Jesus as the Christ and their interpretation of the 
                                                          
185
 Kai. o;ti toi/j eivj auvto.n pisteu,ousin( w`j ou=si mia/| yuch/| kai. mia/| sunagwgh/| kai. mia/| evkklhsi,a|( o `
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Torah in the light of Christ’s own teachings. In the eyes of the Graeco-Roman pagans 
‘Christian’ also is seen as a shame name, because (according to the logic of Justin’s 
story) the ‘Jews’ have successfully cast them as a new group outside of the traditions of 
Israel. However, it is not entirely clear how distinct ‘Christians’ appeared from ‘Jews’ 
to the Graeco-Roman pagans. Both are deemed atheists. ‘Christians’ may be considered 
a new sect at times, which would be illegal, but as Titus, Trajan and Pliny make 
obvious, their status as a new superstition and their relationship to ‘Judaism’ was not 
certain. This ambiguity seems to be a reflection of an inner-‘Jewish’ and inner-
‘Christian’ uncertainty about the precise status of what exactly constitutes ‘Christian’.   
2.1 Criminality and Confession 
Although Romans may well have had difficulty clearly telling ‘Christians’ and ‘Jews’ 
apart, by the year 117 AD (as we saw in Pliny) they were clearly were familiar with 
‘Christians’ as a name given to people, albeit a concept lacking in much definition. This 
section will focus on how Justin presents the Roman treatment of this group and what 
this reveals about the content of the name. In doing so, we shall see that the only content 
‘Christian’ seems to have is that of a criminal charge. The consistency of Justin’s story 
that ‘Christians’ are slandered because of ‘Jews’, though this need not imply complete 
historicity, resides in the fact that being ‘Christian’ is considered an offence by non-
‘Jews’ also.  Being ‘Christian’ is a charge to which people confess (o`mologian) or deny 
(avrneomai). It is a shame name. 1A 4.3, 4, 5, 7 introduces this theme neatly: 
‘For neither condemnation nor punishment could reasonably be based on a name 
unless actions can show something to be virtuous or wicked. And, in point of fact, you 
do not punish all who are accused in your court proved to be guilty. But with us you 
take the name as proof, though, so far as the name goes, you should punish our 
accusers instead. For we are accused of being Christians, and it is not right to hate 
kindness of heart ... For just as certain people, although they have learnt from Christ 
the Teacher that they should not deny as some who have been taught by the Master, 
Christ, not to deny, are knocked of course when questioned, so too, perhaps, by their 
evil lives they play into the hands of those who are already disposed to accuse all 
Christians of irreligion and injustice.’186 
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 evx ovno,matoj me.n ga.r h; e;painoj h; ko,lasij ouvk a;n euvlo,gwj ge,noito( h;n mh, ti evna,reton h; fau/lon diV 
e;rgwn avpodei,knusqai dunhtai) kai. ga.r tou.j kathgoroume,nouj evfV u`mw/n pa,ntaj pri.n evlegcqh/nai ouv 
timwrei.te\ evfV h`mw/n de. to. o;noma w`j e;legcon lamba,nete( kai,per o[son ge evk tou/ ovno,matoj tou.j 
kathgorou/ntaj ma/llon kola,zein ovfei,lete) Cristianoi. ga.r ei=nai kathgorou,meqa to. de. crhsto.n 
misei/sqai ouv di,kaion)))o]n ga.r tro,pon paralabo,ntej tine.j para. tou/ didaska,lou Cristou/ mh. avrnei/sqai( 
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From this we learn that Justin and his brothers and sisters in Christ are accused and 
convicted of being ‘Christians’. The response of the Romans is neither indifference nor 
praise but prosecution. Justin’s argument that a name means nothing apart from actions 
is to say the actions speak louder than words. This is a prelude to his argument for 
differentiation amongst those who should be considered worthy to share in Christ’s 
name, those who can reasonably be said to follow his way, and those who cannot. The 
salient point at this juncture is that Justin is explicit in claiming that being ‘Christian’ is 
a recognisable charge, related to the Master, Christ, whom he follows. 1A 11.1 expands 
on the name:‘Whereas we speak of that which is with God, as appears also from the 
confession of their faith made by those who are charged with being Christians, though 
they know that death is the punishment awarded to him who so confesses.’187 Death is 
the reward for those who confess to the crime of being ‘Christian’. This claim is 
repeated in Dial 46. 2A 2, provides an extended account of this reality: 
A certain woman was living with a husband who was licentious, and she had once been 
licentious herself. But when she learnt the teachings of Christ she came to her sense, 
and tried to persuade her husband to come to his, reporting what she had been taught, 
and telling him of the punishment in eternal fire that will come to those who live 
senselessly and not according to right reason. He, however, continued in his lascivious 
ways and did things which alienated his wife. For the woman considered it irreligious 
to sleep any longer with a man who tried, wrongly and against the law of nature, to 
make use of every opening for pleasure; and she wanted to withdraw from the 
marriage. But her advisers prevailed upon her to continue living with him, on the 
grounds that there was hope that her husband might at some time change, and so she 
forced herself to stay. But then the woman’s husband went to Alexandria, and it was 
reported that he was behaving in even worse fashion. So, to avoid becoming a partner 
in his evil and impious behaviours by remaining in the marriage and sharing his table 
and his bed, she gave him what in your language is called a ‘divorce’, and was 
separated from him. That perfect gentleman, her husband, should have been glad that 
she had stopped doing the things she had so readily done in the past with servants and 
hired workers, delighting in getting drunk and in all kinds of evil, and glad that she 
wanted to stop doing what he had been doing. Instead, when she had left him because 
                                                                                                                                                                          
evxetazo,menoi parakou,ontai( to.n auvto.n tro,pon kakw/j zw/ntej i;swj avforma.j pare,cousi toi/j a;llwj 
katale,gein tw/n pa,ntwn Cristianw/n avse,beian kai. avdki,an ai`roume,noij) 
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ginw,skontej tw/| o`mologu/nti qa,naton th.n zhmi,an kei/sqai( fai,netai) (own trans). 
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he did not want to stop, he brought a charge against her, saying that she was a 
Christian. She then submitted a petition to you, the emperor, praying that she be given 
leave to set her financial affairs in order first and to answer the charge later, after she 
had arranged her affairs; and this you granted. Her former husband, unable for the 
time being to proceed against her, then turned against a man called Ptolemy, who had 
been her instructor in the teachings of the Christians, in the following manner. He 
persuaded a centurion who was a friend of his to arrest Ptolemy and to ask him if he 
was a Christian. And when Ptolemy, a lover of truth who would not even think of 
deceiving or lying, confessed that he was a Christian, the centurion had him put in 
chains and subjected him to punishment for a long time in prison. Finally, when the 
man was brought before Urbicus, the same question was put to him again, and this 
only: whether he was a Christian. And again, because through the teaching of Christ he 
had come to personal knowledge of the good, he confessed the school of divine virtue. 
For whenever a person denies something, he does so either because he altogether 
repudiates what he denies, and so becomes a denier, or he shuns confessing it because 
he knows that he does not deserve it, and that matter has nothing to do with him. 
Neither of these is the case with a true Christian. And Urbius ordered him to be led 
away. Another Christian, a man called Lucius, on seeing the judgement given in this 
irrational way, said to Urbicus: “Why did you order this man to be punished when he is 
not convicted of being either an adulterer or a fornicator or a murderer or a thief or a 
robber or one who has done any evil at all, but confesses that he is called by the name 
of Christian? Your judgement does not befit a pious emperor, or a philosophical Caesar 
– his son- or the holy senate, O Urbicus.” His only reply was similarly to say to Lucius: 
“I think you also are one of them.” And when Lucius said, “Certainly”, Urbicus 
ordered that he too be led away. Lucius further confessed that he was thankful to have 
been set free from evil masters such as these and that he was going to the father and 
king of all. And still another, a third, came forward and was sentenced to be 
punished.’188 
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Key to understanding this passage is the lack of conception of what a ‘Christian’ is at 
this time. As Thorsteinsson notes, the charge brought against the woman who converts 
is nothing more than that she was a ‘Christian’, quite apart from any content.189 As the 
others come forward it is obvious that no further charges or evidence are required to 
secure a conviction. As Justin says at 1A 4.1, there is nothing that can be judged from a 
name alone, evidence of something must be required.
190
 In this narrative we find three 
‘Christians’ individually charged with ‘being Christian’. Though it is not clear what 
status such charges and trials had in all places in under Roman law, it is clear that this is 
no casual name calling. These are serious accusations which can and do result in death 
for the accused if they fail to deny or recant. Following the accusation, the woman is 
allowed to put her affairs in order and prepare a defence. Ptolemy and Lucius are not as 
fortunate and suffer at the hands of the authorities on this charge. Furthermore, Justin 
says in 2A 8.6 that Crescens  may understand ‘Christian’ teachings and their truth but 
conceals and distracts from this out of fear, suggesting that being ‘Christian’ is 
something with which death and punishment are to be associated and expected. Indeed, 
in Dial 44.1 Justin says that death belongs to ‘Christians’ and Judith Perkins has argued 
that suffering is the feature which most defines ‘Christians’ in the minds of non-
‘Christians’:  
‘What did inhabitants of the Roman empire know about Christianity? Notwithstanding 
the paucity of sources for the period and their elite bias, it is safe to say that one thing 
                                                                                                                                                                          
avnh,r( de,on auvto.n cai,rein o[ti a] pa,lai meta. tw/n u`phretw/n kai. tw/n misqofo,rwn euvcerw/j e;pratte( 
me,qaij cai,rousa kai, kaki,a| pash|( tou,twn me.n pw/n pra,xeqn pe,pauto( kai. auvto.n ta. auvta. pau,sasqai 
pra,ttonta evbou,leto( mh. boulme,nou avpallagei,shj( kathgori,an pepoi,htai( le,gwn auvth.n Cristianh.n 
ei=nai) kai. h` me.n bibli,dio,n soi tw/| auvtokra,tori avne,dwke( pro,teron sugcwrhqh/nai auvth/| diokh,sasqai ta. 
ea`uth/j avxiou/sa( e;peita tV avpologh,sasqai peri. tou/ kathgorh,matoj meta. th/n tw/n pragma,twn auvth.j 
dioi,khsin\ kai. sunecw,rhsaj tou/to) o `de. tau,thj pote. avnh,r( pro.j evkeinwn me.n mh. duna,menoj tanu/n e;ti 
le,gein( pro.j Ptolemai/o,n tina dida,skalon evkei,nhj tw/n Cristianw/n maqhma,twn geno,menon evtra,peto dia. 
tou/de tou/ tro,pou) evlato,ntarcon fi,lon auvtw/| u`pa,rconta e;peise labe,sqai tou/ Ptolemai,ou kai. 
avnerwth/sai eiv Cristiano,j evsti) kai. to.n Ptolemai/on( filalh,qh avllV ouvk avpathlo.n ouvde. yeudolo,gon 
th.n gnw,mhn o;nta( o`mologh,santa ea`uto.n ei=nai Cristiano,n( evn desmoi/j gene,sqai o` ek`ato,ntarcoj 
pepoi,hke( kai. evpi. polu.n cro,non evn tw/| desmwthri,w| evkola,sato) teleutai/on de. o[te evpi. Ou;rbikon h;cqh o` 
a;nqrwpoj o`moi,wj auvto. tou.to mo,non evxhta,sqh( eiv ei;h Cristiano,j) kai. pa,lin ta. kala. ea`utw/| 
sunepista,menoj dia. th.n avpo. tou/ Cristou/ didach,n( to. didaskalei/on th/j qei,aj avreth/j w`molo,ghsen) o` 
ga.r avrnou,menoj ot`iou/n h; kategnwkw.j tou/ pra,gmatoj e;xarnoj gi,netai( h; e`auto.n avna,xio.n evpista,menoj 
kai. avllo,trion tou/ pra,gmatoj th.n om`ologi,an feu,gei\ w-n ouvde.n pro,sesti tw/| avlhqinw/| Cristianw/|) kai. 
tou. Ouvrbi,kou keleu,santoj auvto.n avpacqh/nai( Lou,kio,j tij( kai. auvto.j w;n Cristiano,j( or`w/n th/n avlo,gwj 
ou[twj genome,nhn kri,sin( pro.j to.n Ou;rbikon e;fh\ `Ti,j h` aivti,a tou. mh,te moico.n mh,te po,rnon mh,te 
avndrofo,non mh,te lwpodu,thn mh,te a[rpaga mh,te a`plw/j avdi,khma, ti pra,xanta evlegco,menon( ovno,matoj de. 
Cristianou/ proswnumi,an o`molgou/nta to.n a;nqrwpon tou/ton evkola,sw* Ouv pre,ponta euvsebei/ auvtokra,tori 
ouvde. filoso,fw| Kai,sari paidi. ouvde. th/| i`era/| sugklh,tw| kri,neij( w= Ou;rbike)V kai. o]j ouvde.n a;llo 
avpokrina,menoj kai. pro.j to.n Lou,kion e;fh\ `Dokei/j moi kai. su. ei=nai toiou/toj)’ kai. Louki,ou fh,santoj\ 
`Ma,lista( v pa,lin kai. auvto.n avpacqh/nai evke,leusen) o` de. Kai. ca,rin eivde,nai w`molo,gei tou/ ponhrw/n 
despotw/n tw/n toiou,twn avphlla,cqai kai. pro.j to.n pate,ra kai. basile,a tw/n o[lwn poreu,esqai) kai a;lloj 
de. tri,toj evpelqw.n kolasqh/nai prosetimh,qh) 
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 R.M. Thorsteinsson, ‘Genre and Purpose’ (2012), 108. 
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 Justin is not alone in highlighting and challenging this situation. Athenagoras’ Embassy 2 makes a 
point identical to Justin’s here.  
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contemporaries knew about Christianity (in fact, the only thing they give any evidence 
of knowing) is that Christians held death in contempt and were ready to suffer for their 
beliefs.’191  
Perkins adds Galen, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, along with the aforementioned 
Pliny and Tacitus, to those pagans who early on discuss ‘Christians’ within the 
parameters of death and suffering.  It is death, like that of other ‘Christians’ at the hands 
of the rulers, that Crescens fears (or at least Justin implies he fears) if the suspicion of 
his ‘Christian’ status be confirmed. 
That being a ‘Christian’ is something to which one confesses (o`mologou/nta), something 
one admits, implies that it is something disgraceful that one would be expected to keep 
hidden. The converse of confession is to deny (avrneomai) and we shall see below that 
Justin juxtaposes these terms in just this way in order to expose those he cannot accept 
as ‘Christians’.  As we see here, the confession of Christ is apologetic through and 
through, long before it comes to mean declaratory like the confessions of creedal 
type.
192
 Justin seemingly uses this term in a positive tone at 1A 8.2 when he says ‘we 
are eager to confess we are Christians’. However, this is only in contrast to the 
possibility to deny a charge. ‘Christian’ is most definitely a shame name in these texts; 
clearly the name of Christ as indeed blasphemed among the Gentiles.  
The fact that ‘Christians’ will not deny this name despite its criminal status is revealing 
about the nature of the name itself and the self-understanding of the ‘Christian’ 
community. Justin says ‘Christians’ will neither deny Christ’s name, nor deny or 
blaspheme Christ himself. These are interchangeable for Justin. To deny his name is to 
deny Christ and blaspheme against god. ‘On the other hand, if any of those accused 
becomes a denier and simply says that he is not a Christian, you release him, as though 
you were in no way able to convict him of doing anything wrong… For just as certain 
people, although they have learnt from Christ the teacher that they should not 
deny…’193 (1A 4.6-7). 
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 For a definition of the meaning of ‘confessions’ as distinct but related to creeds in the reformed, and 
following into the modern period see J.K.A Smith, Calvinist (2010), 49- 54. 
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 kai. pa,lin eva.n me,n tij tw/n kathgoroume,nwn e;xarnoj ge,nhtai( th/| fwnh|/ mh. ei=nai fh,saj( avfi,ete auvto.n 
w`j mhde.n evle,gcein e;contej a`marti,nonta))) o]n ga.r tro,pon paralabo,ntej tine.j para. tou/ didaska,lou 
Cristou/ mh. avrnei/sqai) 
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 In Dial 131.2 ‘Christians’ would ‘endure all torments rather than deny Christ even by 
word’.194 Again, in Dial 96.2:  
‘But when neither they nor you will listen to us, but you do all in your power to force us 
to deny Christ, we resist you and prefer to endure death, confident that God will give us 
all the blessings which He promised us through Christ.’195   
Add to these are the same sentiments in Dial 9; 30; 121 and 1A 31 and the pattern is 
clear: ‘Christians’ will always confess to the criminal charge of being ‘Christians’ 
because Christ’s name is made their name and ‘the church...has arisen from His name 
and participates in His name (for we are all called Christians)’, as Dial 63.5 proclaims. 
This makes it clear that the name is neither chosen, nor is it given by god as Israel was, 
but rather that the name is dictated by those who killed Christ and persecute his 
followers. In this way, ‘Christians’ are like Christ; they share in his fate. Christ himself 
is the central foreground and ‘Christians’ follow behind him. A claim of belonging and 
composition is being made here. Rhetorically and subtly Justin is elevating Christ, who 
he is and his teaching, and arguing that despite their criminal status ‘Christians’ are 
simply those who follow his ways, which he will demonstrate to be good ways. At 1A 
14.4 Justin declares that it is for the rulers to judge for themselves ‘whether we have 
been taught (dedida,gmeqa) and teach these things’. ‘These things’ refers to Christ’s 
teaching but the crucial, self-referential plural does not refers to Justin’s community or 
true ‘Christians’ only. More precisely it applies to all ‘Christians’ but not to all those 
who are commonly called, charged and confess to being ‘Christians’. ‘Christians’ will 
not deny Christ when they are accused because he is all they have.  
There is only one group after and under Christ. Though the Romans consider the title 
shameful in itself, Justin will argue, by outlining what it is to truly follow Christ, that 
they have failed to understand ‘Christians’ and persecute them needlessly. Christ is the 
leader with whom ‘Christians’ identify and the criminal understanding of the name 
shows that the Romans do not know truly who Christ is or who genuinely follows him. 
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 pa,nqV u`pome,nomen u`pe.r tou/ mhde. me,cri fwnh/j avrnei/sqai to.n Cristo,n) 
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 Kai. mh. peiqome,nwn h`mi/n mh,te( evkei,nwn mh,te u`mw/n( avlla. avrnei/sqai h`ma/j to. o;noma tou/ Cristou/ 
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2.2 An outsider’s view 
In 2A.12.1 Justin further demonstrates that ‘Christian’ is a shame name used by those 
who do not believe in Christ by recounting his own understanding prior to his 
conversion: 
‘For I myself, too, when I was delighting in the doctrines of Plato, and heard the 
Christians slandered, and saw them fearless of death, and of all other things which are 
counted fearful, perceived that it was impossible that they could be living in wickedness 
and pleasure.’196 
Here Justin describes himself as an outsider, delighting in Plato. He recalls the speech 
he heard about people accused of being ‘Christians’ as well as their endurance and 
ethics. Justin presents himself as an outsider in this description and is attempting to 
report how ‘Christians’ are seen outside of the community in an objective fashion. 
‘Christians’ were considered bad news. In observing them objectively197 Justin finds the 
opposite to be the case. This is naturally supposed to tell the audience that if one is truly 
a ‘lover of truth’, they too should be able to tell objectively that ‘Christians’ are not, in 
fact, bad. The key point, is that ‘Christians’ were an observable and distinct group and 
that despite a lack of understanding of their practices, were nonetheless considered a 
bad group in the eyes of the populace. Justin is only reporting his pre-‘Christian’ view, 
a Graeco-Roman outsider’s view, which understands there to be a group, whatever its 
composition and provenance,
198
 to which the maligned name ‘Christian’ is assigned. 2A 
13.1-2 provides a similar view: ‘For I too, learning of the evil cloak placed around the 
divine teachings of the Christians by the wicked demons to divert other human beings, 
laughed at those falsely making these accusations and at their cloak and popular 
opinion. Praying and fighting with all my might to be found a Christian.’199 Here, Justin 
states again that to him ‘Christians’ were a recognisable group that he first knew of on 
account of falsehoods spread by others. The default understanding was one of iniquity 
from which one has to move out and be re-educated. There is no neutral position. Once 
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 Kai. ga.r auvto.j evgw,( toi/j Pla,twnoj cai,rwn dida,gmasi( diaballomen,nouj avkou,wn Cristianou.j or`w/n 
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 That is as recognisably existing and being pejoratively understood but not necessarily strongly 
separate from ‘Judaism’. 
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 Justin probably only has ‘true Christians’ in mind here rather than those he is wishes to rule out of the 
‘Christian’ name. 
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the label exists it carries associations and these are negative in the eyes of most. When 
Justin’s view changed, he strove to become a ‘Christian’, which is to say something like 
“if those whom are commonly known as Christians are characterised by such virtue, 
contrary to what is said about them, then I want to become one of them.” He wants to 
join their group and, indeed, he confesses to, rather than denies, the charge of being a 
‘Christian’. We must remember that this is a very bold claim. This is not similar to 
confessing belief in Christ today, which might, in the western world, bring about mild 
ridicule or indifference. This was equivalent to declaring oneself to be a serious 
criminal, which is why it is a confession or admission, albeit one that is morphing into a 
prideful boast as a subversion of what it means to confess. The term ‘Christian’ is still 
being defined negatively, as an external reference to a group. The term is still 
conditioned by the negative definition but is now, adopted and defiantly transformed by 
Justin.  
3 Teacher and Pupils 
As already alluded to, Justin thinks of himself as a philosopher. This is for him a 
‘Christian’ vocation; being a philosopher and a ‘Christian’ is no contradiction because 
his philosophy is that of Christ.
200
 Justin frequently describes Christ as a teacher 
(dida,skaloj). Skarsaune plays down the significance of Christ’s teaching office for 
Justin, noting that in the Dial he only calls Christ a teacher twice.
201
 It is true that Justin 
only says this explicitly of Christ twice in the Dial (76.3; 108.2), but he also says this 
three times in 1A 4.7; 19.6 and 32.2.  Many of these references occur in the context of 
the misunderstandings displayed by human teachers of Trypho.
202
 Furthermore, as will 
be shown below, Justin frequently refers to ‘Christians’ has having been taught 
(evdi,daxan) and as those who follow Christ’s teaching (dida,gmasin). As far as Justin is 
concerned, this is the main defining feature of any genuine ‘Christian’ group. This 
should not be thought of as a competing or contradictory definition to his claim for 
‘Christians’ being a race. When Justin makes that claim it is in order to demonstrate 
continuity with ‘Jewish’ heritage, which he usually perceives as being in contrast to his 
interlocutors. The claim of the teaching and philosophy of Christ is fundamental for his 
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 Rebecca Lyman has pointed out that perceived natural distinction between Justin being a ‘Christian’, 
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 O. Skarsaune ‘Conversion’ (1976), 62. 
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 Dial 9.1; 38.1,2; 43.6; 48.2; 62.2,3; 68.7; 71.1; 83.1; 94.4; 102.5; 103,2,9; 110.1; 112.2,4; 117.3,4; 
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‘Christian’ definition. It is the first thing that makes a ‘Christian’, and which can be put 
to the test by examining the evidence that Christ’s teaching is followed. Christ is 
another means of reconnecting to antiquity but the first marker of the ‘Christian’ 
philosophy is Christ himself, no one and nothing else, neither other teachers (be they 
‘Jewish’ or Stoic or Platonist), nor Marcion, nor Valentinus or Simon. Only after this is 
established can Justin defend the antiquity of faith, open it to his interlocutors and rule 
out alternative formulations of ‘Christianity’ that do not adhere, by Justin’s standards, to 
Christ’s teaching. 
In 2A 2.2 it is not said of the woman who converts that she became a ‘Christian’. Rather 
it is said that ‘But when she learnt the teachings of Christ she came to her senses, and 
tried to persuade her husband to come to his.’203 And likewise of Ptolemy in the same 
chapter when asked ‘whether he was a Christian: ‘And again, because through the 
teaching of Christ he had come to a personal knowledge of the good, he confessed the 
school of divine virtue.’204 (2A 2.13) being conscious of his duty, and the nobility of it 
through the teaching of Christ, he confessed his discipleship in the divine virtue.’ 
Ptolemy was disciple – one under the rule and disciple – of the teachings of Christ. The 
woman was persuaded and attempted to persuade by virtue of these teachings. Not by 
ritual, custom or birth rite of an ethnos are these converts made but by becoming 
disciples and pupils under their one and only master, Christ. 
There are numerous occasions in the Dial and both Apologies where Justin refers to 
Christ as having ‘taught us’ (evdi,dacen h`ma/j), and to ‘Christians’ as having been taught 
by the prophetic Spirit or simply being taught without a subject specified.
205
 Justin also 
frequently refers to Christ being a teacher and references his teaching. For example, in 
Dial 76.3, he says ‘And, in calling him angel of great counsel, did not Isaiah predict 
that Christ would be teacher of those truths which he expounded when he came upon 
this earth?’ 206 The same is found in Dial 105.5 and 108.2 also. This is not reserved 
only for Dial. In 1A 12.9 he says: ‘That all these things should come to pass, I say, our 
Teacher foretold, He who is both Son and Apostle of God the Father of all and the 
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 evpei. de. ta. tou/ Crostou/ dida,gmata e;rnw( evswfroni,sqh kai. to/n a;ndra o`moi,wj swfronei/n pei,qein 
evpeira/to)  
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 kai. pa,lin ta. kala. ea`utw/| suneoista,menoj dia. th.n avpo. tou/ Cristou/ didach,n( to. didaskalei/on th/j 
qei,aj avreth/j w`molo,ghsen) 
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 Dial 18.1; 32.5; 48.4; 53.1; 76.3; 96. 3; 1A 4.7;  6.2; 13.3; 14.4; 15.9; 19.6; 23.2; 32.2;  33.5; 46.1; 
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 Kai. `Hsai<aj de. mega,lhj boulh/j a;ggelon auvto.n eivpw,n( ouvci. tou,twn w-nper evdi,daxen evlqw.n 
dida,skalon auvto.n gegenh/saqai proekh,ussen;  
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Ruler, Jesus Christ; from whom also we have the name of Christians’.207 Further 
examples of this understanding of Christ can be found in 1A 8.3; 16.14; 21.1. Christ as 
the teacher confers his name to his pupils. We have here a positive adoption of the name 
‘Christians’ in the context of school tradition. The description of ‘Christians’ as people 
who have been taught by Christ is by far the most common Justin employs. In addition 
to the five examples above, the same concept is extended by three occasions 
‘Christians’ which describe as being disciples (maqhtai,) in Christ’s name and of his 
doctrines, where ‘disciple’ means somebody who is taught, the pupil of a teacher or an 
apprentice of a master. This occurs in Dial 35.2; 39.2 and 1A15.6.
208
 Further, those who 
are acquainted with( evpignwskw, to come to know, to have knowledge Christ occurs 
twice (Dial 8.2; 44.4) and those who are his friends (filoi) twice (Dial 8.1; 139.4). 
Friendship is important but clearly being someone who is taught by Christ is the 
primary description and focus.  Direct relation to Christ as the teacher of truth is the 
model and the insider definition of what ‘Christians’ are. 
 
Although what Christ has to offer is gained by following his doctrines not by rituals and 
sacrifices, composition of the ‘Christian’ group around the teaching of Christ has a 
parallel with the ‘Jewish’ community on precisely these lines. Justin is keen to draw this 
out. ‘Christians’ are not the only people who have teachers and teaching and, therefore, 
Justin has to make a point of who the teacher of true teachings is. In doing so, Justin 
contrasts his interlocutors’ teachers with Christ the teacher. For example: ‘”I am 
aware,” I replied, “that my assertion must seem paradoxical, especially to you of your 
race, who were never interested in understanding or doing what God requires, but 
rather what your teachers require, as God himself cries.”’209  (Dial 48.2) Here, Christ’s 
teaching is claimed to be consistent with and revealing of the requirements of god. This 
is sharply contrasted with his interlocutors’ teachers who give only their own teaching, 
like the founder of any philosophical school. Justin makes claims like this numerously 
in the Dial. For example, in Dial 27.4 Justin says: ‘But you are a hard-hearted people, 
without understanding, blind and lame, children in whom there is no faith. As he [god] 
himself says, “Honouring him only with your lips, but your hearts are far from him, 
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 genh,sesqai tau/ta pa,nta proei/pe( fhmi,( o` h`me,teroj dida,skaloj kai. tou/ patro.j pa,ntwn kai. despo,tou 
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 Though his disciples, meaning the twelve who travelled with Jesus, are referred to twelve times Dial 
49.5; 51.2; 53.1,2,4,5 (twice); 99.2; 100.4; 105.6; 107.2 and 1A 67.8.  
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 Kavgw. pro.j tau/ta e;fhn \ Oi=dV o[ti para,doxoj o` lo,goj dokei/ ei=nai( kai. ma,lista toi/j avpo/ tou/ ge,nouj 
u`mw/n( oi[tinej ta. tou/ qeou/ ou;te noh/sai ou;te poih/sai, pote bebou,lhsqe( avlla. ta. tw/n didaska,lwn u`mw/n( 
w`j auvto/j o `qeo.j boa|/) (own trans.). 
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teaching your own doctrines” and not his.’’210 The ‘Jews’ are here accused of teaching 
their own doctrines, neither those of god nor those of Christ. These teachers and their 
pupils do not understand what god wants, and offer only the appearance of living in 
god’s ways and according to the commandments. The motif of these teachers being 
hard-hearted is one that Justin repeats often as a contrast to ‘Christians’ who have a 
spiritual receptiveness to god through their spiritual circumcision. Dial 38.2 also makes 
the claim that these teachings and teachers are at odds with god: ‘I shall recount to you 
other doctrines which may seem even more paradoxical to you, but don’t be disturbed; 
instead of leaving me, become more zealous and inquisitive listeners. At the same time, 
forsake the tradition of your teachers, for they are convicted by the prophetic Spirit of 
being incapable of understanding the truths spoken by God and of preferring to spread 
their own opinions.’211  Justin is warning Trypho against the vainglory of his teachers in 
contrast to the teachings of god. To him they are godless and bow ‘the knee to Baal’ 
(Dial 39.1). This is remarkably similar to what Justin says about philosophical truth in 
the introduction to the Dial. There, as will be examined in detail in the following 
chapter, Justin holds that philosophy was once pure revelation given by god, but has 
degenerated into a loose collection of half-truths perpetuated by the conceited fancy of 
the leaders of the philosophical schools and the foolish sycophants who follow them. 
This, which is a key argument in demonstrating the kind of thing Justin claims 
following Christ to be, the true philosophy, the way and teaching, is a radical critique of 
what these teachers suggest. Justin is urging Trypho to take heed of those who can 
perceive the truths of god with the aid of the Holy Spirit, and to join his own school 
tradition: the true ‘Christians’ and true Israel. In his words: ‘...every day some of you are 
forsaking your erroneous ways to become disciples in the name of Christ, and this same 
name of Christ enlightens you to receive all the graces and gifts according to your 
merits. One receives the spirit of wisdom, another of counsel, another of fortitude, 
another of healing, another of foreknowledge, another of teaching, and another the fear 
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  `Umei/j de. lao.j sklhoka,rdioj( kai. avsu,netoj( kai. tuflo.j( kai. cwlo.j( kai. ui`oi. oi-j ouvk e;sti pi,stij evn 
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 :Eti ga.r kai. paradoxote,rouj dokou/ntaj a;llouj lo,gouj avkou,sete \ mh. tara,ssesqe de, avlla. ma/llon 
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ta. i;dia ma/llon dida,skein proairou,menoi) 
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of God’.212 (Dial 39.2) Teaching is the key term and there can be only one true teaching 
for Justin; anyone who demurs from the true way of God and Christ is wrong.  
A further contrast is that his interlocutors have teachers with whom they are naturally 
associated as ancestors by virtue of their ethnicity, yet only kata sa,rka (according to 
the flesh, i.e. descended from Abraham) whereas the ‘Christians’ only have their 
‘Christian’ ethnicity through association with their teacher, just as Platonists or Stoics 
have association only through the philosophy they follow. Furthermore, association 
according to the flesh, especially the mark of circumcision in the flesh, is rejected by 
Justin as a sign of a lack of nationhood. At Dial 19.4 Justin points out that Adam, nor 
Abel, nor Enoch, nor Lot, nor Noah (‘the beginning of our race’), nor Melchizedek (‘the 
priest of the Most High’), was circumcised. To Melchizedek ‘Abraham the first who 
received circumcision after the flesh, gave tithes, and he blessed him, after whose order 
God declared, by the mouth of David, that He would establish the everlasting priest.’213  
Justin concludes: ‘to you alone this circumcision was necessary, in order that the 
people may be no people, and the nation no nation.’ 214 (ibid.5) Circumcision then, in 
contrast to the everlasting priesthood that ‘Christians’ know through Christ without it, is 
a sign of a different identity, it does not mark out a special people of nation but the 
opposite making them not appear as a nation, to blend in (Justin was aware that 
Egyptians and others also practiced circumcision as Dial 28.5 makes clear where he 
says circumcision was of no use to the Egyptians or the sons of Moab or Edom). 
Moreover, according to Justin, circumcision and other commandments, like keeping the 
Sabbath, are necessary only in order to ‘retain the memorial of God’ (i[na mnh,mhn 
lamba,nhte tou/ qeou/), because ‘Jews’ had lost sight of god and were practicing idolatry. 
Being associated with the patriarchs ‘according to flesh’ (i.e. being marked by a fleshly 
circumcision) was therefore, Justin argues, a sign of disobedience. Rather than 
signalling honourable identity and nationhood under god, it rather indicated distance 
from god. This is in contrast to the true Israel, the uncircumcised ‘Christians’, who 
know him through Christ.  
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 ginw,skwn e;ti kaqV h`me,ran tina.j maqhteuom,nouj eivj to. o;noma tou/ Cristou/ auvtou/ kai. avpolei,pontaj 
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For Justin, the identity of a people or a nation is the result of an identity formed by 
teaching, the type of teaching philosophical schools shape and deliver. Even what we 
call ‘religion’ is understood by Justin primarily in the sense of  ‘philosophy’, school 
adherence and tradition, a system of beliefs and practices ‘voluntarily’ adopted and 
maintained. Indeed, as Boyarin suggests,: ‘We see in both such scholastic Christian 
writers as Justin and in the equally scholastic producers of the Mishnah the impact of 
the philosophical schools and their own developing notions of orthodoxy and authority, 
as well as the coming together of other cultural discourses into the aggregate discourse 
of orthodoxy.’215  
Justin is in the vanguard of identity formation and orthodoxy. The definition Justin puts 
forward as ‘Christian’ philosophy, further down the line becomes ‘Christianity’. 
However, Justin is not himself arguing for an independent voluntary belief system. As 
we have seen in his understanding of ‘Christians’ as the true race of Israel, he primarily 
recommends practices (baptism, the Eucharist), interpretation of the prophets and the 
Torah, rather than merely intellectual doctrines. Nonetheless, Justin’s central stress it 
that it is through Christ, the one and only teacher and teaching, rather than through the 
traditions of the law, that true friendship with god is handed down. ‘Christians’ are 
followers who are led directly to god rather than a pre-existing family that thinks it 
belongs to god by right or birth. As mentioned before, Tertullian will later say that 
‘Christians’ are made not born. For Justin, the tutelage of Christ is the first and most 
important marker of what makes a ‘Christian’. The following section will examine the 
shape of this philosophy of Christ that Justin argues for and how he establishes it.  
3.1 Christian Philosophy/Student  
Being a philosopher under the tutelage of Christ is something of great importance to 
Justin. Concerning the historicity of Justin’s philosophical journey Skarsaune makes a 
salient point: ‘the way a man describes his own conversion may reveal some very 
essential ideas of his concerning conversion in general, indeed, it may tell us something 
important about his conception of Christianity.’216 Skarsaune is surely right here. 
Whether or not Justin’s philosophical journey is more or less historically factual, his 
presentation is noteworthy and is a clue to the fundamental shape of ‘Christian’ faith 
that Justin proposes. We should not over emphasise the novelty of this presentation. 
Justin does not portray ‘Christian’ faith as a philosophy in order to impress the Romans. 
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Rather, it is a way of demonstrating fidelity and linage from Christ. Loveday Alexander 
has said: ‘To the casual pagan observer the activities of the average synagogue or 
church would look more like the activities of a school than anything else. Teaching or 
preaching, moral exhortation, and the exegesis of canonical texts are activities 
associated in the ancient with philosophy, not religion.’217 There is not a qualitative 
distinction that we moderns tend to apply to religion and philosophy in the second 
century and Graeco-Roman philosophy participated in ‘religion’ and would appear 
often to have a ‘religious’ nature.218 Nonetheless, the claim for a ‘Christian’ philosophy 
is innovative because it allows Justin to claim the heritage of Abraham and Noah and 
with Noah the idea of being ‘a race’ despite being of gentile stock. Moreover, it allows 
Justin to present ‘Christians’ as being gathered from all over the world and every nation. 
‘Christians’ are no longer a ‘no-nation’, but the true Israel that can demonstrate its 
antiquity. As such, it should not be understood as a new superstition that undermines the 
Roman order (and so runs the risks of being threatened by it), but should be legally 
tolerated by the Roman authorities.  
 
At the beginning of the Dial, Trypho recognises Justin as a philosopher (chiefly because 
he wears a philosophers cloak) and beckons him over so that he and his friends can 
learn from him. Justin does not waver from this image at any point; He is seen by 
Trypho and his friends as a philosopher and he sees himself this way too. Indeed, he 
continues to wear the cloak and states that he is a philosopher in Dial.8.2. In explaining 
why he has beckoned Justin over, Trypho reveals some philosophical education of his 
own and his instruction never to despise philosophers. This is interesting in light of the 
fact that Trypho later reveals that he has been instructed by his teachers not to speak to 
‘Christians’, as although Trypho does not recognise Justin to be a ‘Christian’ until 
Justin spells it out for him in Dial 8.1. Justin asks him why the law is not enough for 
him after Trypho introduces himself as a Hebrew of circumcision ( `Ebrai/oj evk 
peritomh/j) in Dial.1.3 and Trypho admits that philosophy takes god as its object. The 
following chapter will examine the claims made about philosophy in the Dial in detail 
but it is sufficient for now to note that Justin’s question is a veiled criticism, the force of 
which only becomes clear when one understands that the teaching of Christ is the 
philosophy and truth which takes the prophets as central texts and that Trypho’s 
                                                          
217
 L. Alexander, ‘Paul and the Hellenistic Schools’ (1995), 60.  
218
 G. H. Van Kooten, ‘Religion or a Philosophy?’ (2010), 395. 
84 
 
interpretation of them is far from true philosophy; He and his teachers have the 
elements of the true philosophy but not the tools to understand them: 
‘Philosophy is indeed one’s greatest possession, and is most precious in the sight of 
God, to whom it alone leads us and to whom it unites us, and in truth they who have 
applied themselves to philosophy are holy men. But, many have failed to discover the 
nature of philosophy, and the reason why it was sent down to men.’219 (Dial 2.1) 
‘Philosophy’ is the ‘greatest possession’ both something ‘bestowed’ by ‘holy men’ and 
something that ‘has been sent down to men’, to holy men, something that has come 
down from ‘above’. It’s original most practitioners seem to have become multiform and 
they fail to notice it the unity truth that was sent down from a single source. This is why 
it is possible for Platonists, Stoics, Peripatetics, Theoretics, and Pythagoreans to exist as 
rival claimants which Justin thinks is problematic: 
‘I wish to tell you why it has become many-headed. It has happened that those who first 
handled it [i.e., philosophy], and who were therefore esteemed illustrious men, were 
succeeded by those who made no investigations concerning truth, but only admired the 
perseverance and self-discipline of the former, as well as the novelty of the doctrines; 
and each thought that to be true which he learned from his teacher: then, moreover, 
those latter persons handed down to their successors such things, and others similar to 
them; and this system was called by the name of him who was styled the father of the 
doctrine.’220 (Dial 2.2) 
Here in these two passages (Dial 2.1-2) Justin is demonstrating his belief that 
philosophy is the highest and most precious endeavour, not just of humanity, but of 
humanity in relation to god. It is inherently theological, and although Trypho has seen 
this, not all have. As a point of order here, we ought to note that this thesis will not 
distract itself with discussions of whether Justin was a genuine philosopher or sought to 
harmonise philosophy and faith.
221
 This kind of debate presupposes a hyper distinction 
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between faith and philosophy that is anachronistic to Justin.
222
 For Justin faith (pi,stij) 
and knowledge (gnw/sij) go together and the piety (εὐσέβεια) is useless unless it is 
rational and reasonable and unless it is demonstrable to others (which is why he was 
convinced by the presbutes because he demonstrated his claims to him). Yet, Justin is 
not content to be an ordinary philosopher and will go on to tell Trypho that philosophy 
is disordered, that it has become sectarian and self-aggrandizing and that it has lost its 
way. While, Justin criticises the philosophies of the Graeco-Roman world, he does not 
do so as a man of faith opposed to a man of philosophy, but rather as a true philosopher 
who fights for the one truth over and against failed philosophies of truths. ‘The 
existence of many sets of philosophers is contrary to philosophy’s nature and purpose, 
for by nature philosophy is a single evpisth,mh – here, as often, “art”.’223 Philosophy, for 
Justin, is an art form of a single and unified nature rather than a factioned discourse of 
competing schools. This is something Justin will rely on in making arguments that 
define who is and who is not a true philosopher, which is a ‘Christian’. More pertinent 
for now is that philosophy is about truth, not a lofty abstract truth, but philosophy as 
something eminently practical. Justin’s view of philosophy is like that of a universal 
science, which searches out truth that can be demonstrated and observed. This is 
illuminated by the Platonic contrast Justin observes between knowledge and opinion 
(evpi,statai kai do,xa). It is this contrast which enables him to denounce Crescens in 
2A.3.5 - 6 either as a victim of or as acquiescent with irrational opinion: 
‘And to show that I speak the truth, in the event that these exchanges have not been 
reported back to you, I am prepared to exchange questions with him again, even in your 
presence. This too would be a kingly task. But if my questions and his answers were 
made known to you, then it would be clear to you that he knows nothing. Or, if he does 
know, but dares not speak for fear of those who would hear, the man is, as I have 
already said, proved to be a lover not of wisdom but of vainglory who does not honour 
even the saying of Socrates – which should be held dear: ‘But a man is not to be 
honoured in preference to the truth.’224 (2A 3.5-6)  
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Crescens is a failed candidate for a philosopher by virtue of being a lover of opinion (ouv 
filo,sofoj avlla. filo,doxoj) and, knowing that they wish to be seen as wise men, Justin 
warns the rulers against this frequently
225
. In this way, Justin sees philosophy as a form 
of critical thinking which distinguishes between knowledge and opinion. It also has a 
moral shape and requires its exponents to display the courage of their convictions, 
which Justin presents as lacking in Crescens.  One cannot live badly and be a 
philosopher and there would be an obvious failure in ones powers to discern and test the 
truth if that were the case. What this ought to make clear is the gravity of what Justin is 
claiming for Christ. He is not claiming that following Christ is a helpful option among 
others, he is claiming that Christ’s teachings are the genuine science of the time and 
anything that does not conform to these is idle, and indemonstrable ramblings; it is talk 
that has a false or confused logic and is impressed more with rhetoric than truth.  
This is the operative understanding of philosophy when Justin declares that he is a 
philosopher: 
‘But my spirit was immediately set on fire, and an affection for the prophets, and for 
those who are friends of Christ, took hold of me; while pondering on his words, I 
discovered that his was the only sure and useful philosophy. Thus it is that I am now a 
philosopher.’226 (Dial 8.1-2) 
Here we have Justin’s first declaration that he has discovered the true philosophy drawn 
from the prophets taught by those who love Christ. This reliable and useful philosophy, 
in contrast to all others, pertains to Christ having the power to ‘instil fear into those who 
have wandered from the path of righteousness, whereas they ever remain a great solace 
to those who heed them.’227 (Dial 8.2). Christ’s teaching can change lives and, as such, 
is something to be practiced. It is a practical and effective way of life, as all philosophy 
should be. It is at this point that Trypho and his friends object, having just discovered 
that Justin is in fact a ‘Christian’ and not the philosopher they expected when they 
hailed him over. The discussion continues as a detailed dialogue of who Christ is and 
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his relationship to the prophets, but Justin’s philosophical vocation never vanishes from 
view entirely.  
 
Justin is a philosopher and philosophy is supposed to be the seeking of truth, as is clear 
by his criticism of the sectarian relativity of the contemporary academy. Given this 
understanding of philosophy and Justin’s claims to be philosopher after Christ, it 
follows for him that the ‘Christian’ philosophy is true and not opinion. More than this, 
though, it takes the name of its founder. This may seem elementary but the necessary 
relationship of philosophies to their founder (and especially Christ’s to the ‘Christian’ 
philosophy) is an important point that Justin is at pains to emphasise: 
 
‘Some are called Marcionites, and some Valentinians, and some Basilidians, and some 
Saturnilians, and others still by other names; each called after the author of the 
individual method, just as each one of those who consider themselves philosophers, as I 
said before, claims he must bear the name of the philosophy which he follows, from the 
name of the father of the particular doctrine.’228 (Dial 35.6) 
The above passage confidently asserts that all philosophies are named after their 
founder. The names mentioned above are not incidental. They will be discussed, chiefly 
with attention to Marcion below. The salient point here is that all who follow a way, a 
philosophy, participate in the name of the founder of that particular way. Philosophies 
take the name of their founder then. ‘Christian’ is analogous to this inasmuch as it 
functions as a label group of people who follow the teaching of Christ. Of course, Justin 
would not be content to accept this as a label for one school among others. The analogy 
serves to show that ‘Christians’ follow a teaching but Justin sees this teaching as more 
fundamental and universal than this.  It is for this reason that when Justin first speaks 
about Christ, in Dial 8.2, after having critiqued the multiform philosophy of his age, he 
simply states ‘Thus, and for this reason, I am a philosopher’ (Ou]twj dh. kai. dia. tau/ta 
filo,sofoj evgw,), not ‘I am a Christian’.229  
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‘But my spirit was immediately set on fire, and an affection for the prophets, and for 
those who are friends of Christ, took hold of me; while pondering on his words, I 
discovered that his was the only sure and useful philosophy. Thus it is that I am now a 
philosopher. Furthermore, it is my wish that everyone would be of the same sentiments 
as I, and never fall away from the Saviour’s words; for they have in themselves such 
tremendous majesty that they can instil fear into those who have wandered from the 
path of righteousness, whereas they ever remain a great solace to those who heed the 
salvation of your soul, and if you believe in God, you may have the chance, since I know 
you are no stranger to this matter, of attaining a knowledge of Christ of God, and, after 
becoming a Christian, of enjoying a happy life.’230 (Dial 8.1-2) 
 
Being taught by Christ and following his teachings thus makes one ‘a philosopher’ 
rather than the follower of a particular school. There is no sense in which the friends of 
Christ naturally belong together by any bonds other than his teaching and way of life 
(which is also his grace and salvation), hence by philosophy. ‘Christian’ philosophy is 
the sole truth for Justin whereas the pagan philosophical schools are confused 
amalgamations, bits of truth and irrationality mixed together. It is only later, when 
Justin points to Psalms and interprets them, especially with regard to the notion of 
anointment, that Justin makes a strong link between the anointed one, Christ, and the 
name ‘Christian’:  
 
‘They further show that the Word of God speaks to those who believe in him (who are of 
one soul and one synagogue and one church) as to a daughter, namely, to the church, 
which arisen from and participates in his name (for we are all called Christians)’231 
(Dial 63.5) 
 
This is strong language. The word of god speaks to those who believe in him. Those 
who follow Jesus hear god. He speaks to them as one soul, one synagogue, one church, 
as to a daughter. Yet, despite such strong language, even in this instance, Justin does not 
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state plainly that it is because ‘These words also show clearly that the one who made all 
these things testified that he is to be worshipped as both God and Christ’232 (Dial 63.5) 
that people call themselves ‘Christians’, but rather he added ‘for we are all called 
Christians’. It appears then the same phenomenon already observed is again present 
here; ‘Christians’ follow Christ, they are the synagogue and within that the gathered 
ones who hear god through Christ but others, outsiders, name them as something other; 
as ‘Christians’ after him 
 
The greater significance of the link between Christ’s name and ‘Christians’ is that in 
acknowledging it Justin has a tool to differentiate ‘true Christians’ from others. Those 
who are equally called ‘Christians’ by outsiders, but are not of Justin’s understanding of 
Christ’s teaching, have no right to belong to the same flock, either because they have 
not been instructed the same way, or because these do not display the same way of life. 
In emphasising the link between Christ and ‘Christians’, Justin will be able to claim that 
some of those who are ‘called Christians’ are mis-titled. That being called ‘Christian’ is 
constituted only by relationship to Christ, who is the teacher, is not incidental to Justin: 
it is essential. He emphasises it again and again. For example, in Dial 117.3 - 5 he states 
the following: 
 
‘For only Christians have ventured to give such prayers and thanksgiving for their food 
both solid and liquid food, whereby the passion which the Son of God endured for us is 
commemorated. But your high priests and teachers have caused his name to be 
profaned and blasphemed throughout the whole world. But those filthy garments, which 
you have placed upon on all who have become ‘Christians’ by the name of Jesus… for, 
first of all, not even now does your nation extend from the rising to the setting of the 
sun, but there are nations among which none of your race ever dwelt. For there is not 
one single race of men, whether barbarians, or Greeks, or people addressed by any 
other name, nomads, or vagrants, or herdsmen living in tents, among whom prayers 
and thanksgiving are not offered through the name of the crucified Jesus to the Father 
and Maker of the universe. And the Scripture sets forth that in the time of the prophet 
Malachi he said, the dispersion of your people over all the earth, had not yet come to 
pass.’233(Dial 117.3-5)   




 Tau/ta ga.r mo,na kai. Cristianoi. pare,labon poiei/n( kai. evpV avnamnh,sei de. th/j trofh/j auvtw/n xhra/j 
te kai. u`gra/j( evn h-| kai. tou/ pa,qouj( o] pe,ponqe diV auvtou.j o` ui`o.j tou/ qeou/( me,mnhntai \ ou- to.  o;noma 
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The close association with the name of Christ is of paramount importance to Justin. His 
mention of abuse in the form of ‘filthy garments’ which have been placed upon ‘all who 
have become Christians by the name of Jesus’, risks that modern readers 
anachronistically read a distorting sense into this quote. For example, Falls translates it 
thus: ‘all who have embraced Christianity by the name of Jesus’.234 ‘all who have 
embraced Christianity’ is quite different to ‘those who have become Christians’, as it 
prejudices the reader’s interpretation, predisposing them to understand the cultural 
phenomenon of later and present ‘Christianity’ as a defined movement during the times 
of Justin. Falls’ interpretation does not seem justified by the text. Having chosen the 
word ‘embraced’, Falls has been forced to use ‘Christianity’ rather than ‘Christians’. 
This provides a reading Justin could not have imagined. The aorist participle genomenoij 
is much better understood as simple having become than having more specifically 
embraced or joined a group. If Justin had meant this he could have said kolla/sqai (to 
join) or avspazo,meqa (embrace) – which he does indeed use at 1A.45.5.235 In these cases 
it is Christ’s name and teaching which is embraced, not ‘Christianity’. Though these 
translations may appear tantamount to the same thing in the context this is not the case 
as a defined ‘Christianity/ism’ did not yet exist, but is rather still emerging.  Bobichon 
favours ‘became Christians’ (sont devenus chrétiens) and so does the present author 
because that is what the text seems to demand. Furthermore, the context of persecution 
in which these people have become ‘Christians by the name of Jesus’ is again 
suggestive of an external giving of the name. Yet, Justin is trying to accommodate this 
name and in 1A 45.5 he says they are embracing Christ’s name.  
At a number of points, Justin emphasises that people are called ‘Christians’ after the 
name of Christ, and that this philosophy or teaching is definitively his. In the Dial there 
are five instances where Justin emphasises the direct relationship between the title 
‘Christian’ and the person of Jesus and two further instances where he draws attention 
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avspazome,noij. 14.2: ‘but now embrace only temperance’ - nu/n de. swfrosu,nhn mo,nhn avspazo,menoi) 2A 
3.2: ‘embrace evil’ – fau/la avspazome,noij.   
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to those who fail to legitimately satisfy this connection.
236
 Minns and Parvis noted that 
Justin often uses lego,menoj (called) either when he is introducing terminology that the 
reader might not be familiar with (they cite brethren as a conceptual example) or when 
he wishes to distance himself from what is implied in the name or title.
237
 Examples of 
the latter include the ‘Sons of Zeus’ at 2A 54.2, the ‘Stoic philosophers’ at 1A 20.2, 
neither of which Justin wants to accept are truly what they are called, as well as the 
‘Jewish’ sects in Dial 80.2 such as Genist, Meristae, Gelilaeans, Hellenists, Pharisees, 
Baptists who are called ‘Jews’ but only pay lip service to god’s commands. 
Interestingly, this pattern reappears when Justin speaks about the naming of 
‘Christians’.  
 
In the Dial Justin mentions those ‘called Christians’ five times:238  
‘At this point, Trypho interrupted me by saying, “indeed I know that there are many 
who profess their faith in Jesus and are considered to be Christians, yet they claim 
there is no harm in their eating meats sacrificed to idols. “The fact that there are such 
men” I replied, “who pretend to be Christians and confess the crucified Jesus as their 
Lord and Christ, yet profess not his doctrines, but those of the spirits of error, only 
tends to make us adherents of the true and pure Christian doctrine more ardent in our 
faith and more firm in the hope he announced to us.’239 (Dial 35.1-2) 
‘These words also show clearly that the one who made all these things testified that he 
is to be worshipped as both God and Christ. They further show that the Word of God 
speaks to those who believe in him (who are of one soul and one synagogue and one 
church) as to a daughter, namely, to the church, which arisen from and participates in 
his name (for we are all called Christians). That this is the case and that we are taught 
to forget our ancestral customs is proclaimed in the following words: 'Hearken, O 
daughter, and behold, and incline thine ear; forget thy people and the house of thy 
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 Dial. 35.1; 63.5; 64.1; 117.3; 35.2; 35.6. 
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 Kai. o `Tru,fwn \ Kai. mh.n pollou.j tw/n to.n I`hsou/n lego,ntwn o`mologei/n kai. legome,nwn Cristianw/n 
punqa,nomai evsqi,ein ta. Eivdwlo,quta kai. mhde.n evk tou,tou bla,ptesqai le,gein) Kavgw/ avpekrina,mhn \ kai. 
evk toiou,touj ei=nai a;ndraj( o`mologou/ntaj e`autou.j ei=nai Cristianou.j kai. to.n staurwqe,nta VIhsou/n 
om`ologei/n kai. ku,rion kai. Cristo,n( kai. mh. ta. evkei,nou dida,gmata dida,skontaj avlla. ta. avpo. tw/n th/j 
pla,nhj penuma,twn( h`mei/j( oi` th/j avlhqinh/j VIhsou/ Cristou// kai. kaqara/j didaskali,aj maqhtai,( 
pisto,teroi kai. bebaio,teroi gino,meqa evn th/ evlpi,di th/| kathggelme,nh| u`pV auvtou/) 
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father, and the King shall desire thy beauty: because He is thy Lord, and thou shalt 
worship Him.
240
 (Dial 63.5) 
‘Here Trypho said, "Let Him be recognised as Lord and Christ and God, as the 
Scriptures signify, by you Gentiles, who are all called Christians from his name; but we 
who serve the God who made him[Christ], are not required to confess or worship 
Him."’241 (Dial 64.1) 
‘Then I answered, "I am not so despicable, Trypho, as to say one thing and think 
another. I admitted to before, that I and many others agreed and believe that such will 
come to pass. However I signified to you that many who are pure and pious true 
Christians think otherwise. Moreover, I indicated to you that some who are called 
Christians, but are godless, impious heretics, teach doctrines that are in every way 
blasphemous, atheistical, and unwise. But so that you may know that I am not saying 
this in front of you alone, I shall put together a statement, as best I can, of the debate 
between us in which I shall document the admission which I have just made to you. For 
I do not desire to follow men and their doctrines but desire greatly to follow God and 
his doctrines. For if you have met any who are called Christians, but who do not 
confess this truth, but boldly blaspheme the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and 
the God of Jacob and say there is no resurrection of the dead, and that their souls are 
taken to heaven when they die; do not understand them to be Christians, just as one 
considering rightly, would not confess that the Sadducees, or similar sects of Genist, 
Meristae, Gelilaeans, Hellenists, Pharisees, Baptists, are Jews (do not be offended 
when I say  what I think), but are only called Jews and children of Abraham, paying lip 
service to God, as God Himself declared, whose the hearts are far from Him. But I and 
others, who are Christians of right mind, know that there will be a resurrection of the 
dead, and a thousand years in Jerusalem, which will be rebuilt, adorned, and enlarged, 
as the prophets Ezekiel and Isaiah and others profess.’242 (Dial 80.2-5). 
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 Kai. o `Tru,fwn \  ;Estw u`mw/n( tw/n evx evqnw/n ku,rioj kai. Cristo.j kai. qeo.j gnwrizo,menoj( w`j ai` 
grafai. shmai,nousin( oi[tinej kai. avpo. tou/ ovno,matoj auvtou/ Cristianoi. kalei/sqai pa,ntej evsch,kate \ 
h`mei/j de,( tou/ qeou/ tou/ kai. auvto.n tou/ton poih,santoj latreutai. o;ntej( ouv deo,meqa th/j o`mologi,aj auvtou/ 
ouvde. th/j proskunh,sewj) (own trans.). 
242
 Kavgw. ei=pon \ Ouvc ou[tw ta,laj evgw,( w= Tru,fwn( w`j e[tera le,gein parV a] fronw/) `Wmolo,ghsa ou=n soi 
kai. pro,teron o[ti evgw. me.n kai. a;lloi polloi. tau/ta fronou/men( w`j kai. pa,ntwj evpi,stasqai tou/to 
genhso,menon \ pollou.j dV au= kai. tw/n th/j kaqara/j kai. euvsebou/j o;ntwn Cristianw/n gnw,mhj tou/to mh. 
gnwri,zein evsh,mana, soi) Tou.j ga.r legome,nouj me.n Cristianou,j( o;ntaj de. avqe,ouj kai. avsebei/j ai`reiw,taj( 
o[ti kata. pa,nta bla,sfhma kai. a;qea kai. avno,hta dida,skousin( evdh,lwsa, soi) [Oti dV ouvk evfV u`mw/n mo,nwn 
tou/to le,gein me evpistasqe( tw/n gegenhme,nwn h`mi/n lo,gwn a`pa,ntwn( w`j du,name,j mou( su,ntaxin 
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It is not insignificant that two (35.1, 64.1) of the above statements come from the mouth 
of Trypho. The first of these is especially interesting because it demonstrates the 
insecurity of the category of ‘Christian’ that is obvious even to an outsider. Of the five 
references three (35.1; 80.3;4) employ lego,menoj and two (63.5 and 64.1) use 
kalou,meqa. The former is used when discussing false ‘Christians’.  
In 35.1 Trypho mentions having heard of people who ‘are called Christians’ and who 
eat idol meat and think it would not affect them. Justin adds that these people are not 
only called ‘Christians’, but are even ‘confessing themselves to be Christians’. 
However, Justin distances himself from these people as he believes they are ‘not 
teaching His doctrines, but those of the spirits of error’. Important for our discussion  is 
that when Justin contrasts himself and his group with these people, he no longer speaks 
of himself and his group as ‘Christians’, but as ‘disciples of the true and pure doctrine 
of Jesus Christ’ (Dial 35.2). As noted before, the correct description of Justin’s group 
derives from the school environment, but without link to a self-descriptor of 
‘Christians’. On the contrary, the external designation by Trypho and the self-
confession of being ‘Christians’ is bundled in a context where Justin distinguishes 
himself and his people from these. There is subtle distancing from the term ‘Christian’ 
here. Justin speaks of those who refer to themselves as such as not and uses descriptions 
of actions and beliefs, rather than a title, to refer to those who truly are ‘Christians’. The 
implication is those for whom it is a noun of self-designation whereas the true; 
‘Christians’ do not see it this way, it appears more verbal for them, more of doing than a 
naming enterprise from the internal perspective. 
The second text (Dial 63) has already been discussed and mention has been made that 
‘springing from His name’ and ‘partaking of His name (for we are all called Christian)’ 
similarly seem to mean that the name is an external designation, although interpretation 
of the Psalms can vindicate those so called as ‘Christians’ as being the ones the 
scriptures identitfy as true worshipers. This interpretation is strengthened by the text 
                                                                                                                                                                          
poih,somai( evn oi-j kai. tou/to o`mologou/nta, me( o] kai. pro.j u,ma/j o`mologw/( evggra,yw) Ouv ga.r avnqrw,poij 
ma/llon h; avnqrwpi,noij dida,gmasin ai`rou/mai avkolouqei/n( avlla. qew/| kai. toi/j parV evkei,ou dida,gmasin) Eiv 
ga.r kai. suneba,lete u`mei/j tisi legome,noij Cristianoi/j( kai. tou/to mh. om`ologou/sin( avlla. kai. 
blasfhmei/n tolmw/si to.n qeo.n VAbraa.m kai. to.n qeo.n VIsaa/k kai. to.n qeo.n VIakwb( oi[ kai. le,gousi mh. 
ei=nai nekrw/n avna,stasin( avlla. a[ma tw/| avpoqnh,skein ta.j yuca.j auvtw/n avnalamba,nesqai eivj to.n ouvrano,n( 
mh. u`pola,bhte auvtou.j Cristianou,j( w[sper ouvde. VIoudai,ouj( a;n tij ovrqw/j evxeta,sh( o`mologheien ei=nai 
tou.j Saddoukai,ouj h; ta.j o`moi,aj ai`re,seij Genistw.n kai. Meristw/n kai. Galilai,wn kai. `Ellhnianw/n kai. 
farisai,wn baptistw/n (kai. mh. avhdw/j avkou,shte, mou pa,nta a[ fronw/ le,gontoj), avlla. legome,nouj me.n 
VIoudai,ouj kai, tekna VAbraa,m( kai. xei,lesin o`mologou/ntaj to.n qeo,n( w`j auvto.j ke,kragen o` qeo,j( th/n de. 
kardi,an po,rrw e;cein avpV auvtou/) VEgw. de,( kai. ei; tinej eivsin o`rqognw,monej kata. pa,nta Cristianoi,( kai. 
sarko.j avna,stasin genh,sesqai evpista,meqa kai. ci,lia e;th evn I`erousalh.m oivkodomhqei,sh| kai. kosmhqei,sh| 
kai. platunqei,sh|( w`j oi` profh/tai VIezekih/l kai. `Hsai<aj kai. oi` a;lloi om`ologou/sin) (own trans.). 
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that follows immediately in Dial 64 where Trypho adds that the Gentiles belief in Jesus 
as ‘as Lord and Christ and God’, does indeed qualify them as ‘Christians’ from his 
name and somehow prophesied in the scriptural witness.  
The text of Dial 80.3-4 discusses those who only appear to be ‘Christians’ but are 
‘godless, impious heretics’ who ‘teach doctrines that are in every way blasphemous, 
atheistical, and foolish’. As Justin does not want to follow ‘men or men’s doctrines’, he 
feels the need to emphatically disassociate himself with ‘some who are called 
Christians’ and who do not admit ‘God and the doctrines [delivered] by Him’. Although 
they are called ‘Christians’, Justin does not believe them to be ‘Christians’. Rather, he 
believes them to be nothing other than a particular sect, named in the same way as 
‘Jewish’ sects such as Genist, Meristae, Gelilaeans, Hellenists, Pharisees, and Baptists. 
Contrary to these groups, Justin claims that he and others ‘are right-minded Christians’, 
the first and sole instance in Dial that he applies the name for himself. This use is in 
parallel to the name ‘Jew’ which in the same context is introduced as another external 
designation (‘called Jews’- avlla. legome,nouj me.n VIoudi,ouj). Hence, even if Justin in this 
instance would have taken the title ‘Christians’ as a positive self-designation, the 
sequence of evidence underlines that such use by Justin in his Dial is only in its infancy.   
What evidence do his Apologies provide? Justin only refers to people ‘called 
Christians’twice.243  
 
‘But someone will say, “some of those who have already been caught were shown to be 
criminals.” Of course. This often happens, when you examine the lives of those who 
stand accused. But you do not usually bring in a conviction on account of others who 
have earlier been shown to be guilty. In general terms, then, we are prepared to admit 
this. For, just as, among the Greeks, those who taught whatever pleased them are called 
in every case by the single title ‘philosopher’, even though they contradicted one 
another in their opinions – so, among the barbarians, an all-embracing common name 
is given to both those who were wise and those who seemed wise: they are all called 
Christians. For this reason, when people are delated to you, we ask that you always 
make their actions the subject of your judgement, so that a person who is found guilty 
might be punished as a wrongdoer, rather than as a Christian; while if anyone is seen 
to be guiltless he might be acquitted as a Christian who does no wrong. We will not ask 
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 1A 7.3 and 26.6.  
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you to punish the accusers. For the wickedness that surrounds them and their ignorance 
of the good is enough for them.’244 (1A 7) 
‘And there is someone called Marcion, from Pontus, who even  now is teaching those he 
can persuade to consider some other, greater than the creator God. And with the help 
of the demons, he has persuaded many from every race of humankind to utter 
blasphemies, and he has made them deny God the Maker of this universe and confess 
some other who is greater, beyond him. And all those springing from them are, as we 
said, called Christian, just as among the philosophers those who do not share the same 
doctrines do have the common name of philosophy predicated of them.’245 (1A 26.5-6) 
Both of these occasions concern the manner in which one can distinguish true and false 
‘Christians among people commonly brought to accused to the Emperor, accused of 
being ‘Christians’. Justin picks up the earlier mentioned argument that by a general 
name alone, it cannot be established what somebody teaches or how one lives. 
Furthermore, in both instances, he draws a comparison with philosophy and the 
common names (o[noma koino,n) that all philosophers are addressed or called by 
(prosagoreu,ontai kai kalou/ntai) regardless of doctrine and may be guilty of the same 
inattention to truth and detail as the original philosophers. The first text (1A 7) makes 
the point that the accusation of being a ‘Christian’ cannot qualify for punishment, and 
specifically that the Emperor should look into the ‘deeds of all’, and that only the ‘evil-
doer’ must be punished, not because he has been called a ‘Christian’ (‘as a Christian’), 
‘since the mere fact of his being a Christian he does no wrong’. Similarly to Dial 80.3-4 
discussed above, this statement comes close to accepting the name as a self-designation, 
although in the context of the passage which is concerned with contrasting true 
members of groups from imposters, it still sounds as an external name that is not yet 
fully adopted but used out of necessity to demonstrate true membership. 
                                                          
244
 VAlla. fh,sei tij\ h;dh tine.j lhfqe,ntej hvle,gcqhsan kakou/rgoi) kai. ga.r polloi. polla,kij( o[tan 
evka,stou tw/n kathgoroume,nwn to.n bi,on evxeta,zhte\ avllV ouv dia. tou.j proelegcqe,ntaj katadika,zete) 
kaqo,lou me.n ou=n kavkei/no om`ologou/men( o[ti o]n tro,pon oi` evn  [Ellhsi ta. auvtoi/j avresta. dogmati,santej 
evk panto.j tw/| e`ni. ovno,mati filosofi,aj prosagoreu,ontai( kai,per tw/n dogma,twn evnanti,wn o;ntwn( ou[twj 
kai. tw/n evn barba,roij genome,nwn kai. doxa,ntwn sofw/n to. evpikathgorou,menon o;noma koino,n evsti\ 
Cristianoi. ga.r pa,ntej prosagoreu,ontai) o[qen pa,ntwn tw/n kataggellome,nwn u`mi/n ta.j pra,xeij 
kri,nesqai avxiou/men( i[na o` evlegc1ei.j w`j a;dikoj kola,zhtai( avlla. mh. w`j Cristiano,j( eva.n de, tij 
avne,legktoj fai,nhtai( avpolu,htai w`j Cristiano.j ouvde.n avdikw/n) ouv ga.r tou.j kathgorou/ntaj kola,zein 
u`ma/j avxiw,somen( avrkou/ntai ga.r th/| prosou,sh| ponhri,a| kai. th.| tw/n kalw/n avgnoi,a|)  
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 Marki,wna de, tina Pontiko,n( o]j kai nu/n e;ti. evsti. dida,skwn tou.j peiqome,nouj( a;llon tina. nomi,zein 
mei,zona tou/ dhmiourgou/ qeou/ o]j kata. pa/n ge,noj avnqrw,pwn dia. th/j tw/n daimo,nwn sullh,yewj pollou.j 
pe,peike blasfhmi,aj le,gein kai. avrnei/sqai to.n poihth.n tou/de tou/ panto.j qeo,n( a;llon de, tina( w`j o;nta 
mei,zona( para. tou/ton om`ologei/n pepoi,hken) kai. pa,ntej oi` avpo tou,twn o`rmw,menoi( w`j e;fhmen( 
Cristianoi. kalou.ntai( o[n tro,pon kai. oi` ouv koinwnou/ntej tw/n auvtw/n dogma,twn evn toi/j filoso,foij to. 
evpikathgoru,menon o;noma th/j filosofi,aj koino.n e;cousin) 
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The second text (1A 26) follows on from the previous one and also reminds us of Dial 
35 and 80 where people have been called ‘Christians’ who according to Justin are 
clearly heretics, hence, followers of their own school opinion, one of them – the only 
one according to Justin who is still alive and teaching – being Marcion, a man of 
Pontus. As mentioned, Justin uses lego,menoj for unfamiliar or unwarranted appellations. 
It is therefore noteworthy that in Dial 35.6 where Justin mentions the followers of 
‘heretical’ schools under the names of their founders, which he does only once in that 
text, he uses kalou,menoi indicating that these are their proper titles.  
Justin has been systematically distancing people who might be thought to be 
‘Christians’ from the name of Christ, in order to reserve and link the name only to those 
who truly follow him, who truly spring from his name. In 2A 2.16 Lucius admits to 
being called (proswnumi,an) by the name ‘Christian’, reflecting the objective and 
external nature of the trial narrative in that chapter. At 1A 12.9 evsch,kamen – bearing the 
name – appears as something true ‘Christians’ inherit directly from Christ. The rightful 
bearers of this name are only those who follow the philosophy of Christ, those who live 
like him: ‘For, apart from those who have been persuaded that the unjust will be 
punished in eternal fire and that the virtuous and those who lived like Christ shall dwell 
with God in the absence of suffering, apart, that is, from those who have become 
Christians.’246 (2A 1.2.) As with the instances before, the opening of 2A shows people 
being persecuted. Mentioning those ‘who have become Christians’ could mean either 
one of two things. First, it could refer to the persecuted people who ‘lived like Christ’ 
and ‘shall dwell with God’ and have become, what they have been accused of being, 
namely Christians. Second, it could be that ‘Christians’ is the self-identity marker of 
those who have been persecuted. The frequency of the emphasis on the link between the 
title ‘Christian’ as an external designation and persecution makes it more likely that the 
former sense also prevails in this passage, although one may see a similar ambiguity as 
in the two instances before. The name of Jesus Christ does not yet instantaneously 
suggest that Justin’s audience positively link ‘Christians’ to Christ, but that the term 
‘Christian’ still carries the shaming character as its primary descriptor. The attendant 
risks of this lack of discernment have already been alluded to and will be further 
discussed below. Justin’s presentation of ‘Christians’ as followers of Christ, the teacher 
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 cwri.j tw/n peisqe,ntwn tou.j avdi,kouj kai. avkola,stouj evn aivwni,w| puri. kolasqh,sesqai( tou.j dV 




of the philosophical and universal truth, is, of course, part of that challenge and the 
correction of the shaming name. 
3.2 Christian’ Diversity 
In his argument for ‘what’ a ‘Christian’ is, which traverses both the Apologies and the 
Dial, Justin has claimed that Bar Kokhba and the teachers of Trypho are the cause of 
‘Christians’ being pushed out of the ‘Jewish’ community and known commonly as 
shameful people. Contrary to this, Justin has insisted that ‘Christians’ are the true 
Israelite race in contrast to that other race who only claim to keep god’s 
commandments. Instead, it is only by keeping Christ’s doctrines and commandments 
that one is following the true philosophy. If one does so, one is worthy of Christ’s name 
and god’s promises. Yet we have already seen that not all so-called ‘Christians’ do this 
and in order to demonstrate ‘what’ ‘Christians’ are, Justin must rule out all such false 
‘Christian’ impostors in order that his definition of faith can stand. 
In Dial 46.1 Trypho asks Justin ‘if some even now desire to live in observance of the 
precepts of the Mosaic Law, and yet believe that the crucified Jesus is the Christ of God 
and that to him it has been given to judge without exception all men, and that his 
kingdom is eternal, could they also be saved?’247 The answers Justin gives reveal the 
diversity of the ‘Christian’ community and force Justin into a stronger assertion of 
‘what’ a ‘Christian’ is. Interestingly, as Trypho has put the question, the issue is not that 
of the ‘Christian’ relationship to ‘Judaism’, but of ‘Christians’ who want to observe 
Moses’ commandments and those ‘Christians’ who do not, but claim that they will be 
saved. Do the latter, like Justin also allow for the former to be saved? Jaroslav Pelikan 
believes that because ‘Christians’ were increasingly being drawn from pagan 
backgrounds ‘For Jewish Christians, the question of continuity was the question of their 
relation to their mother; for Gentile Christians, it was the question of their relation to 
their mother-in-law’.248  Yet, we see from Justin’s text that ‘Christians’ who ‘even now’ 
want to observe the laws of Moses not reckoned to belong to a ‘daughter’-group of 
‘Judaism’, but are presented by Justin’s Trypho as if they were part of Trypho’s own 
race.  
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 VEa.n de, tinej kai. nu/n zh/n bou,lwntai fula,ssontej ta. dia. Mwse,wj diatacqe,nta kai. pisteu,swsin 
evpi. tou/ton to.n staurwqe,nta VIhsou/n( evpigno,ntej o[ti auvto,j evstin o `Cristo.j tou/ qeou/ kai. auvtw/| de,dotai 
to. kri/nai pa.ntaj a`plw/j kai. auvtou/ evstin h` aivw,nioj basilei,a( du,nantai kai. auvtoi. swqh/nai ; 
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Much contemporary scholarship has, therefore, questioned the binary nature of the 
relationship between two things, one called ‘Judaism’ and one called ‘Christianity’. 
Trypho’s question prompts Justin to take a position and states that in his opinion Torah 
observant ‘Jews’ who follow Jesus will be saved: ‘The logical implication of this 
exchange might seem to be that, so long as one believes in Jesus Christ, one can 
continue to follow the customs particular to one’s ethnos or genos.’ (Dial 47.1)249 Yet 
this is only true for ‘Jews’, not for non-‘Jews’, as Justin makes a point of the fact that 
pagan converts give up the customs of their former lives when they become ‘Christians’ 
(Dial 121.3). So Justin is forced to admit that, the Mosaic law is peculiarly compatible 
with the philosophy of Christ, because ‘Jews’ can be ‘Christians’ while still remaining 
‘Jews’, making the distinction between ‘Jewishness’ and ‘Christianness’ appears less 
strong than one might imagine. However, when Trypho pushes him, Justin admits that 
not all ‘Christians’ share this view and that he disagrees with those who do not (Dial 
47.2). This seems to be within tolerable limits, however, as a difference of opinion 
(Justin thinks – dokei - and does not state that they will be saved) is not sufficient that 
those who disagree would not be recognisable to him as ‘Christians’. When Trypho asks 
the question again (Dial 80.1), Justin responds that there are many ‘Christians’ who do 
not share his view. He calls these pure (kaqaroj), pious (euvsebh.j) and truly (o]ntwj) 
‘Christian’ (Dial 80.2). This again makes clear that this group are within tolerable limits 
for Justin. These are truly ‘Christians’ even if they do not share Justin’s view on this. 
In the same paragraph, Justin explicitly reintroduces those who ought not be considered 
‘Christians’; namely, atheistic and impious heretics (Tou.j ga.r legome,ouj me.n 
Crostoanou,j, o;ntaj de. avqe,ouj kai. avjebei/j ai`resiw,taj.). These are in contrast to right-
minded (o`rqognw,menoj) ‘Christians’ like Justin. These ‘right-minded’ ‘Christians’ are 
not in opposition to other pure, pious and genuine ‘Christians’ even if they do not agree 
on all issues. In defining ‘what’ a ‘Christian’ is to Trypho then, and dispelling ignorant 
prejudices, Justin has to isolate those who he considers to illegitimately bear the name 
‘Christian’. These are more than disagreeable or mistaken ‘Christians’, they are failed 
candidates for being ‘Christians.’ To summarize for Justin, the central feature that 
distinguishes these failed candidates for ‘Christians’ from the true pious ‘Christians’ is 
that they do not keep ‘Christian’ doctrines; they do not follow Christ’s philosophy. In 
1A 16.8 Justin confidently asserts this: ‘And whoever are not found living as He taught 
are not be recognized as Christians, even if they speak the teachings of Christ with their 
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tongues. For he said not those who only speak but those who also do the works will be 
saved.’250 These failed candidates may be called ‘Christians’ and may confess Christ, 
they may even when charged or asked if they are ‘Christian’ admit that they are, but as 
Justin says in 1A 4.1 nothing can be judged by a name alone; simply saying they are 
‘Christians’ is not enough to make them ‘Christians’ any more than saying one is a 
Stoic but following none of the Stoic philosophy makes one a genuine Stoic. Such 
people might pay lip service to the teachings of Christ (Cristou/ dida,gmata), but they 
cannot be seen to do his works (ta e;gra); they cannot be found to have the shape of life 
that his philosophy demands. Again Justin says this in Dial 35.2 “‘...there are such 
men,” I replied, “who pretend to be Christians and confess the crucified Jesus as their 
Lord and Christ, yet profess not his doctrines, but those of the spirits of error…’.251 
This distinction is crucial to Justin. Both 1A and the Dial wrestle with the issue of 
defining and clarifying ‘what’ and who ‘Christians’ are and this is because, as the next 
two chapters will argue, Marcion looms large in Justin’s sphere and threatens to define, 
or confuse what little definition there is, of the identity of followers of Christ and risk 
imperial suppression as a novel superstition.  The following chapters will examine in 
detail the efforts Justin makes to distinguish his community and theology from that of 
Marcion and other ‘heretics’. Firstly we will consult the Dial, especially the eleven 
introductory chapters which determine the trajectory of the debate in the rest of the 
piece. The chief concern here will be to note the strategy Justin employs for outlining 
his own community’s beliefs in ways that subtly rule out the foundations of the 
Marcionite commitments. This is quite a subtle task that involves close attention to the 
topics under discussion and the significance of Trypho’s understanding of who and 
what ‘Christians’ are. We will also consider the two chapters that seem to have Marcion 
himself as a more or less direct target (Dial 35, 80). In chapter three we will move on to 
the Apologies to consider the way which Justin, addressing an audience with different 
cultural commitments and prejudices, advances what ‘Christians’ are in way that by 
necessity rules out a theology that could be deemed Marcionite.  
 
So, what is a ‘Christian’ in Justin? As we have seen this is an internally disputed 
question. ‘Christians’ are diverse. For Justin diversity is tolerable but there are certain 
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commitments – which centre on the teachings and doctrines of Christ – which if broken 
undermine any sense of a meaningful ‘Christian’ identity.  For Justin a ‘Christian’ is not 
a cultic practitioner, nor a member of a nation with aspirations to power and influence. 
A ‘Christian’ is simply and only one who follows the teachings and philosophy of 
Christ. This rules some out, but is something that all should aspire to. There is no such 
thing for Justin as ‘Christianity’ yet, only discipleship and correct living under Christ’s 
direction. This discipleship incorporates one into his name in the same manner as 
following Plato incorporates one into Plato’s name but does not make one a member of 
specific nation or people. It is a way of life. That some ‘right-minded’ ‘Christians’ 
disagree with Justin even on the relation to ‘Jews’ suggests that the distinction between 
‘Jews’ and ‘Christians’ is becoming mutual – which is contrary to Justin’s wishes and 
description of how ‘Christians’ come to be hated – and that the way of ‘Christians’ is 
steadily separating from the ‘Jews’ until it becomes a religion in its own right. 
Justin blames Bar Kokhba and the teachers of Trypho for the persecution of ‘Christians’ 
by singling them out. He believes Graeco-Romans have learnt from this. We have seen 
that there are various reasons why the Graeco-Romans had an issue with ‘Christians’ 
and that Justin sought to get round these by demonstrating that a ‘Christian’ is first and 
foremost a philosopher neither a rival nor a new ethnic cultic tradition. Justin has thus 
made an attempt to clarify what a ‘Christian’ is. This means admitting that not all 
‘Christians’ agree on all things. Yet there is further work for him to do as he must 
outline that not all who are taken to be ‘Christians’ live up to this identity. This is the 
central feature of his work that the remaining chapters of this thesis will be dedicated to 
outlining. Chiefly, Justin is working hard in all of his texts to distinguish himself and 
his community from that of Marcion. 
Chapter 3: Reading Between the Lines: the conspicuity of Marcion in the Dialogue 
Now we shall turn to the Dial specifically and expound the evidence for an agenda to 
clarify the ‘Christian’ philosophy which demands distinction from others who are also 
called ‘Christians’ but, according to Justin, do not merit this name. Yet there is a prior 
question as to what the Dial represents as text itself. Andrew Jacobs has characterised 
the problem as follows: 
‘The Dialogue is a notoriously difficult text to parse—both in historical and literary 
terms—as a straightforward text of Jewish-Christian differentiation. Despite Justin’s 
frequently rancorous tone throughout the long Dialogue, the very dialogic nature of the 
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text hints at ongoing communication and rapprochement: the shared desire to 
determine what divides Jew from Christian cannot help but gesture at what holds them 
together. I am not suggesting that, beneath a veneer of discourtesy and acrimony, Justin 
is trying to get in touch with his “inner Jew”; to the contrary, I think the text lays out 
for us the ways in which Christians of the second century felt haunted by that “inner 
Jew,” and sought to confront, domesticate, and humble him. Yet at the same time, this 
early text illustrates the ways in which such efforts at confrontation and domestication 
lack clear resolution.’252 
What Jacobs highlights here is the precise relationship of ‘Christians’ to ‘Jews’ in this 
text which in this period is a very complicated one and our understanding of it must 
alter our reading. There have been scholars, like Theodore Stylianopoulos,
253
 who think 
that the Dial is definitively aimed towards a ‘Jewish’ audience and others like Jon 
Nilson
254
 who have believed that it is directed towards a pagan audience – albeit 
Judeaophile in outlook. However both these perspectives, and Jacobs more subtle 
position, hold to a stable understanding of ‘Judaism’ and ‘Christianity’, not to mention 
pagan ‘outsiders’. Although we cannot rule the question out of court completely, the 
complexity of how identity is constructed in the ancient world, as we learn through 
Buell, Nasrallah, King, Lyman et al. This means that it is impossible to identify an 
audience in these terms. Stylianopoulos considers the possibilities that the Dial could 
have been directed towards ‘gnostic’ ‘Christians’ or a pagan audience, represented by 
the addressee Marcus Pompeius, yet each of these is presented with interests distinct 
from the others. Whilst of course topics of interest vary in importance we have learnt in 
chapter two that ‘gnostic’, ‘heretical’ and ‘orthodox’ ‘Christianity’ are not yet defined 
enough to be able to identify truly separate and exclusive groups – though it is heading 
in that direction. They all seem to be called ‘Christians’, as Justin claims. We also know 
that ‘Christians’, at least not all ‘Christians’, are not already completely distinguishable 
from ‘Jews’, and that the construction of ‘Jewishness’ and ‘Judaism’ is too complicated 
in itself to be able to meaningfully discuss whether the problem of the law, as 
Stylianopoulos rightly points out, the central explicit argumentative feature of the text, 
is an intra-‘Christian’ problem or an inter ‘Jewish’-‘Christian’ problem.255 Given the 
extent, and different tone, of the handling of Scriptural material in the Dial, in contrast 
                                                          
252
 A.S. Jacobs, ‘Dialogical Differences’ (2007), 299. 
253
 T. Stylianopoulos, Mosaic Law (1975), 33-44. 
254
 J. Nilson, ‘Addressed?’ (1977), 538 -546. 
255
 T. Stylianopoulos, Mosaic Law (1975), 35. 
102 
 
to 1A, it is reasonable to suppose that the audience of Dial is different from 1A and not 
the rulers directly, as 1A purports to address. Some variety, or a number, of ‘Jewish’, 
‘Christian’, ‘proto-‘heretical’ audience is most likely. But more important is the 
question what was Justin trying to achieve? The argument of this thesis is that Justin 
was trying to define the ‘Christian’ philosophy which was misunderstood and, in his 
eyes, often misrepresented. Marcionism is the biggest threat and that which must be 
most ruled out by those concerned. Exactly who those people were I don’t think the 
evidence allows us to be clear on, given the complexities of identity we now recognise. 
Another perennial feature of discussion of the Dial are complaints about its tangential 
and repetitious nature. As Skarsaune has noted, the exhaustively detailed exegesis on 
themes often repeated, which the modern reader finds so tedious, were probably 
considered by Justin to be among the texts highest virtues. Justin in this regard, is a 
teacher, like Christ and the apostles, and is doing everything he can to ensure that his 
audience learn the central truth by heart.
256
 Often the repetition is due to Trypho and his 
companions unsearchableness who repeat the same or similar questions, or who retract 
agreement already given on a certain point prompting Justin to argue it again afresh.
257
 
None of this structure is accidental or incidental. The fabric of the text in this regard 
reveals how hard Justin is working to get across ‘what’ the ‘Christian’ philosophy is, 
what the truths of Jesus Christ are and for the audience to be left in no doubt. This, as 
this thesis argues, is frequently an exercise in distinguishing ‘Christians’ from 
Marcionites, who are created as a group in the process of this clarification. In repeatedly 
making clear his claims for who Christ is and who his father is, Justin is making out a 
‘Christian’ faith which necessarily excludes Marcion. 
We will begin analysis of this feature of Justin work in the Dial first by considering the 
so called philosophical section which comes at the start of the Dial. This is very much a 
part of the wider project of the text and crucially introduces a major thesis that will 
define and guide what Justin looks for and finds in his exegesis and his claims for who 
Christ is. After this we will consider where these same themes can be observed later in 
the text and how they function to exclude Marcion from the stable of the ‘Christian’ 
philosophy.  
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1 Dialogue Introduction Commentary  
Much scholarly interest has been paid to the opening sections of the Dial. Many of these 
have found these first chapters, which Justin devotes almost entirely to a discussion of 
philosophy, to be at odds with the rest of the text and perhaps therefore corrupt.
258
 
Goodenough doubted the veracity of Justin’s summary of philosophies:  
‘This interesting account of Justin’s philosophical quest has always been taken literary 
by his commentators, although the story of his conversion to Christianity which 
immediately follows it has long been regarded by many scholars as an idealization of 
Justin’s actual experiences. The fact is, however that the two narratives are one, 
unbroken by transition… Justin, in the entire passage, is dramatizing the relations 
between Christianity and philosophy and has adopted the familiar convention of 
relating someone’s adventures in passing from school to school, and finally in the 
Christian school, in order to criticise each school by the adventures.’259  
Goodenough also notes the similarity in literacy style and convention to Lucian’s 
Menippus where the protagonist travels through many philosophical schools giving each 
up on account of mutual contradictions, which undermine their authority in his eyes. 
Goodenough is not suggesting interdependence but conventional literary form perhaps, 
with even wider use in ‘Jewish’ Tannaim also.260 So for Goodenough this opening 
section of the Dial represents an idealised account in order to challenge philosophy over 
and against ‘Christianity’. Andersen – according to Barnard – thinks Justin’s summary 
reveals leanings towards Middle Platonism.
261
 For Andersen the historical data is in the 
attitude, redolent of Middle Platonism, towards other philosophies that Justin exhibits. 
Barnard does not doubt the historicity of Justin’s account of his philosophical quest – 
though it does end at an ideal zenith in Christ for him – which took place in a world 
where eclecticism was typical. He found the truth he was looking for – hence his 
continuing to wear the philosopher’s cloak and invite people into his school. Faith in 
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Christ is a way, a philosophy – the truth – for him. Van Winden, much closer to 
Goodenough in this regard, has looked more generously at the text and found it to be 
consistent with the body of the piece – its themes carried on throughout, without 
contradiction.  
The reader must approach this introductory section, and the rest of the text, whilst 
discarding the knowledge that philosophy does not seem to be the central topic, because 
the nature of the discussion reveals why so much is devoted to it here.
262
 The content 
here is in many ways consistent with the philosophical situation of the time but more is 
being outlined than this situation.  
In 1975 Stylianopoulos indicated that the Dial was brimming with anti-Marcionite 
material but that it was difficult to assess the extent of this because not all of this 
material was immediately or necessarily indicative of Marcion.
263
 Philippe Bobichon, in 
his recent critical edition, has paid much attention to particularly focused contra-
Marcionite elements, but even he, however, has not carried this far enough.
264
 It is my 
thesis in this chapter that this introductory section (chapters one to eleven) are not only 
consistent with the rest of the piece, but vital to understanding it. It is an important 
opening section because it establishes the purpose of the piece which has not been 
adequately accounted for. This purpose of Justin is to clarify what the ‘Christian’ faith 
is and what it is not. His biggest challenge, or his fellow traveller who causes the most 
confusion, is Marcion. Justin’s agenda in the Dial then is to distinguish his theology 
from that of Marcion, as he states, the only still living and therefore salient ‘heretic’. I 
focus, therefore, on Marcion to the general exclusion of the other ‘heretics’ for two 
reasons (a) that he is the only one presented by Justin as a contemporary teacher and (b) 
that Justin provides more information about Marcion than about any of those others like 
Basilides or Valentinus. In addition, Marcion appears in all of his writings (and we need 
even to take into account that Justin had written a first text ‘To Marcion’ which 
unfortunately is lost). 
The introductory section of the Dial has a structure whose intention and historicity has 
vexed many historians and scholars, in order to suit its purpose. The purpose which it is 
designed for is to outline key theological commitments which separate Justin from 
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Marcion before the interlocutor (or hearer) discovers that Justin is a ‘Christian’. In the 
previous chapter I showed that ‘Christianity’ is not a uniform enterprise and that there 
was a great deal of confusion about what a ‘Christian’ is at the time Justin writes. 
Furthermore the definition of ‘Christian’ was something more in control of outsiders 
than in the hands of people like Justin. Justin in this section is laying down a series of 
markers for things which he denies or does not deny. That is, the introductory section is 
designed to rule out certain key doctrinal commitments, and rule others in, without the 
dialogue partner being prejudiced by what they already understand ‘Christians’ to be.  
The philosophies Justin talks about in his journey are therefore not incidental – they 
may well represent a real journey of his or an idealised version of his and other popular 
accounts – but what is most noteworthy are the markers Justin lays down throughout 
this introduction which he will later draw on more heavily. Goodenough may have been 
right that the account should not be separated into a ‘historical’ philosophical section 
and an ‘idealised’ ‘Christian’ section.265 Andersen may also be right that there are clues 
in this account liking Justin to genuine Middle Platonic. Neither of these accounts ask 
anything deeper of this account other than that it be a simple progression from untruth 
or limited truth to the truth in Christ. Justin, however, is much more subtle than this. 
Rather in telling a simple story he is laying the ground work for theology as such; 
establishing key commitments and ruling out others. He is providing a thematic 
catalogue as a prelude. The preliminary structure can be observed in the fabric of the 
text itself. Towards the end of the introductory section, just after Trypho and his friends 
have learnt that Justin is a ‘Christian’, Justin attempts to end the Dialogue after having 
been offended in 9.2. Having been encouraged to stay, Justin and Trypho, plus a smaller 
group of Trypho’s companions, settle down in the Xystus to begin the discussion 
proper. 
The key themes and doctrines that are ruled in and out in this section continue 
throughout the piece and are added to by further commitments. Below we will examine 
the Dial introduction in detail, building on the themes of ‘Christian philosophy’ and 
disputed identity established in the previous chapter. Key themes that provide space for 
counter point between Justin and Marcion, and which recur frequently in the text, are 
that of the oneness of god, his creation of the world, care and providence, his 
judgement, what it means to live rightly and the sources of revelation. As the text 
continues beyond the introduction themes, it will become more sharply focused in 
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relation to Christ, but it is first necessary to establish a general shape for the kind of 
things possible in Justin’s theology (or philosophy as he calls it), the kind of god and 
revelation he accepts – this is precisely what Justin does in the introductory chapters. 
The journey through philosophy in the Dial introduction is a progression, not a set of 
conversions. It is intended to show that Justin has reached ‘philosophical’ truth, not a 
‘religious’ conversion. He has not become a ‘Jew’, he has not abandoned his paganism 
but fulfilled all that was good about it.
266
  ‘Christians’ were called atheists, as far as we 
can tell from Justin, for two potential reasons. (a) because they invent new gods – as 
Socrates was accused of at 1A 5.3 and (b) because they reject the gods of their ancestors 
and convert into another tradition – which contravened Roman law. The record of 
Justin’s journey through philosophy in the introduction to the Dialogue is designed to 
circumvent both of these reasons. There, Justin travels to the divine philosophy 
explicitly through the Hellenistic philosophical tradition. He reaches its zenith or logical 
conclusion in ‘Christianity’ then and is thus not a convert to another tradition. Secondly 
the god he discovers, though it is the god of Adam, Abraham and Noah, is universal and 
has all along been the source of all that is good in the philosophical tradition as well as 
in the Israelite tradition. There is no new god then and this god was, in Justin’s view, 
already internal to the Hellenistic tradition. 
Before proceeding to detailed analysis of Justin’s presentation of the ‘Christian’ 
philosophy and the ways in which it is subtly distinguished from other forms, 
particularly Marcionism, it will be useful to provide a brief summary of the opening 
chapters (Dial 1-8). Justin becomes engaged in a conversation with Trypho, ‘a Hebrew 
of the circumcision’, who had ‘escaped from the war lately’.  Justin is curious, as he 
thinks that Trypho should be content not with philosophy but with the prophets.  
‘Trypho retorts that philosophy, to his knowledge, is occupied with the very same 
questions (1:1-3). Yes, says Justin, it ought to be so, but most philosophers have taught 
these matters in the wrong way, or not at all. Trypho then asks what Justin’s own 
philosophy is (1:4-6). The answer falls into five parts: 1) Praise of the true philosophy 
as opposed to doctrines of the philosophical schools (2:1). 2) An outline of the history 
of philosophy (2:2). 3) Justin’s philosophical itinerary (2:3-6). 4) The dialogue with the 
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Old Man (3:1-7:3). 5) Justin’s conversion to Christianity as the True Philosophy (8: 1-
2).’267 
To this I would add that the three chapters up to chapter eleven are transitionary 
chapters where Justin moves the discussion on to the main topic of scriptural 
interpretation by (a) denying that ‘Christians’ believe baseless tales whilst the ‘Jewish’ 
leaders misunderstand the scriptures (9:1). (b) Trypho raises the question of the non-
distinctive and non-observant nature of ‘Christians (10: 2-4). (c) Justin confidently 
proclaims and confesses the one true god and his new covenant with all people (11: 1-
4). From here all the major claims about ‘what’ a ‘Christian’ is have been made and the 
discussion can continue in detail over the reasonableness of the interpretation of this. 
We will now take each chapter in turn and take note of Justin’s presentation and the 
work it does. 
Dial 1 
Trypho’s interest in philosophy launches chapter one. The first noteworthy marker is 
how Trypho and Justin perceive Justin’s identity:  
 
‘He answered, “In Argos I was taught by Corinthus, the Socratic philosopher, never to 
slight or ignore those who wear that gown of yours, but to show them every 
consideration and to converse with them, since from such a conversation some good 
might be derived by them or myself. It would be to the advantage of both if either should 
benefit from this meeting. Accordingly, whenever I see anyone wearing such a gown, I 
gladly accost him. So, for this same reason, it has been a pleasure to greet you. These 
friends of mine share my hope of hearing something profitable from you.”’ 268 (Dial 
1.2) 
 
From this we learn that Justin dresses as a philosopher so that he is seen as such, and 
also that this matches his self-understanding. There is nothing about his dress or 
ethnicity which marks him out as ‘Christian’. The only obvious identification he has is 
that of a philosopher. Much has been made of this fact in the past. Many have viewed it 
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as evidence that Justin believes in continuity between Greek philosophy and 
‘Christianity’.269 This is however to neglect the nature of his discussion because as we 
shall see below his views very much exclude that possibility. But that Justin is a 
philosopher – as discussed in our first chapter – is the marker in this introduction that 
needs to be duly noted because of the nature of the discussion it makes possible, that is, 
in what ways topics can be discussed whilst protecting Justin from revealing his 
‘Christian’ identity to a prejudicial Hebrew audience.  
Secondly Justin has laid a subtle but distinct irony here in his presentation. Trypho has 
said that whenever he sees anyone like him he does not despise them but approaches 
them with kindness and hopes to converse with them and to learn from them. Trypho is 
interested in Justin because Trypho has an interest in philosophy and does not see his 
philosophical education as complete at this point. There is no reason to doubt Trypho’s 
philosophical interest, much of his role in the Dial is to use logic to dispute Justin’s 
arguments and he is familiar enough with pagan mythology to suggest that he has 
enquired into the tradition.
270
 In having Trypho enquire of him in this way however 
Justin is anticipating, by concealing his ‘Christian’ identity, Dial 38.1 where Trypho 
will reveal that the teachers who instructed him admonished him neither to converse 
with ‘Christians’ nor to have any kind of communication with them. So Trypho has two 
instructors – Socratics and Hebrews – and whilst he thinks Justin is a philosopher he 
can, and indeed pleasures in, addressing him. Had he however known he was 
‘Christian’ – or what he thinks a ‘Christian’ is – he would perhaps not have come 
anywhere near him in the first instance. Justin’s words, recorded before this in 1A 4.8 
on the matter of bona fide philosophical identity are instructive here:  ‘Some assume the 
name and appearance of philosophers who behave in no way worthily of their 
profession’. Justin consciously appears to Trypho in this text as a philosopher rather 
than as a ‘Christian’ but the discussion will reveal that he is in fact one most truly suited 
to the profession of philosophy – more so than those normally considered philosophers 
by Trypho – precisely because of his affiliation with Christ. 
We also discover that there is nothing that obviously marks Trypho out as a ‘Jew’. 
Justin has to ask who he is and Trypho strikingly identifies himself as a ‘Hebrew of 
circumcision’.271 Such a self-classification is clearly staking a claim. We saw in the 
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previous chapter that ‘Israel’ and ‘Hebrew’ function as internal and disputed identity 
claims. Trypho is telling Justin not just that he is a ‘Jew’ but that he is a true member of 
‘Israel’ – something Justin will deny in the delineation of his philosophy. This exchange 
demonstrates that Trypho was not easily identifiable, or that his identity was at least 
disputable as we know from chapter one, and in this he shares this non-identifiability 
with those people who by some have been called ‘Christians’. Laura Nasrallah, 
however, sees a fundamental difference between Trypho’s and Justin’s characteristics:  
 
‘Throughout the Dialogue Justin will berate Trypho for his Hebrewness and for 
circumcision. But even the elements which sound neutral – escaped from the war, an 
immigrant to Greece – are loaded. The allusion to Bar Kokhba revolt reminds the 
audience that while Justin and Trypho look similar – they are from the same part of the 
world, cosmopolitan, travelling the empire and pursing philosophy – they are not. Jews 
may be refugees from the effects of the empire they traverse, while Justin and his ilk – 
those of the ‘nations’ who are Christian – have nothing to do with Judean goings-on. 
Justin wants to assert to Romans, who may have a hard time distinguishing Christianity 
from Judaism, that Christians have an identity that is, to use Buell’s vocabulary, ‘fluid’ 
and ‘universal’, compared to Trypho’s ‘fixed’ and limited identity.’272 
There is some truth in this. Justin does portray Trypho and his teachers as somehow 
‘fixed’ in Buell’s sense in contrast to the ‘philosophical’ ‘Christian’ tradition that can be 
picked up by anyone. Moreover, the reference to Bar Kokhba serves as a reminder of 
the troublesome and rebellious past, which is to be contrasted with the servant nature of 
‘Christians’. However left unqualified this would be overstated, as Justin does not take 
all the power for himself in this exchange. He is in the minority in the debate. There is 
another way of looking at this exchange. Graham Stanton has argued persuasively that 
Trypho’s friends represent proselytes to ‘Judaism’, inasmuch as ‘Judaism’ exists at this 
time.
 273
  As such these pagan proselytes are people from a similar background to Justin, 
also convinced of the one true god, but who rejected Christ as a route to god. Justin, 
once Trypho knows he is a ‘Christian’, is of similar status as a pagan interested in 
Israelite and Hebrew traditions, like one of the friends, albeit errant in his approach. 
This seems to be what Trypho is implying in Dial 8.4 when he says to Justin ‘for I have 
already considered you a friend’274 whilst chastising him after discovering, he is a 
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‘Christian’. Trypho is warm towards Justin’s intentions, his ‘eagerness to study divine 
things’ – which being truly divine pertain to the one true god and rather than any 
general meta ontotheology. Though this is speculation this could be read as though 
Trypho places Justin in a similar position to his other friends, who were not Hebrew’s 
born of circumcision as Stanton made clear. Identity is a key issue for both sides, 
Trypho and Justin, and though Trypho calls Justin a friend he will soon reject his 
‘Christian’ claims as blasphemy. The connected topics of philosophy and Trypho’s 
identity are further developed by a subtle but searching question put by Justin in Dial 
1.3. Justin asks why Trypho should be interested in philosophy when he has his own 
lawgiver and prophets. That is, what possible interest could Trypho have in Graeco-
Roman philosophical schools when he already has the materials of the true philosophy? 
The law and prophets are thus noteworthy already at this early stage and are identified 
at this stage as belonging to the Hebrews’ setting the scene for Justin to claim them for 
himself. Justin’s question about why a Hebrew should be interested in philosophy also 
anticipates what the presbutes will say about the prophets being the only source of true 
knowledge that there is, as well as casting Trypho as one duped by philosophy’s 
teachers and preservers. Dial 2 will reveal that philosophy is erroneous and later Justin 
will claim that true philosophy comes precisely from the prophets whom Trypho does 
not seem to look to for inspiration.  
Dial 1 continues to explore the shape of contemporary philosophy and what its concerns 
ought to be and does so in such a way as to determine how Justin will be able to 
characterise the following of Christ and the true ‘Israel’:  
‘”Yes, indeed,” I said, “we, too, are of the same opinion. But the majority of the 
philosophers have simply neglected to inquire whether there is one or even several 
gods, and whether or not a divine providence takes care of us, as if this knowledge were 
unnecessary to our happiness. Moreover, they try to convince us that God takes care of 
the universe with its genera and species, but not of me and you and of each individual, 
for otherwise there would be no need of our praying to him night and day. It is not 
difficult to see where such reasoning leads them. It imparts a certain immunity and 
freedom of speech to those who hold these opinions, permitting them to do and say 
whatever they please, without any fear of punishment or hope of reward from God. How 
could it be otherwise, when they claim that things will always be as they are now, and 
that you and I shall live in the next life just as we are now, neither better nor worse. But 
there are others who think that the soul is immortal and incorporeal, and therefore 
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conclude that they will not be punished even if they are guilty of sin; for, if the soul is 
incorporeal, it cannot suffer; if it is immortal, it needs nothing further from God.”’ 275 
(Dial 1.4-5) 
The issue of the number of gods that exist should for Justin be a central issue of 
philosophy. Van Winden has produced some excellent analysis of this passage which 




Firstly that the problem of god is generally neglected among philosophers. Whether this 
was actually the case is not all that pressing. Indeed Van Kooten has noted that 
Epictetus sees the aim of philosophy similarly to discern how, if there is a god, his 
nature may be. As Van Kooten notes this programme has striking similarity to early 
‘Christian’ writing.277 Why does Justin think it to be an important topic to raise with 
Trypho? Secondly, the existence of a sub-class of philosophers who do not neglect the 
problem of god but defend the thesis that His providence is restricted. They take up a 
special position in connection with the problem of god rather than neglecting it 
altogether. Still, this is not yet what Justin has in mind at this point. He is trying to 
express that those defending a restricted providence must also conclude that they have 
nothing to expect from Him, a god who does not care for them. Hence in daily life they 
do not take god into account, and in that sense they do not ‘inquire about the divine.’278 
This is different from the first group of philosophers who do not enquire at all. Or they 
enquire in theory but not in practice, nor in the way they live. The consequence of this 
neglect is that for the ethical life of the philosophers god is not a relevant factor, there is 
no punishment and no reward.  
 
Who were these two groups of philosophers? This and related questions have been 
discussed ad nauseam. Hyldahl takes the view that the Stoics are the target but Van 
Winden disagrees, and demurs from the received wisdom by stating that Greek 
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philosophy in general is what Justin has in mind.
 279
 Most of the time, as we shall see 
below, Greek philosophy in general does seem to correlate better with what Justin 
recorded, but there is another layer to the text which I want to bring out. Justin is not 
primarily talking about any philosophical groups, even though the names and positions 
of real philosophical groups appear in his reports. He is interested in ways of framing 
his argument. The question as to whether the number of gods interests philosophers is a 
worthwhile question to raise with Trypho because it is an important issue for Justin, or 
rather a central tenant of the true ‘Christian’ philosophy put under threat by Marcion.280 
Justin wants Trypho to recognise that he and his philosophy think this topic to be 
central whatever others might claim. Furthermore the second group of philosophers, 
those who do not neglect the problem of god, but think he does not care, are not a 
genuine and separate group of philosophers, but another marker that resonates with 
Marcionite theology. Marcion was not only claiming that the god of Israel was not the 
god of his Christ, he believed this god was an evil god who created and sustained the 
world but was not loving towards its inhabitants.
281
 At the same time his belief in 
another god the transcendent god who neither rewarded nor punished, could be read as 
if this god was indifferent towards humanity. Maricon’s belief in the transcendent god 
as well his acceptance of the reality of the god of Israel, who is the creator of the world 
– and seen as not relevant to ‘Christians’ - make him sound a propagator of multiple 
gods. Furthermore the distinction between Christ and his Father makes him, and Justin 
who shares this, seem less than monotheistic. Justin of course wants to deny that this 
makes him less than monotheistic and continually asserts his allegiance to and belief in 
the one true god, the creator, only. The philosophical discussion then is mainly about 
establishing positions from which Justin can outline differences in his philosophy – 
which Trypho has asked to know – and that of Marcion. Trypho soon finds out that 
Justin is a ‘Christian’ (Dial 8.1). As we know from Dial 38.1, Trypho was not meant to 
converse or associate with ‘Christians’ in any way, so it becomes clear why Justin hides 
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his identity. Furthermore Trypho’s view of ‘Christians’, as shall become clear, is 
frequently imbued with a Marcionite character so it is incumbent on Justin to dispel this 
coloration. Hence Justin uses Trypho to launch into a piece on why ‘Christians’ were 
different from Marcionites. Given the shame name status of ‘Christians’ Justin has to 
proceed with subtlety and control the terms of the debate if he is going to be able to 
successfully differentiate ‘Christians’ from Marcionites and Hebrews from ‘Israel’.   
 
Chapter one ends with Trypho inviting Justin, who he sees as a wise and learned 
philosopher on account of his cloak and his insights thus far, to share his own views on 
god and his own particular philosophy, his way of life. Textually speaking Trypho has 
taken Justin’s bait and the introduction proper now proceeds. 
Dial 2 
As we saw in the previous chapter Justin outlines that philosophy, in his view does 
indeed pertain to god and in fact comes from god at the beginning of Dial 2.1:‘"I will 
tell you," I replied, "my personal views on this subject. Philosophy is indeed one’s 
greatest possession, and is most previous in the sight of God, to whom it leads us and to 
whom it unties us, and in truth they who have applied themselves to philosophy are holy 
men. But, many have failed to discover the nature of philosophy, and the reason why it 
was sent down to men;”’282 Philosophy is a gift given to men, it has come down to 
them. We ought not to be misled by the giftedness of philosophy here however. This is 
a step in the argument that will allow Justin to claim that the truth of Christ is 
philosophy without having to reject the category as such. That philosophy’s purpose has 
escaped most of its practitioners is a clue to the central point here: ‘The point, however, 
is not the divine nature of philosophy, but the problems engendered by philosophy. 
Philosophy for Justin is univocal, but it has become erroneously diverse.’283 This is a 
central truth on which Justin will rely to differentiate ‘Christians’ from Marcionites and 
others and ‘Jews’ from ‘Israel’ by virtue of teaching that demurs from that of god. In 
detailing this Justin must point out that such diversity belies not just error but 
membership of a different school, a different philosophy: 
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‘“They who first turned to philosophy, and, as a result, were deemed illustrious men 
were succeeded by men who gave no time to the investigation of truth, but, amazed at 
the courage and self-control of their teachers as well as with the novelty of their 
teachings, held that to be truth which each had learned from his own teacher. And they 
in turn transmitted to their successors such opinions, and others like them, and so they 
became known by the name of him who was considered the father of the doctrine.”’ 284 
(Dial 2.2) 
This is really the key passage in this chapter; it establishes the point for what follows in 
this long introductory section and the wider differentiation project in the whole piece. 
As we noted in chapter two, Justin here stresses that philosophies have founders and 
followers. Amram Tropper concerning how this system operated in Justin’s time writes:  
‘A succession, as popularly understood in the classicizing atmosphere of the Second 
Sophistic, (i.e., the cultural renaissance in the Greek-speaking east of the Roman 
Empire from the mid-first to the mid-third century CE) outlined the transmission of 
proper doctrine over the course of history. The founder’s successors continue his legacy 
and viewed the interpretation of his writings as the unfolding of his ideas. In a 
scholastic or intellectual succession list, the central factor was the belief that the 
founder’s heirs transmitted proper doctrine.’285 
 Credibility as a member of a school relied upon faithful remembering and 
representation of the founder of that school’s doctrine then. That is the legacy, without 
this, the legacy is lost or perverted into something else. Followers follow systems 
named after founders, that is they follow the doctrines of men, rather than those of 
Christ (Dial 48.4). For Justin, however, all schools, bar his own school, were already 
perverted and taught erroneous doctrines. He’ll even go as far as to question whether it 
is worth studying philosophy at all in the face of the critique offered by the presbutes. 
The message he received from the presbutes was the philosophy of Christ, given 
through the prophets. Justin is thus part of a chain of followers of a divine tradition, 
going back to Christ and passing it on likewise. In this sense, the presbutes represents a 
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very particular teacher of Justin’s, like Justin saw himself, passing down revelation to 
his students like Tatian which will then further be received by Irenaeus.
286
  
In contrast to his own lineage of tradition, Justin speaks of other schools and their 
masters as originators of doctrine (path.r tou/ lo,gou) at Dial 35.6 he calls them avrcngon 
(founder) which is the same word he uses for the leader of the evil demons at 1A 28.1
287
 
and for Simon Bar Kokhba at 1A 31.6.
288
 Those following and handing on these 
doctrines only make things worse because these followers usually have lost interest in 
the truth and are instead star struck by the patience and self-restraint and novelty of their 
founders. Justin will go on to discuss a number of contemporary forms of philosophy in 
the course of making this point. The presentation of these is not unique in his time and 
may or may not represent his actual experience in Graeco-Roman philosophical 
schools.
289
 The point however is that this survey of philosophy establishes for him that 
human wisdom is erroneously equivocal and will allow him to argue below for the true 
‘Christian’ philosophy which is univocal which will necessarily imply the 
differentiation of ‘Christians’ from Marcionites, as well as others, but particularly 
Marcionites given the shape of the discussion Justin has with Trypho. The full 
illumination of the parallel Justin is drawing with philosophical schools is made by 
holding it alongside the argument against ‘Christian’ sectarianism in Dial 35.6 and in 




One science One faith 
Various schools Various sects or heresies 
Adherents name after the ‘father of the 
doctrine’ 
Adherents named after the ‘father of the 
doctrine’ 
They call themselves philosophers but are 
not 
They call themselves Christians but are 
not 
This journey through the philosophy tale is the foundation for a central analogy of one 
discipline versus sectarian novelty. Justin believes he follows the true philosophy which 
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comes directly from Christ and that this teaching was predicted and is corroborated by 
the prophets. This double-source of authority becomes clear, once contrasted with 
Justin’s main opponent, Marcion, who had advocated a direct revelation of Christ to 
Paul and a mediation of it through Paul alone at the expense of all the Prophets 
(including Moses, John the Baptist and even contemporary prophets) and their god the 
creator and god of Israel. I’m not suggesting that Marcion is the only target here, but he 
is the main contestant that Justin had in mind when he elaborates his own line of 
tradition. And it is in contrast to Marcion that Justin directs his criticism. 
Dial 3 
In Dial 3 Justin begins the story of his meeting with the presbutes which leads to his 
conversion. Van Winden conjectures whether the palaio,j in Justin’s text (which seems 
tautological beside elder) might be a corruption of polioj,291 which can commonly be 
taken to mean grey or whether old here simply means honourable, respectable or 
venerable. According to Bruce Chilton Justin’s language of palaio,j tij prejbuthj 
‘emphasizes the antiquity and traditional wisdom of his interlocutor more than the 
English phrase – ‘a certain old man’ does.’292 This should not be overlooked because 
anything they discuss, especially what the presbutes says about the prophets, must be 
read as true philosophy from Justin’s perspective. This would add more to the emphasis 
on wisdom and antiquity rather than the age of the man. Given that the presbutes will 
present a or rather the philosophy through the prophets and Christ, his credentials in 
wisdom are not irrelevant. Justin has not introduced a man but a wise and experienced 
man to present his case. This is especially noteworthy against the views of Hyldahl who 
considers the presbutes to be a ‘barbarous stranger’ because he asks various questions 
suggesting he does not know the answers, such as asking Justin if he is merely a lover 
of words and thus misunderstanding Justin’s characterisation of himself by filologia, 
by which Justin means he is a philosopher, and instead takes him to mean he is a lover 
of words (filosofoj) as opposed to one who is concerned with real life.293 Van Winden 
points out that Hyldahl fails to recognise the strategy of the presbutes and reads the 
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words too plainly. The presbutes is practicing a Socratic method by asking questions to 
encourage a response following a logic rather than not knowing the answer. This itself 
shows his wisdom and learning in the respectable ways of this thought world.
294
 
Furthermore since the debate is chiefly about Platonism he is clearly not ignorant in 
such matters according to this method. Rather the question is designed to anticipate the 
revelation that the ‘Christian’ philosophy is the only way that can truly be considered 
philosophy and truth. The presbutes has lost some of his household and has gone 
looking for them. I’d like to conjecture, which is it all that can be said on this, that there 
is an echo of the good Shepherd here. Given that true identity, the true flock, is a main 
topic in the Dial and that Trypho has a group of friends who are probably pagan 
proselytes, this statement may be considered to cast the presbutes as a Christ type figure 
looking for his flock who have strayed.
295
 Indeed the only other occasion when Justin 
mentions the presbutes is Dial 23.3, where he promises to recount the message, he 
received from that man, in order to win those who wish to become proselytes to the 
philosophy of Christ.
296
  This is ultimately only conjecture but it seems to fit. 
In the course of this discussion the problem of the nature of philosophy surfaces again 
and we find a further affirmation of the power of philosophy from Justin: 
‘“Philosophy”, I answered, “is the knowledge of that which exists, and a clear 
understanding of the truth; and happiness is the reward of such a knowledge and 
understanding.”’ 297  (Dial 3.4) The presbutes does not query this though he will 
critique the reliability of many philosophical doctrines in the course of their 
conversation but as far as Justin is concerned this definition of philosophy always 
stands and, as he later spells out, its content can only be Christ. Following the above 
statement the presbutes quickly asks Justin what his conception of god is and he replies: 
‘“God is the Being who always has the same nature in the same manner, and is the 
cause of existence of all else.”’ 298 (Dial 3.5) And the presbutes was pleased with this 
answer. That is to say that this answer is a starting point sufficiently close to the 
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‘Christian’ view that the presbutes did not need to challenge it. Justin is not yet a 
‘Christian’, but the answer he has given is not only compatible with the ‘Christian’ 
philosophy of the presbutes, it also shows another typical anti-Marcionite feature. 
Marcion, by contrast, would not have been pleased with this statement, because though 
he would have agreed that the creator is the cause ‘of existence of all else’, he would 
not think of him as the transcendent (Middle Platonic) divine who ‘always has the same 
nature in the same manner’. It was precisely this notion of divine consistency which 
Marcion saw betrayed by the creator of the Old Testament who was described as 
unreliable, had anthropomorphic characteristics and changed between love and hate, 
between promise of salvation and punishment and acted as a pondering judge.
299
 
Marcion’s alien god, in contrast, was indeed extraneous to both the philosophy of Justin 
and the presbutes.  So even in Justin’s self-portrait of his pre-‘Christian’ state he is 
more ‘Christian’ than Marcion and creation is for the first time laid down as a 
distinctive marker of the theological discourse.  
The presbutes has been pleased that Justin thinks in terms that sound like a singular 
creator god who is consistent. Naturally at this stage Justin’s conception is not meant to 
sound fully ‘Christian’, even if it is accepted by the presbutes to be a correct and 
reasonable starting point from which to continue the discussion with Justin. The next 
significant question asked is, how does Justin know this? What is the basis of Justin’s 
knowledge; in what way is it demonstrable? This is the discussion of the nature of 
science and the possibility of a science of being. The presbutes’ intention here is to 
drive his opponent into a corner in the Socratic manner and prove that there is no 
science of knowing god, apart from the science revealed by the prophets. When Justin 
responds to the question as to whether such a science exists, the presbutes says: ‘Well 
then, is the knowledge of man and God of the same kind as that of music, arithmetic, 
astronomy or the like?’300 (Dial 3.6.) Justin admits that the science of knowing god does 
not proceed in the same way as these other sciences and so the presbutes says that Justin 
has been wrong to answer that there was a science of knowing god because knowledge 
proceeds by sight or hearing and this is not possible with god.  
What has the point been here? The presbutes says: ‘“Then, how” he reasoned, “can the 
philosophers speculate correctly or speak truly of God, when they have no knowledge of 
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him, since they have never seen nor heard him?”’ 301 (Dial 3.7) The point is that for the 
presbutes there is one god, maker and sustainer of all, who is consistent and unchanging 
but that no one can know him apart from by his own visible and audible revelation. The 
presbutes is trying to rule out the possibility of natural theology, the possibility of any 
knowing of god that bypasses his revelation in the prophets. Why is this important to 
him? Because he will later want to demonstrate, at the conclusion of the Socratic 
dialogue, that the prophets and Christ are the only means of knowledge of god. That 
only from what god has said through the prophets and done in Christ we can know god. 
The consequence of this is that any vision of god that does not proceed on this basis is 
erroneous. Having the presbutes outline the only way of knowing god defines the 
‘Christian’ philosophy and it does so to invalidate Marcion’s contrary position who 
rejected a) the creator god and b) the prophets as mediators of true revelation. It follows 
then that Marcion’s claims to knowledge of god, as a ‘Christian’, qualify as an invalid 
by the standards of the presbutes. And although the text of Justin’s introduction is not 
directly addressing Marcion, Justin prepares the grounds and makes every effort to rule 
out the principles consistent with typically Marcionite positions (none other, as far as 
we know, have rejected the prophets and the creator).  
Dial 4 
In Dial 4.1 the presbutes tries to tease out of Justin exactly what in his opinion makes 
the perception of god possible. The presbutes asks: ‘Will the human mind be capable of 
seeing god, if not aided by the Holy Spirit?’ 302 This is the same spirit who spoke 
through the prophets. The presbutes is asking Justin if it is possible to know god, the 
one true god, without his spirit guiding. Again this is suggestive of a contra-Marcionite 
agenda because Marcion rejects what the prophets have said about Christ and thus must 
have been read as if he rejected the guidance of the god of the prophets. Justin’s 
response is that the human mind can see god unaided, that within the philosophy of 
Plato the human mind has a sense perception of god, so that a natural theology is still 
possible. It is not without conditions though. This vision of god comes to those souls 
who ‘are well disposed because of their affinity and desire of seeing him.' 303 (Dial 4.1) 
Van Winden details that Justin is here drawing on Plato’s theory of the forms: only like 
knows like and so ‘if the human mind is able to know the true reality, it must have some 
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kinship (sugge,neia) with it.’304 This gives the presbutes the ammunition he needs to 
continue to deconstruct the possibility of a natural theology. 
The presbutes asks in what this affinity consists and clarifying his question he asks if 
the soul is part of the royal mind itself. As Van Winden notes: ‘His objection against 
Platonism is obviously: if the human soul is thought to be kindred with god, what is the 
difference, then, between the two?’305 The concept of the royal mind is not a clear one 
in the Middle Platonists of the period. Albinus and Numenius speak of two minds, that 
of god and a second which is between god and where humans live. The relationship of 
these to one another is not easy to establish.
306
 However the specifics of this need not 
detain us. The presbutes has introduced the concept in order to get Justin to ascent to it 
– which he does – and elaborate further to a position he can firmly dispute. The 
presbutes now pursues a reductio ad absurdum argument concerning the ability of 
animals to see god according to this Platonic logic. He does this so that he will be able 
to refute the notion of the transmigration of souls in order to undermine the entire 
Platonic doctrine of the nature of the soul.
307
 The important moves for our purposes are 
that ‘righteousness’ and temperance (sw,frona) have become new criteria for seeing god 
in the course of the argument and the presbutes defeats existence of this in this other 
philosophy by showing that the Platonic doctrine does not have the tools for such 
righteousness and temperance because the non-righteous would not be treated in a 
meaningfully different way. As Goodenough put it: ‘The Old Man seems to use 
practical expediency as an adequate philosophical criterion, and from that test alone he 
has put aside both doctrines. He argues that it is useless to punish people when they do 
not remember afterwards either the fact or the reason for their having been punished, 
and concludes that such punishment, because useless, cannot exist.’308 The presbutes 
rounds off by saying: ‘“Therefore,” he concluded, “souls do not see God, nor do they 
transmigrate into other bodies, for they would know that they were being thus punished, 
and they would be afraid thereafter to commit even the slightest sin. But I do concede 
that souls can perceive that there is a God, and that justice and piety are 
admirable.”’309 (Dial 4.7) This is very revealing for the purposes of our argument. 
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Having, insofar as Justin is convinced, debunked the notion of the transmigration of 
souls, the presbutes inserts that there is a grain of truth here, that righteousness and 
piety (euvse,beia) are relevant factors. God exists and can be known and being righteous 
is not irrelevant to this. It is irrelevant in a system where true punishment does not exist. 
The implication is that in an otherwise arranged philosophical system this would make 
sense. This is significant for us because it is precisely the notion of punishment and 
righteousness that Marcion rejects in god. The presbutes is admitting that these are 
really part of the picture with the true god but only where there is a genuine alternative 
or consequences to actions. In Marcion’s system this is what is lacking because he 
deliberately jettisons it. We have already seen in our introduction that it is unlikely that 
Marcion distinguished between a just and a good god, however he did believe that the 
creator god was a cruel judge and therefore not just or righteous. Temperance too, as we 
shall see below, is something Justin claims for ‘Christians’ but says he cannot claim for 
Marcionites and that those who are not temperate are those who fall into demon inspired 
theology like Marcion’s (1A 26.7; Dial 58.3) The subtext here can be understood to be: 
if Platonism, that venerable philosophy, cannot see god because the transmigration 
undermines the necessity  of justice then how much further away is Marcionism, and 
any kind of ‘Christianity’ which disavows the need to be righteous and temperate before 
god? Righteousness and temperance have become another marking of the ‘Christian’ 
philosophy in which all ‘Christians’ must be defined  
Dial 5 
Having dealt with souls, and the lack of expertise philosophers have concerning them, 
the presbutes engineers a shift in the argument towards the nature of the world. He 
demonstrates that souls are not immortal because if the world is begotten then so must 
also be souls. Both parties assume the Aristotelian theory in which ‘unbegotten’ and 
‘immortal’ are a pair equal and opposite to ‘begotten’ and ‘perishable’.310 So souls are 
not free to transmigrate for the world and everything in it depends on the one true god 
for its existence and has no life apart from him. The ultimate sovereignty of god in such 
matters is further demonstrated by what the presbutes says next. Having shown that 
souls and the world are not immortal, he now qualifies his argument by saying, though 
he has distinguished the perishable from the unperishable logically, that this does not 
mean that all perishable things die. This is not because they are immortal but because 
god sustains them. Why so? Because otherwise, according to this argument, evil doers 
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would get off scot free. The resulting claim is that god sustains souls; the worthy to 
never die and the evil in punishment. This is part of the ‘Christian’ doctrine that the 
presbutes is trying to establish and this is why he has had to attack the doctrines of the 
immortal soul and transmigration. These positions, as far as he is concerned, assume a 
state of affairs in which the sovereignty of god over ethics and existence is undermined. 
Of course these Platonic notions are of no serious threat to Justin as he presents the 
piece. Rather they represent problems that stand against the doctrine of god as 
understood in relation to Christ and through the prophets with the guidance of the Spirit. 
They thus challenge, as indicated above, Marcion who in the eyes of Justin must have 
been seen as undermining the sovereignty of god by neither rewarding righteousness, 
nor punishing wrong doing. As above, this is not a direct rebuttal of Marcion but a 
removal of conditions that make his theology possible, or rather a careful drawing of 
what sort of arrangements are possible within ‘Christian’ doctrine which necessarily 
excludes Marcionite tendencies. Since Marcion denied the relevance of punishment, and 
by extension righteousness, in relation to the one true god anyone who has heard the 
presbutes could not think Marcion to be a ‘Christian’. 
Dial 6 
At the end of the previous section Justin had tried to align the views of the presbutes 
with those of Plato and those of Pythagoras also. Justin is inclined to see the doctrines 
of the presbutes as complimentary to the philosophies he knows as part of the wider 
discipline of philosophical speculation. To this the presbutes angrily retorts: ‘“I do 
care,” he answered, “if Plato Pythagoras or anyone else held such views. What I say is 
the truth and here is how you may learn it.”’ 311 (Dial 6.1) Here Plato and Pythagoras 
are held up in sharp contrast to the truth which is a marker that we are soon to reach the 
presbutes’ definitive statements about faith. It is not that the statements of these 
philosophers do not have a measure of truth, but they are insignificant in contrast to 
what the presbutes is about to reveal. He next gives a demonstration of the nature of the 
soul in two parts. Firstly that the soul is not a life-force itself but only participates in 
life, so it is possible for it to come to an end. god is the source of its life. And secondly 
the means of its coming to an end.
312
 Sources for the second part of this argument have 
been sought by many commentators in contemporary philosophers. As said above, this 
thesis is not concerned with the literary sources of the doctrines in this section chiefly, 
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because these are well attested and secondly because they can sometimes prove 
something of a red herring in demonstrating the force of what Justin is trying to do in 
this text, namely to rule out and distinguish ‘Christian’ theology from anything that 
might take a more Marcionite or otherwise non-‘Christian’ or Gnostic shape. Whatever 
the sources of the presbutes’ statements are, they are designed to emphasize the 
sovereignty of god. The uniqueness of god and his power is the central seam of the 
argument. As Van Winden wisely noted:  
 
‘More important is that the entire argument of the old man against Platonism is 
dominated by one idea: ‘if the Platonic opinion of the soul is true, the soul is not 
distinguishable from God.’ Hence the old man’s attach on the Platonic theory of a nous, 
which is able from itself to know God; this would mean that the human soul is divine, 
which, of course, is untrue. Hence also the attack on the immortality of the soul; for 
‘immortal’ means ‘unbegotten’ and these are properties of God alone. The unity of this 
entire argumentation, actually one great deduction ad absurdum, has escaped the 
commentators.’313  
 
Van Winden is spot on here, although even he has not noticed that this deduction ad 
absurdum has a relevance in the wider theological landscape of the time, as Bobichon 
noticed of the later section (Dial 10.1) being a double response to Marcion. Justin, 
through the speech of the presbutes has been attempting to rule out and separate from 
‘Christian’ theology any kind of natural theology so he can assert that the prophets, the 
prophets who belong to the one true god, are a genuine source of revelation. The other 
part of that argument that will be made, is that the prophets speak of Christ but naturally 
Justin needs to establish first that they are a genuine source of revelation from the one 
true god before he can enter into the debate about whether or not the prophets really 
speak of Christ. These introductory chapters are concerned with the prophets being true 
revelation of god so that anyone who wants to know god must be conversant with them. 
The rest of the debate is about why this doesn’t make Justin a ‘Jew’. From this point we 
find ourselves very quickly at the introduction of the prophets. 
Dial 7 
From the presbutes demolishment of philosophy Justin wonders if it is worth perusing 
at all. Justin asks: 'If these teachers do not know the truth, I asked, “then from where 
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might anyone get help?”’ 314 (Dial 7.1) He is despairing; perhaps there is no one who 
can teach truthfully.
315
  Just as Justin questioned Trypho in chapter one about why he is 
interested in philosophy and provoked an enquiry into his own philosophy so Justin has 
been questioned to the point that he now wants to hear what his opponents own views 
are. The presbutes’ rejection of affiliation with Plato and Pythagoras is in order that he 
can introduce the teachers of the truth. Now that Justin has enquired of the presbutes, 
this one will introduce the source of revelation, the peak towards which the previous 
introductory chapters were leading: 
  
‘“A long time ago, “ he replied, “ long before the time of those so-called philosophers, 
there lived blessed men who were just and loved God, men who spoke through the 
inspiration of the Holy Spirit and predicted events that would take place in the future, 
which events are now taking place. We call these men the prophets. They alone knew 
the truth and communicated it to men, whom they neither deferred to nor feared. With 
no desire for personal glory, they reiterated only what they heard and saw when 
inspired by a holy spirit.”’ 316 (Dial 7.1) 
And so the prophets enter the scene finally as teachers of those who want to know god 
in contrast to ordinary human teachers who are charlatans.
317
 What these men knew was 
from god rather than human opinion and they were on good terms with god. The 
presbutes who’s religious/ethnic affiliation is not revealed , is claiming that the prophets 
are the sole source of truth and that ‘Their writings are still extant, and whoever 
consults them will profit greatly concerning knowledge of the beginning and end of 
things, and all  that a philosopher ought to know.’318 (Dial 7.2) This then is the source 
philosophers should be conversant with, because these prophets are the only ones (Ou-
toi mon,oi to. avlhqe.j kai. ei=don kai. evxeipon avqrw,poij) to have seen the truth. Their 
teaching is therefore the original teaching, theirs is the primordial philosophy, it is not 
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one among many but the first and only philosophy.
319
 Conversely Barnard thought that 
Justin regarded Platonism as a preparation.
320
 This is actually closer to Trypho’s view 
who sees philosophy as a preparation for something with god. However, for Justin 
Greek philosophy was not travelling towards god. Instead he sees the ‘Christian’ 
philosophy as the original and true philosophy – not something he needed to be 
prepared for in his journey (as the peripatetic advised). His journey is not intended to 
show an ascent but a meandering until he found the truth. The presbutes challenges the 
best that philosophy can offer, which Justin comes to see is defeated by the prophets.  
Though the presbutes has appeared somewhat dismissive of his similarities in doctrine 
with the ancient philosophers he has not told Justin that he ought not to be a 
philosopher, but instead a ‘Christian’ (the presbutes never uses this label). Rather he has 
said that philosophers should know and believe the prophets. Justin, in despair, does not 
give up on philosophy and replaces it with revelation, as Goodenough understood his 
acceptance of the prophets. So he embraces philosophy afresh and all the more as an 
out-narration of all others, as the true science and demonstrable truth.
321
 This is because 
true knowledge of god comes through direct encounter with god. Though no human 
mind can see or know god according to Platonic doctrine, the prophets have been filled 
with god’s spirit and were able to speak through it; they have direct experience of god 
then. They spoke and wrote the truth down which the presbutes opposed to the 
teachings of Plato and Pythagoras.
322
 The merit of faith in the prophets according to the 
presbutes is the power of the Holy Spirit which filled them.
323
 It is not just the words 
that matter but who and what is said through them. And it needs this Spirit, in order to 
understand the scriptures hence why Justin believes that Hebrews like Trypho and their 
teachers do not understand their scriptures or their god.
324
 Van Winden details Justin’s 
account and emphasis on the nature of the prophet’s writings, especially compared with 
those sophistic works of the philosophers:  
‘pisteusanta evkei,noij – But one will learn the truth when credence is given to their 
writings. This very important observation is explained in what follows: “For they have 
not set out their accounts with formal argument, since superior to all such arguing, they 
were trustworthy witnesses for the truth; but events past and present compel us to agree 
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with what was spoken by them.” [Dial 7.2] Their writings are not based on logical 
arguments. On the contrary, since they received the truth through a divine spirit, they 
are trustworthy witnesses, superior to all logical proofs; past and present prove that 
what they said is true. Apparently Justin argues here against those who considered the 
logical argument to be the only valuable one in philosophy.’325  
Who might this be that Justin argues against? Van Winden mentions Galen as a 
possibility.
326
 Quite so, but closer to home is Marcion who explicitly rejected the 
allegorical interpretation of the scriptures favouring only and at all times a plain reading 
of the text which does not allow for the prediction of events in the prophets. On closer 
inspection it is possible that Justin uses the philosophers not only to argue against them, 
but also Marcion. Van Winden’s Galen reference is very apposite to reveal this. Galen 
treated both ‘Judaism’ and ‘Christianity’ as defective philosophies without the means to 
demonstrate their claims. But his disdain was not reserved for these. He also looked 
down on members of any philosophical school because they had, as he understood it, 
privileged allegiance to a teacher or school over demonstration.
327
 Galen’s objection 
then is just as David Sedley claims in saying: ‘in the Greco-Roman world, especially 
during the Hellenistic and Roman periods, what gives philosophical movements their 
cohesion and identity is less a disinterested quest for the truth than a virtually religious 
commitment to the authority of a founder figure.’328 Immediately this will appear as an 
obvious parallel to the argument Justin made in Dial 2.2. Furthermore Galen also 
provided a literary account of his journey through philosophical schools which is 
remarkably, though these were not unique of course, similar to Justin’s in Dial 2.3-5. 
The key difference is that Galen disavows all sects whereas Justin chose Plato’s before 
choosing Christ’s. However it should be remembered that Christ’s philosophy, though 
named after him as the founder, is the universal and primordial philosophy, in short it is 
not a sect but simply the truth. Justin speaks of it in the manner of a school to make the 
point he needs about the misapplication of the name ‘Christian’ elsewhere, but 
fundamentally like Galen he does not choose a school but, as his argument against 
schools in Dial 2.2 suggests, rejects them in favour of the truth. The objection may be 
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raised that Galen objected to ‘blind faith’ and Justin spoke of the prophets having no 
proof which might suggest that he was defending faith of this sort. However the more 
significant point is that according to Justin, the prophets did not argue for their claims, 
they were beyond this because these things could not be demonstrated because they had 
not happened. But in Justin’s time they can be seen to have happened so no one can 
argue against them. Justin rejects proof no more than Galen. It is perfectly in keeping 
with this that their writing should be read with proper faith (pisteu,anta) as Dial 7.2 
states. This is not a request for blind faith, but for trust and an open-mindedness to see 
that what the prophets claimed will happen and has in fact happened. In Justin’s mind it 
is an appeal for clarity and sensible thinking.  
Concerning the character of the prophets, the presbutes says they were just and loved 
god and did nothing for personal glory but sought only to glorify god
329
, which of 
course fits the requirement that those who know god must be just and temperate which 
the two interlocutors had agreed upon already. This ought to be taken as a contrast to 
those philosophers who love the novelty and fame which Justin has already mentioned 
Dial 2.2. In this, Justin criticises Marcion who both stressed the idea of novelty and, 
who, by being the founder of a sect in Justin’s eyes reveals himself to be like those 
philosophers he criticised as seeking fame and personal glory – which were things 
enjoyed by Simon and Menander who appear as Justin’s predecessors in 1A 26 and 56. 
More directly against Marcion, Justin maintains that these very prophets ‘for they 
exalted God, the Father and Creator of all things, and made known Christ, his Son, who 
was sent by him. This the false prophets, who are filled with an erring and unclean 
spirit, have never done, nor even do now.’330 (Dial 7.3). These are strong words, later on 
picked up against Marcion by Tertullian.
331
 The passage, therefore, provides further 
evidence that Marcionite theology is a background canvas against which Justin writes. 
Marcion would not glorify the maker of all things – the god of Israel - and equate him 
with the one god, the Father who sent Christ, his Son – quite the opposite, he would 
consider such a deity to be a lesser, menial god. Interesting also is the fact that the 
presbutes mentions that the false prophets have been seduced by unclean spirits. This 
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reads as Justin entering another subtle overture about Marcion as he also says about 
Marcion in 1A 58.3 that the demons have put him forward to do the work which is to 
‘attempt nothing else than to seduce men from god who made them, and from Christ 
His first-begotten’332 – clearly resonating the presbutes’ words. The only other time 
Justin mentions Marcion he is again in league with devils, it is by their aid (dia. th/j tw/n 
daimo,nwn sullh,yewj)that he is able to achieve his success (1A 26.5).333  
Finally the presbutes rounds off his speech by urging Justin: ‘Above all, beseech God to 
open to you the gates of light, for no one can perceive or understand these truths unless 
he has been enlightened by God and his Christ.’ 334 (Dial 7.3) This summary is against 
all the Platonic argument that propose to lead to god. The presbutes insists that only 
from god and through Christ can this knowledge be given. That one true god and his 
son are announced together is also significant. This goes beyond a statement to which 
Trypho could subscribe. Hence, both Marcion and Trypho are excluded and stand 
outside the gates of light. And one is reminded of Justin’s work pro.j Marki,wna: ‘I 
would not have believed the Lord if he announced another God beside our Creator, 
Maker and nourisher. But since from the one God who made the world, formed us, and 
contains and administers all things, the Only-begotten Son came to us…’335 The god 
who sends Christ is thus the one powerful and creative god who has jurisdiction over 
all. The revelation of this god is through the prophets and so Marcionite theology is 
ruled out as non-‘Christian’ theology. Justin’s philosophy will also challenge Trypho, 
but on the other issue of Messianism.  
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In Dial 8 Justin records the moment of realization of the truth of divine philosophy. 
This is the transitionary chapter that marks the beginning of the end of the introduction 
and the start of the discussion proper, the presbutes departed and Justin remerges as the 
main speaker.  This is where Trypho discovers that Justin is a ‘friend of Christ’. From 
the presbutes Justin was filled with a desire and passion for the prophets and all of those 
who can be counted as friends of Christ (oi[ eivsi Cristou/ fi,loi). Being a friend of 
Christ and attending to the prophets are then for Justin, through the tradition of the 
presbutes, what it means to be ‘Christian’. One cannot follow Christ without reading 
and believing the prophets, for without them his Christ would be a baseless and a free 
floating teacher, speaking only his own opinions. There would be no necessary 
connection to the one true god, the maker of all things, and neither would there be any 
obvious aim or need for him. Those who are Friends of Christ here naturally excludes 
Marcionites, more than any other group, because that which had inspired Justin’s heart 
is necessarily two-fold: the writings of the prophets and those who are friends of Christ. 
Marcionites claim to follow Christ but do not love the prophets and therefore fail to 
meet the first criterion. This pairing sets up all the discussion to follow regarding 
Trypho and the observance of the law. The love of the prophets is sufficient in 
combination with an allegiance to Christ and his friends. Otherwise ‘Christians’ would 
be Hebrews or Greek proselytes.
336
 Also it is noteworthy that the ‘Saviour’s words are 
enough to put to shame or instil fear in those who have strayed from the path [of 
righteousness].’337 (Dial 8.2) This sounds very much contrary to the Son of Marcion’s 
good god who does neither judge nor punish, but is characterised by mercy alone. Those 
who stick by Christ and put his words into practice have nothing to fear accordingly, but 
those who hear and do not obey are putting themselves at risk. Judgement is strongly 
part of the Saviour’s remit in Justin’s account of the faith, in stark contrast to Marcion. 
Naturally, therefore, Marcion and his followers would count among those who have 
heard his words and do not obey them given that he espouses a different god from 
Christ’s Father. Even more intriguing is the fact that Justin wishes that all should desire 
like him ‘not to fall away (avfistasqai) from the Saviour’s words.’ (Dial 8.2) As 
Skarsaune has noted, this is a puzzling thing for Justin to desire for those who have not 
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yet become ‘Christians’.338 Three explanations present themselves a) that Trypho’s 
friends, the proselytes used to be ‘Christians’ and are now seeking to become ‘Jews’, b) 
that Justin is warning them that by becoming ‘Jews’ they will join an apostate tradition 
which rejects its true Saviour’s words, c) that is, Justin has Marcionites in mind at this 
point and is urging Trypho’s friends not to follow their example and join them by 
rejecting the Christ of god. It seems as though a) is an unlikely explanation because we 
have no further evidence that would suggest this and it would be odd for Justin to ask 
people who have never been ‘Christians’ not to be apostates. Skarsaune favours a 
version of b).
339
 In favour of c) we have our evidence so far, and more to follow, that 
the topics Justin discusses in defining his ‘Christian’ philosophy are those which most 
keenly distinguish himself from Marcion. Yet, Justin is fighting on multiple fronts in all 
of his texts and we should be wary of tying too much down to one audience or intention, 
and, as here, the commonalities between Trypho and Marcion are also obvious. As far 
as Justin is concerned both have rejected Christ and neither understand the scriptures – 
as was alluded to by the presbutes in Dial 7.3 and will be developed further by Justin in 
relation to Grace – so it is possible that he is treating them together here. 
Justin urges Trypho and his friends to get to know the Christ of god. The importance of 
the genitive case (Cristo.n tou/ qeou/) here should not be overlooked. It would be very 
easy to gloss over this and think that Justin is encouraging them simply to get to know a 
Christ or get to know Jesus, or even the Messiah. He says explicitly and specifically that 
they should know the Christ of god which strongly implies a contrast with any other 
would be Christs that they may have heard about. The Christ Justin follows is that of the 
god of Trypho and there is no space for negotiation or compromise on this. This is an 
assured contra-Marcionite staking of claim. Justin, then, believes that he has found the 
singular philosophy, the one which is useful or serviceable. In light of all he has 
outlined Justin claims it is for those reasons he is a philosopher. Thus, he has now 
answered Trypho’s request in Dial 1.6, to ‘tell us what your philosophy is.’340 The 
philosophy Justin has outlined is the only one that is effective and has the power to 
change lives. He believes it brings perfection. This philosophy is not just abstract 
thinking but a way of life; he has found a discipline or rule of faith which is efficacious 
and comes from Christ with the prophets as its guarantors. 
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The reaction that comes from Trypho and his friends – who are probably proselytes to 
‘Judaism’ as discussed in the previous chapter – is not what Justin would have hoped 
for. Justin’s philosophy is laughable to them. Trypho claims that if Justin had remained 
a philosopher – a Platonist or some such – then there was hope for him: ‘For, while you 
adhered to your former school of philosophy and lived a blameless life, there was hope 
of a better destiny for you, but, when you have turned away from God and have placed 
your hope in man, what chance of salvation do you have?’ 341 (Dial 8.3) Trypho cannot 
accept to put one’s trust in a man by forsaking god. Compared to such apostasy, 
philosophy was a blameless life with hope for a better destiny. Trypho clearly sees 
Justin’s new philosophy to be different from both Graeco-Roman schools and his own 
traditions of Israel. It appears to him as some kind of new cult devoted to a human 
being, not something akin to the god of Israel. Taking into account Justin’s view of the 
pluriform nature of philosophy in Dial 2 and that in Dial 35 an analogy with this is 
drawn with ‘heretics’ including Marcionites it is no surprise here though that Trypho’s 
words  reflect this in seeing the ‘Christian’ philosophy as a novelty founded on man 
rather than god. Trypho has also claimed that Justin’s turn from god to a man was done 
under the guidance of men of no reputation or worth (avkolouqh/sai ouvdeno.j avxi,oij). 
Whom does Trypho have in mind? (Dial 8.3) Marcion, or the apostles? The meaning of 
this charge will become clearer in the following chapter, where it will be shown to what 
extent Trypho’s view of ‘Christianity’ coincides with Justin’s view of the major 
contemporary heresy he is dealing with. Here Trypho’s agenda for the rest of the piece 
is obvious. He has admired that Justin is interested in god – unlike many philosophers 
as previously outlined – and that he has good things to say about the prophets,342 but he 
accuses him of turning away from god, the god of Israel, the maker of all things, in 
favour of a man. This is not the view Justin has been trying to establish. Justin has 
worked hard to argue that his Christ is not an alternative to this god, the creator, but that 
he himself worships him, and, as he goes on to say, is a member of true Israel.  
Trypho outlines things Justin ought to do if he were really interested in god, which 
amounts to keeping the law. If he does this, he may obtain mercy from god (e;leoj e;stai 
para. qeou/) (Dial 8.4). This point is almost a summary of the whole debate. Trypho and 
Justin have alternative accounts of how one can obtain mercy from god and the rest of 
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the piece is a long outworking of the law versus grace through Christ.
343
 Both contesters 
agree on the presupposition. They both seek mercy from god, from the same god who, 
as both believe, is capable of giving mercy, whereas Marcion would deny that the 
creator god would be the god of mercy. The contesters’ agreement, therefore, seems to 
be designed to exclude a suspected Marcionism; the very fact that Justin has the 
audacity to expect mercy from this god is an contra-Marcionite statement. The topic of 
mercy from god will recur frequently in the Dial as a marker of this distinction and as a 





Justin responds in Dial 9 with the counsel that Trypho does not know what he is saying. 
Trypho has recommended in the previous chapter that Justin remained a Platonist rather 
than become somebody who forsakes god. That is, better to be a well-meaning neutral 
in god’s eyes than an apostate. Against Trypho’s accusation of Justin having put his 
confidence in a man and turned away from god by trusting in empty fables, Justin 
makes an important defence: 
 
‘If you will agree to hear our account of him, how we have not been deceived by false 
teachings, and how we shall not cease to profess our faith in him (even though men 
thereby persecute us, and the most cruel tyrant tries to force us to deny him), I will 
prove to you, here and now, that we do not believe in groundless myths nor in teachings 
without demonstration, but in doctrines that are inspired by the Divine Spirit, abundant 
with power, and teeming with grace.’ 345 (Dial 9.1) 
 
The questions arises then, what is that Trypho considers to be empty fables which Justin 
denies? Trypho in the next chapter gives us the explanation, when he states: ‘But the 
precepts in your so-called Gospel are so marvellous and great that I don’t think anyone 
could possibly keep them. For I took the trouble to consult them.’346 (Dial 10.2) The 
dispute, therefore, reveals to be one of competing sources – is ‘the so-called Gospel’, a 
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written text (‘I have carefully read’ it) with its narratives (‘empty fables’) and its 
‘precepts’ (‘no one can keep them’) in competition with the commandments of the 
Torah and the narratives of the prophets. As mentioned before, ‘so-called’ (lego,menoj) is 
used by Justin, when either the audience is unfamiliar with a concept, or if the concept 
is something of dubious character. Here, however, Justin makes case that he himself 
does not believe ‘empty fables or words without any foundation’, but instead follows 
‘an account of Him’ which does neither deceive nor makes Justin ‘cease to confess 
Him’. For Justin, this account is made of ‘words filled with the Spirit of god, and big 
with power, and flourishing with grace’. This most likely refers to his acceptance of the 
prophets but we know Justin elsewhere relies on what he calls the memoirs of the 
apostles (VApomnhmoneu,masi tw/n avposto,lwn).347 Justin is therefore denying that the 
tradition Trypho refers to as dubious is so but also that it is the only source, or even the 
primary source, of witness to Christ.  
 
Justin would recognise Trypho’s charge that he believes empty fables, because he thinks 
‘Christians’ do not accept the prophetic or Torah traditions,  as a charge against 
Marcionite theology. Trypho is accusing Justin of what he just spent eight chapters 
denying and furthermore he blasphemes Christ, the Christ of the one true god, in the 
process. Thus he responds that Trypho does not understand what he is talking about: ‘I 
excuse and forgive you, my friend," I said. "For you know not what you say’348  (Dial 
9.1) Justin has not turned away from god – the one true god in favour of a man.  
 
Justin claims that Trypho has been instructed by teachers ignorant of the meaning of the 
scriptures in forming his views. This refers to prejudiced ‘Jewish’ teachers but it is the 
same charge that Justin holds against heretics like Marcion. And Justin pleads for 
Trypho and his friends to hear from him the reasons that ‘Christians’ are not erroneous 
in their doctrine or life after Christ. This is not a shallow appeal. If Trypho will listen to 
what Justin’s account of Christ is (Dial 9.1),349 he will hear not just about Christ, but the 
correct perspective about him. He should be open minded and recognise that his view of 
‘Christianity’, based on a misunderstanding that ‘Christians’ reject the Israelite 
traditions in favour of novel tales which is rather the Marcionite version Justin is trying 
to rid himself of. At risk here is that Trypho may conflate all ‘Christians’ under claims 
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which are more specifically Marcionite from Justin’s perspective. The discussion so far, 
which has centred on one god being the creator, carer, provider and mercy giver who is 
just and righteous and who spoke through prophets, evidences that Justin is working 
hard to dispute this view of a Marcionite ‘Christianity’.  
 
Justin then sets out the aim of the rest of the Dial: ‘to prove to you, here and now, that 
we do not believe in groundless myths nor in teachings without demonstration, but in 
doctrines inspired by the Divine Spirit, abundant with power, and teeming with grace.’ 
350
  (Dial 9.1) These empty fables, of which Justin feels accused, are presumably these 
gospel narratives which Trypho has read, and Justin has declared his intention to prove 
that they are true, that Jesus is who ‘Christians’, true ‘Christians’ like him, say he is. In 
denying he believes empty fables Justin is not confessing the fiction of the gospel 
traditions but to deny that they are without foundation, deny that this tradition is 
separate from the grace and spirit of god, whom both believe is in the prophetic 
tradition. Horner has pointed out that this is the hook that keeps Trypho involved in the 
discussion. Having learnt that Justin is a ‘Christian’ he could have, and should have 
been obedient to his teachers, conversed with him no more and walked away. Trypho, 
believing ‘Christians’ worship an invented messiah, wants proof of Justin’s claims and 
this request continually recurs and keeps the discussion going and Justin tries to 
demonstrate that his belief in Jesus is not groundless..
351
  
Justin’s declaration of intention is not only a response to Trypho but it is strongly 
contra-Marcionite. The project to define the ‘Christian’ philosophy as that which 
follows a Christ who is the ‘Jewish’ Messiah under the one true god, demonstrable 
through the witness of the prophets shows Justin’s different perspective and clearly 
rules out Marcionism as a ‘Christian’ enterprise – though not necessarily other 
‘heretical’ groups which did neither postulate another god to the god of Israel nor 
rejected the prophets.   
This needs to be read in conjunction with the previous chapter where Trypho has 
accused ‘Christians’ of following men of no reputation and believing groundless 
reports. Trypho may well have had in mind the New Testament scriptures circulating at 
this time, shortly after this the so-called Gospel (legome,nw| Euvaggeli,w) will be 
mentioned by him (Dial 10.2), or the Apostles or both. The irony here is that Justin’s 
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response refers not only to New Testament texts, but also to the books of the prophets. 
Marcionites hold only by a New Testament gospel
352
 but Justin’s community hold New 
Testament traditions only as elaborations of the true meaning of what is said in the 
prophets, as commentaries on the grace revealed in those ancient texts.
353
 Justin does 
not understand the Gospel, the memoirs of the apostles, singular or plural, or reports 
about Jesus to be stand-alone new revelation. They are necessarily connected with the 
previous revelation which Trypho himself has been brought up with. Once again Trypho 
thinks of ‘Christians’ in the terms that Justin would apply only to Marcionites. In 
contrast, Justin is claiming to believe ‘words filled with the Spirit of God, and great 
with power, and flourishing with grace’, the same texts which Trypho himself 
accepts.
354
 Justin’s claim then is that Trypho has misunderstood ‘Christians’ and that 
they share a lot and that he can demonstrate his belief from the same sources that 
Trypho refers to rather than to something novel and independent.  
Grace is the key to this. That which is true for Justin is that which has been imbued with 
grace. There are numerous examples in the Dial
355
 of grace being the determining factor 
in understanding, Bobichon has noted that the whole of the Dial is a demonstration in 
which grace is the central feature or active agent,
356
 but Dial 58.1 is the clearest: ‘“I 
intend to quote Scripture to you,” I said, “without any reliance on mere artistic 
arrangement of arguments. Indeed, I have no such skill, but this grace alone was given 
me from God to understand his Scriptures.”’ 357 It is grace that intercedes. This grace 
opens the eyes to see. Dial 92.1 is also strikingly clear in this regard: ‘If, therefore, one 
were not endowed with God’s great grace to understand the words and deeds of the 
prophets, it would be quite useless for him to relate their words and actions, when he 
can give no explanation of them.’358 Ownership of the scriptures depends on the 
possession of grace from god. Justin reiterates, this time with reference to the Spirit that 
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speaks through scriptures, and that his interlocutors have no understanding of and no 
claim upon the scriptures,
359
 in Dial 29.2 he states: ‘You should be, for they are 
contained in your Scriptures, or rather not yours, but ours. For we believe and obey 
them, whereas you, though you read them, do not grasp their spirit. ’360 To Justin Christ 
speaks in scriptures when Trypho accuses him of believing only groundless stories, 
while, in fact, he is basing his testimony on the same texts Trypho upholds – as well as 
the memoirs of the apostles as corroboration of the prophecy of these texts. This 
accusation has importance for distinguishing ‘Christians’ from Marcionites also, 
because Marcion too does not understand these scriptures. He reads them at the plainest 
level seeing no prophesy of Christ and setting them in contrast to his new god. Justin’s 
response to him would just be the same as it is to Trypho here; that he has neither the 
grace to understand the scriptures nor sees the Spirit – the Spirit of god – who speaks 
through them. And so Justin’s declaration that he can prove (avpo,deixij) that he, and the 
true followers of Christ, believe not in men of no reputation but in words full of grace 
(teqhlo,si ca,riti) – to which Trypho and his friends find reason to laugh – is 
tantamount to an early announcement that true ‘Christians’ read the Prophetic scriptures 
and can demonstrate their claims for Christ from these by grace, thus distinguishing true 
‘Christians’ from the followers of Marcion. What is this grace though, what force or 
function does it have? Skarsaune cogently explains this by plotting a middle way 
between Pycke and Joly. Pycke has criticized Joly for seeing Justin’s use of grace here 
as supernatural knowledge and failing to see the rational contents of this knowledge. 
Skarsaune agrees but considered Pycke’s definition, a typological method of 
interpretation too general and vague. Rather he points out that where grace is mentioned 
it is always connected intimately to the apostolic proof from scripture taught by Christ 
and passed on to all by the apostles. Without the instruction of the Christ via the 
apostles the scriptures cannot be properly understood: 
‘Justin can talk about the grace to understand and the apostolic instruction in the same 
terms (1) Without the grace to understand one cannot understand the scriptures, Dial 
92:1; 119:1; (2) before Christ revealed the meaning of the prophecies, they could not be 
understood, Dial 76:6. This also makes clear the role or rational argument: once the 
hidden meaning of the scriptures has been brought to light by Christ and the apostles, it 
shows itself to be rational and convincing, and every denial of its validity and cogency 
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is due either to hatred of the truth (Dial 44:1; 53:2; 68:1; 95:4) or cowardice, Dial 
36.9; 44:1; 112:5.’361 
So for Justin the grace to understand is instruction received from Christ and his true 
followers. Dial 48.4 repeats this claim quite clearly: ‘For we have been told by Christ 
himself not follow the teachings of men, but only those which have been announced by 
the holy prophets and taught by himself.’ 362 ‘Christian’ is someone who believes what 
Christ taught and what the prophets taught and announced of him who is from their 
god; the god of Israel, the creator. Without the prophets ‘Christian’ teaching, as far as 
Justin is concerned, would be merely human speculation and without Christ and his 
apostles this teaching could not be known. This grace, this particular stream of 
instruction, being a principle, seam of the ‘Christian’ philosophy necessarily rules out 
the position of Marcion who Justin believes follows a different Christ and would not be 
considered a receiver of this Christ’s grace.363 
Dial 10 
In Dial 10 Justin attempts to define the terms of the debate to follow: ‘My friends, is 
there any accusation you have against us other than this, that we do not observe the 
Law, nor circumcise the flesh as your forefathers did, nor observe the Sabbath as you 
do?’ 364 (Dial 10.1) This is Justin in effect asking Trypho if he has any challenges 
beyond that which he has already denied, that which is applicable to Marcionites but not 
to ‘Christians’, and beyond what Justin would admit differentiates his own position 
from that of Trypho, his non-fleshly understanding of law observance. In this chapter of 
the Dial Justin offers Trypho a series of alternative options for complaint. Like the civil 
servant manipulating the minister by offering two solutions, one less than favourable 
and the other plausible, Justin has prompted Trypho. He asks if Trypho believes 
‘Christians’ are immoral and promiscuous or if they charge them with believing 
untruths. Trypho responds that it is only the latter as the former is ridiculous and thus 
the debate focuses towards why ‘Christians’ hope in a man apart from god and do not 
keep god’s commandments. Since Trypho cannot distinguish ‘Christians’ and 
Marcionites, because Justin is creating the distinction as he goes, Trypho does not 
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believe immorality of ‘Christians’ in general be they followers of Marcion or otherwise. 
Bobichon has seen fit to find a connection with Justin’s question here and his 
agnosticism as to whether Marcionites are guilty of such immorality in 1A 26.7.
365
 
There Justin says he does not know if Marcionites are guilty of those things which are 
said about his own group but that they are not persecuted according to their doctrines. 
His refusal to absolve Marcionites as innocent as he does for his own group removes 
them from the class ‘Christian’. Justin’s point at 1A 26.7 is that all ‘Christians’ are 
roundly accused of such immorality and that may or may not separate Marcionites from 
followers of Christ but certainly there doctrines are different. Bobichon is right to note 
that this other appearance of very similar accusations comes in the context of discussing 
those who are followers of Marcion. This is not to say that Marcionites were especially 
signalled out and slandered for this, indeed it is rather Justin’s point that they are not. 
Here in Dial 10.1 Justin is trying to ascertain what Trypho knows about ‘Christians’ and 
how clearly he understands them before he can outline fully what his own group 
believes. By his answer Trypho does not distinguish, just as the rulers do not, between 
‘Christians’ and others who claim Christ and the accusations made against them all. 
This information tells Justin what he needs to know and at the start of the following 
chapter we will see that he opens immediately with a strongly contra-Marcionite claim. 
In 10.4 Trypho gives further details of his understanding of ‘Christians’ by accusing 
them of not only worshipping a man but failure to be circumcised, keep god’s 
commandments and  rejecting his covenant (basically a repetition of his point from 8.4). 
This complicates the picture. Justin will deny all these things by claiming spiritual 
circumcision, eternal decrees and the new covenant. Yet Trypho accuses ‘Christians’ of 
these lacks whilst thinking they might still receive favour from god, his god. This 
suggests Trypho does not simply think ‘Christians’ worship another god but 
understands they claim the same god as he. Of course Justin has previously, through the 
speech of the presbutes and his own claim that what ‘Christians’ believed is inspired by 
the Spirit of god and full of grace, made this claim obvious to Trypho.  
Having reached chapter eleven we have now come to the end of the introduction proper. 
The transition that began in chapter eight is complete as all the major themes of the rest 
of the work have now been marked out by Justin. ‘If, then, you can give a satisfactory 
reply to these charges and can show us on what you place your hopes, even though you 
refuse to observe the Law, we will listen to you most willingly, and then we can go on 
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and examine in the same manner our other differences.’ 366 (Dial 10.4) As Bobichon 
has noted this statement ultimatum from Trypho introduces a whole structural chunk of 
the Dial. The introduction has finished and from chapter eleven to twenty nine a new 
section will run which is devoted to the requirements of the Law and the ways in which 
‘Christian’ observe the true Law but not the Law of Moses.367 
Dial 11 
Before moving on we’ll now look at chapter eleven also to see how the other side of this 
transition looks. In Dial 11 Justin begins his defence that ‘Christians’ do indeed fear 
god, the same god as Trypho worships and no new god as the Marcionites.  
‘And I answered him, “Trypho, there never will be, nor has there ever been from 
eternity, any other God except him who created and formed this universe. Furthermore, 
we do claim that our God is different from yours, for he is the God who, with a strong 
hand and outstretched arm, led your forefathers out of the land of Egypt. Nor have we 
placed our trust in any other (for, indeed, there is no other), but only in him whom you 
also have trusted, the God of Abraham and of Isaac and of Jacob. ’368 (Dial 11.1)  
Why would Justin say such a thing? If one has not already recognized the contra-
Marcionite stand of Justin in the previous chapters, this statement which rejects ‘another 
god’ comes, as Stylianopoulos notes seemingly out of nowhere.369 Justin has already 
said that philosophy neglects the question of the number of gods and the relevance of 
this for human life but he has not suggested that ‘Christians’ believe in any other god.  
Why would Justin still then begin his defence that ‘Christians’ fear the same god as 
Trypho does by denying they serve any other god? Of course this could be in keeping 
with the tradition of ‘Jewish’ monotheism, simply a statement against idolatry. This is 
possible but ignores what we have seen so far, that Marcion’s theological claims are 
being subtly and continuously ruled out by Justin.  Justin’s blunt statement here makes 
much more sense if he believes Trypho is confused on this point or at least might 
harbour the assumption that Justin held the same position as Marcion and believed in 
another god. It is hard to imagine a passage that more succinctly and deliberately 
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distinguishes the faith of Justin from that of Marcion. Stylianopoulos made this point 
with regard to the intended audience: ‘These statements [the above and those which 
accuse heretics of blasphemy of the creator, Dial 35.5, 80.4, 1A 58.1] in no way have 
their Sitz in Leben in the ‘Jewish’-‘Christian’ debate, but in the controversies of ancient 
Christianity against Marcion.’370 Indeed, this rejection of another god makes most 
sense against the threat of Marcion to Justin and the ‘Christian’ philosophy. After being 
asked to prove that he fears, god – the god of Trypho – in the space of a few sentences 
Justin has said that ‘Christians’ do not consider themselves to have one god of their own 
and Trypho to have another, which is as close to saying “we are not Marcionites” to 
someone who does not know what a Marcionite is. Justin is making it as plain as 
possible that he believes in only one true god, the creator. That this is for him a direct 
response to the challenge to show that he does neither scorn the covenant nor spurn the 
commandments shows he sees the challenge as not to be seen as a Marcionite as he goes 
straight on to deny the central feature of Marcion’s theology – two gods, one evil 
creator and one good, transcendent.  
In saying this Justin is also affirming the traditions of the prophetic scriptures and 
strengthening the link between his god and the history of the covenant and 
commandments. The god ‘Christians’ believe in is not just a creator, he is not just a 
demiurge. He is also the very same god who called the Israelites out of slavery. He is a 
just deliverer and he is the god of Trypho’s forefathers Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. 
There is to be no doubt whatsoever that ‘Christians’ believe, and believe in exclusively, 
the one god who begot the Israelites. Any doubt on this score would leave Justin open 
to appearing as a Marcionite and that is exactly what Justin wants to put an end to. 
Justin says the law at Horeb is obsolete, or out of date is perhaps a better translation – 
Justin here uses palaio,j to mean lacking relevance as Paul does at 2 Cor. 3:14 though 
Paul is not consistent with his adjectives for the Old Covenant
371
: 
 ‘Now, I have read, Trypho, that there will be a final law and a covenant above of all, 
which now binds all men to observe who seek the inheritance of God. For the law 
promulgated on Horeb is now old, and was given to yourselves alone; but this law is for 
all. Now, a newer law put against the older cancels the older and a covenant coming 
afterwards terminates the older one. An eternal and final law – namely, Christ himself – 
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has been given to us, and the covenant is trustworthy, after which there shall be no 
further law, no commandment nor decree.’372 (Dial 11.2) 
Justin is walking a fine line here because he is in partial agreement with Marcion on the 
point of the covenant and so Trypho’s lack of distinction may seem justified. Marcion 
thinks Christ brought a new revelation from a different god. This was antithesis of the 
law of the lower god.
373
 Justin, in talking of the old law in contrast to the new law in 
Christ then is at risk of appearing Marcionite, taking a radical Pauline stance – 
Marcion’s favoured Apostle no less. At this point Justin looks most like he could have 
been influenced by Marcion’s system and so has to be extremely careful. Justin talks 
about a last law or covenant (teleutai/oj no,moj kai. diaqh,kh) than  which is 
hierarchically the foremost (‘chiefest of all’), universal and for all who seek the 
inheritance of god (tou/ qeou/ klhronomi,aj). He and Marcion agree that the law 
promulgated on Horeb is somehow contrasted with the gospel and that the former does 
not apply to ‘Christians’, but only to his interlocutors, and that the law ‘which comes 
after in like manner’ ‘has abrogated that which is before it … has put an end to the 
previous one’. However, although he calls the last law ‘an eternal and final law’ (no,mon 
aivw,nion)374 which will not be replaced – ‘after which there shall be no further law, no 
commandment nor decree’. This eternal law has continuity with the law at Herob which 
immedatiely demonstrates that Justin is not in the same camp as Marcion. Although the 
law and gospel, the old and new covenants, are contrasted they are from the same god. 
His proof for this position again marks his contra-Marcionite agenda because it 
evidenced by the prophets rather than a new direct revelation:  
‘Have you not read these words of Isaiah: “Hear me, listen to me, my people; and give 
ear to me, you kings: for a law shall go forth from me, and my judgement shall be a 
light to the nations. My justice approaches swiftly, and my salvation shall go forth, and 
nations shall have hope in my arm?” And concerning this new covenant, God spoke 
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through Jeremiah thus: “Behold the days shall come, said the Lord, and I will make a 
new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah: it will not be like 
the covenant which I made with their fathers, in the day that I took them by the hand to 
lead them out of the land of Egypt.”’ 375  (Dial 11.3) 
In quoting these passages from the prophets Isaiah and Jeremiah, Justin takes evidence 
from the prophets that god has predicted a new covenant, the one Justin claims to serve, 
and Christ the saviour who brings it to all nations, and yet, it is a ‘covenant with the 
house of Israel and with the house of Judah’.  
Hence, Justin, has to interpret these sayings by pointing to a spiritual Israel: 
‘If, therefore, God predicated that he would make a new covenant, and this for a light to 
the nations, and we see and are convinced that, through the name of the crucified Jesus 
Christ, men have turned to God, leaving behind them idolatry and other sinful 
practices, and have kept the faith and have practiced piety even unto death, then 
everyone can clearly see from these deeds and the accompany powerful miracles that he 
is indeed the New Law, the new covenant, and the expectation of those who, from every 
nation, have awaited the blessings of God. We have been led to God through this 
crucified Christ, and we are the true spiritual Israel, and the descendants of Judah, 
Jacob, Isaac, and Abraham, who, though uncircumcised, was approved and blessed by 
God because of his faith and was called the father of many nations. All this shall be 
proved as we proceed with our discussion.’376 (Dial 11.4-5) 
This reference to the prophets distinguishes Justin from Marcion, although he makes 
use of the the ‘new covenant’ which Paul demonstrated from the from Jeremiah 
31:21.31 which appears to emphasize novelty, like Marcion’s theology. Justin identifies 
Jesus Christ with the ‘new law’ and the ‘new covenant’ and sees his own people (‘we’) 
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as ‘the true spiritual Israel’ and ‘descendants of Judah, Jacob, Isaac, and Abraham’ 
(VIsranlitiko.n ga.r to. avlhqino,n( pneumatiko,n). Because Justin wants to defend his 
belief in the same god as the one Trypho trusts, he adds that it was this god who had 
approved of Abraham ‘in uncircumcision’. Justin was firmly claiming Trypho’s heritage 
whilst not wishing to live according to the commandments of Moses and the law, while 
Marcionites may have seemed more credible to Trypho since they would neither wish to 
live according to the law, and consequently nor claim the ‘Jewish’ heritage. 
Justin ends the chapter by saying that he will proceed to prove all this in the course of 
his discussion with Trypho. And so we are at the end of the introduction which 
summaries what Justin intends in the beginning of his long and elaborate proof of it.
377
 
If anyone wants to know the subject of the Dial then they just need read these first 
eleven chapters. The central topic is an apology for what true ‘Christian’ faith is which 
separates clearly from Maricionism.  Having covered chapter eleven we have now 
reached the end of the introduction proper. The transition that begun in chapter eight is 
complete as all the major themes of the rest of the work have now been marked out by 
Justin. From chapter twelve to twenty nine Justin will devote his attention to dealing 
with the requirements of the law in detail. After this the bulk of the piece considers how 
the prophecies foretell Christ and the final section, from around chapter 109, considers 
the relationship between ‘Jews’ and ‘Christians’. 
1.2 Summary 
This introductory section has introduced the main themes. The first of these is the 
question of how many gods there are and what character they/this god has. This is a 
major topic in chapters one and three. The existence of a diversity of opinion on these 
matters reflects the topic of how the previous theme can be known, or resigned to a 
matter of opinion. Chapters five and six emphasis the themes of god’s sovereignty, 
responsibility and care for his creation, as well as his righteousness and judgement 
whilst chapter seven introduces the prophets as the agents of revelation of this the true 
god. Chapters eight, nine, ten and eleven move the debate on to the matter of a 
scriptural debate over which party is truly a child of this god. That is, the themes given 
in the previous chapters are assumed as definitions of the character of god and the 
debate concerns who knows Him. These characteristics of god, as we have seen, are 
naturally contra-Marcionite. That the one single god is creator, both cares for and judges 
all human beings and speaks through prophets was rejected by Marcion. Trypho’s 
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complaint that those who follow Christ forsake god is unfounded as far as Justin is 
concerned and Justin shows himself to start from the same understanding of god as 
Trypho. From this premise, however, Justin wants to show that Jesus Christ is the 
crucified one in whom Trypho should trust – from this very same god -, although as we 
will show in the next paragraphs, Trypho’s questions about the god ‘Christians’ believe 
in were not settled once and for all. 
2 Repetition of themes in the Dial  
2.1 Number of gods 
The issue of the number of gods Justin believes in as a ‘Christian’ continually arises in 
the Dial. On no less than four occasions
378
 does Trypho directly ask Justin to justify his 
belief in another god and on eight occasions Justin declares directly his belief in the one 
true god.
379
 Clearly the number of gods followers of Christ believe in and Christ’s 
relationship to the Father is at issue. Given that Marcion truly professed another god, 
greater than the creator and another Christ from this greater god, as Justin says in 1A 
26.5 and 58.1, Trypho’s repeated requests and Justin’s assertions are a means of 
clarification. Every time Trypho claims to be unconvinced by Justin’s arguments for 
Christ, Justin is afforded the opportunity to clarify what he means, though he does not 
always do so immediately, and uses scripture to do so. Bobichon has noticed and 
commented on this theme: 
‘Justin carefully distinguishes the term a[lloj qeo,j and  e[teroj qeo,j. The first of these 
two formulas, which comes most often from Trypho, refers to Gnostic polytheism or 
theses (11. 1.5; 50. 1; 56. 3.4.9.11.14.15; 60. 5; 68. 3, 4; cf. 61, 2;. 65. 7; 93.2). The 
second, usually used by Justin, is the word << numerically (avriqmw/) distinct >> from 
the father (55. 1; 56. 4.11; 62. 2 cf. 65. 1.5; 128. 4; 129. 4). The distinction is clearly 
underlined in 56, 4.11, where the two expressions appear, We find, however,  a[lloj 
where  e[teroj would be better, at 56. 1 and 61 * .14. 2 *. Cp. I Apol. 58.1 is caused by 
Marcion’s views: a[llon de, tina katagge,llei para. to.n dhmiouryo.n to.n pa,ntwn qeo.n 
kai. o`moi,wj e[teron uio.n. The issue addressed here will be remembered in 5O, 1* 
(intervention from Trypho) and treated from 56. 1 (citing Gen 18, 1-3;. 19, 27-28; 
recall the question by fellow Trypho, two findings in 60, 5 and 68, 3-4). But it has 
resulted from a double development time devoted to the Law (Ch. 11-29), and the 
                                                          
378
 50.1; 55.1; 56.12; 68.4.  
379
 11.1 (twice); 56.4; 56.11; 60.5; 74.3; 93.2; 115.4. 
145 
 
theophanies (Chapter 56). The dual response Justin offers here is a simultaneous 
refutation of the theses of Marcion (cf. I Apol 26, 5; 58, 1).’380  
Justin consistently uses a[lloj in 1A when describing Maricon’s belief in another god 
and e[teroj when speaking of his own belief in Christ as another god but not a different 
deity from the one true god. Bobichon provides a full list of references for this (quoted 
above).  Dial 56.3 is a good example of this pattern. There Trypho says that Justin has 
not proved there is another god using a[lloj: ‘Oiv de. e;fasan nenohke,nai me,n( mhde.n de. 
e;cein eivj avpo,deixin tou.j lelgme,nouj lo,gouj o[ti qeo.j h; ku,rioj a;lloj ti,j evstin h; 
le,lektai u`po. tou/ a`gi,ou penu,matoj para. to.n poihth.n tw/n o[lwn)’ Justin’s reply 
conversely uses e[teroj: o[ti esti. kai. le,getai qeo,j kai. ku,rioj e[teroj u`po to.n poihth.n 
tw/n o]lwn. Positively Justin has used e[teroj, to refer to the other god he believes in 
(numerically distinct but the logos of the one god) and in the same passage uses a[lloj 
negatively to deny that there is a separate god with a diferent Christ: ‘the Maker of all 
things – above whom there is no other God.’381 At the end of this same chapter (Dial 
56.11) Justin uses e[teroj in precisely the same way as before when speaking of Christ as 
another but not separate god. That this is the case suggests that Justin is trying, in the 
manner described by Bobichon, to distinguish himself from Marcion’s theology since 
Trypho’s use appears to presume a Marcionite position. The careful, but subtle 
differentiation from the Marcionite position is absolutely necessary because otherwise 
Justin might appear to be or think the same as Marcion, or might even be thought to 
have be influenced by Marcion on this particular point. That would be fatal to Justin’s 
project so he has to outline that his understanding of the second god is unique. 
Furthermore, that Justin needs to work hard to establish his belief in the one true god, 
the creator of all things, quite firmly flags this topic up as a clue to a deeper 
background, a Marcionite threat in the context. 
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Trypho does not accuse Justin of not believing in god’s providence and care. In the 
introduction Justin raises the issue that some deny that god cares for humanity, beyond 
indifferently sustaining the material existence of the world. (Dial 1.4) Without this care 
for humanity there are no proper standards, no fear of judgement or hope for reward, in 
short no righteousness which is the measure of god’s mercy for both Justin and Trypho. 
We know that Marcion did not believe that the creator, the god of Moses, cared for all 
of humanity, but nor did he think him indifferent. Rather Marcion thought this god to be 
the creator and sustainer of material existence but also a cruel judge who manipulated 
his people, the ‘Jews’. Justin united himself and Trypho as those who believe that god 
does indeed care for humanity. However Trypho is puzzled as to how Justin thinks he, 
and ‘Christians’, can have a share in god’s providence and mercy whilst not do as He 
commands. For Trypho god cares for all but all have to live according to his 
commandments. Ultimately Trypho and Justin’s position is very similar then; both 
believe god cares for all, but they have different mechanisms for receiving his care. The 
topic of god’s care and relevance to human beings runs through the entire Dial.  
In Dial 23.2 Justin says: ‘Therefore, we must confess that He, who is unchanging, has 
commanded these similar things to be performed because of sinful men, and we must 
profess Him to be benevolent, foreknowing, without need of anything, righteous and 
good.’382  God is, according to Justin, benevolent or kind-hearted (Fila,nqrwpon) and in 
need of nothing (avnendeh/). Woven in with this is god’s foreknowledge, consistency and 
righteousness which will be dealt with below. Another example of the theme of god’s 
providence is evident in Dial 106.1: ‘The rest of the psalm shows that he knew that his 
Father would grant him everything, and would raise him from the dead. It also shows 
that he urged all of every race who fear God to praise him because of his mercy, 
through the mystery of the crucified one.’383 Similar is said shortly after at Dial 108.3, it 
is said: ‘we pray that even now that you may mend your ways and find mercy from God 
the Father of all, who is most benign and compassionate.’384 This god, the one true god, 
is a god who has mercy and compassion (evle,ouj( poluele,ou) no less than descendants of 
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evdh,lwsen  (own trans.). 
384
 avll euvco,meqa ka;n nu/n metanoh,santaj pa,ntaj evle,ouj tucei/n para. tou/ euvspla,gcnou kai. poluele,ou 
patro.j tw/n o[lwn qeou/) 
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Judah, Jacob, Isaac and Abraham – who also became god’s children – by faith (pi,stei) 
upon those who seek him. Both these quotations present a vision of the creator god 
which is very different from that of Marcion. He is not the angry and distant god 
Marcion believes him to be, but a benevolent and merciful god and he is available to all, 
not just the ‘Jews’ as Marcion believes. Bobichon notes the mercy of god is one of the 
topics that Justin and Trypho hold in common and is raised repeatedly.
385
 Seven times, 
and a further five in scriptural quotation,
386
 Justin mentions mercy as something that 
comes from god as an expectation or something to be hoped for. Trypho of course 
concurs that god is merciful and compassionate but he thinks this is towards him and his 
people. Marcion however held the god of the ‘Jew’, the creator, to be a cruel and 
petulant judge, not a kind and merciful father. Even if Marcion could envisage mercy 
from this god, his view would be the same as Trypho’s, that it belongs only to the 
‘Jews’, only to those who live according to the Law. Yet it is Justin’s claim that through 
Christ the mercy of god is given. Not only then does this god give mercy to all nations 
but he does through Christ his Son. And yet, Justin and Trypho both think that mercy is 
linked to justice, and justice involves threat and punishment, both of which is rejected 
by Marcion. In Dial 8.4 Trypho urges Justin to observe the Sabbath, circumcision and 
all the written law so that he may then receive mercy from god. These are the means of 
becoming righteous before god in Trypho’s tradition. In Dial 4-7 Justin quotes Isa. 
55:3-13 which echoes this sentiment. If the unrighteous changes his ways and returns to 
the Lord he will receive god’s mercy. It is he who turns away and repents from the 
former ways that receives the mercy of this god. Who turns from idolatry and other sins 
and lives the life of god will receive god’s compassion. The debate between Justin and 
Trypho is not about whether mercy exists then; both parties assume that god not only 
created this world but has vision and care for human life. The debate is about how it is 
that ‘Christians’ might gain or expect to gain this mercy from god whilst not living 
according to this commandments; in short how can ‘Christians’ be righteous before this 
god? This itself is a contra-Marcionite framing of the issue. 
2.3 Justice and Righteousness 
Righteousness (dikaiosunh) and Justice (dikaioj or judgment as krisin) are major 
issues in the Dial. They determine how one is seen and accepted by god. However they 
are very much Justin’s terms. Justin sets up righteousness as a prerequisite whilst 
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 18.2; 43.2; 96.3; 106.1; 108.4; 133.1;141.2 ; In scripture 14.5; 25.2,4; 36.4; 118.2; 
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speaking as a Platonist in discussion with the presbutes in Dial 4.3 and the presbutes 
accepts as congruent with the ‘Christian’ philosophy. Trypho never speaks of being 
righteous or just before god explicitly.  That said, many of the appearances of these 
terms and concepts occur in the context of scriptural quotations which Trypho accepts; 
righteousness comes up most commonly with reference to the righteousness of god, 
Christ, the prophets and patriarchs, the eternal will and decrees of god and those who 
follow Christ and are saved and just with reference to god. In Dial 92.5 Justin quotes 
Deut 32:4: ‘God is true and righteous, and all His ways are judgments, and there is no 
unrighteousness in him.’387 This is a statement of what Justin believes and of what 
Trypho must already believe. That god is righteous and just is something Trypho and 
Justin agree on. Yet, it is another matter in which Justin’s ‘Christian’ philosophy 
distinguishes itself from who Marcion believes this god to be. Trypho takes the 
righteousness and justice of god as read but questions them with reference to Christ. 
According to Trypho one needs to be just and righteous before god, and assumes that 
such righteousness only happens to a life lived in accordance with the Law. Justin has to 
work incredibly hard to establish that ‘Christians’ do not reject (like Marcion) the Law 
itself, but that, although he is stating that the Law belongs to Trypho, and that 
‘Christians’ do not need to follow its commandments, they are still living under the 
grace of this god because Christ’s commandments are consistent with the eternal law 
which is part of Trypho’s law and Christ will judge, as the creator’s agent, the righteous 
according to this.  
The first step in establishing that ‘Christians’ can be righteous before god is that they 
have a righteous example. Ultimately this will be Christ but it begins with the prophets. 
The presbutes, in Dial 7.1, established that these were righteous men who listened to 
god and Trypho would not want to demur from this. ‘Christians’ listen to god’s 
messengers, though Justin believes that only ‘Christians’ understand them correctly. For 
Justin the prophets and patriarchs are righteous on account of their faith rather than the 
law or ancestry. ‘Christians’ are saved according to Justin by their righteousness, which 
means their faith. ‘Whereas, the Gentiles who believe in Christ and are sorry for their 
sins shall receive the inheritance, along with the patriarchs, the prophets, and every just 
descendant of Jacob, even though they neither practice circumcision nor observe the 
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Sabbaths and feasts.’ 388 (Dial 26.1) Justin has similar reasons for arguing so 
strenuously for circumcision being given as a sign rather than for righteousness; 
Righteousness becomes the bridge here by which Justin can connect the past and 
present under the same god.
389
 The promises made to Israel are applicable to gentiles 
under righteousness; righteousness is a characteristic of the universal ‘Israel’ then.  
Naturally this is just the sort of connection that Marcion would have found completely 
unacceptable. That the prophets and patriarchs may have been righteous men he would 
have had no need to question, provided they remained righteous men without relevance 
or import to ‘Christians’. That they might have been made right by the god of Israel, the 
creator, because of something they share with ‘Christians’ faith would be wholly 
unacceptable to Marcion. Marcion would not accept that the prophets and patriarchs 
lived according to faith rather than the law. This is a link he would not acknowledge, 
demarcating them as part of the ‘Jewish’ god and his people and not part of a 
‘Christian’ dispensation. Furthermore, according to Justin, this god, the one true god 
who is righteous and just, not only accepts those who do have faith in him but wishes all 
to have faith in him and has made eternal decrees in keeping with his righteousness and 
justice which are relevant for all people: ‘But the fact that God can be falsely accused 
by the unintelligent of not having always taught the same truthful doctrines to all, you 
can blame on your own sinfulness.’ 390 (Dial 30.1) Justin further mentions god’s eternal 
righteous decrees twice and his acts of righteousness which are the same for all also.
391
 
This gives Trypho and those like him a share in god’s vision, albeit with conditions, but 
it is also strongly contra-Marcionite. It is tantamount to declaring again and again that 
the god of Israel is the only and universal god; what he designs is good and true and 
ordained for all. There is no space for another god with his own decrees for Justin. 
‘Christians’ as far as Justin is concerned fulfil the commandments and will of the one 
true god, by faith. Righteousness as a pan-human quality afforded by trust in the god of 
the ‘Jews’ is not something Marcion could ever count as ‘Christian’ and so in arguing 
for ‘Christians’ place among the dispensation of Israel – as the true Israel  – according 
to faith Justin again demarcates the true ‘Christian’ philosophy from a Marcionite one. 
                                                          
388ta. de. e;qnh ta. pisteu,santa eivj auvto.n kai. metanoh,santa evfV oi-j h[marton( auvtoi. klhronomh,sousi meta. 
tw/n patriarcw/n kai. tw/n profhtw/n kai. tw/n dikai,wn o[soi avpo. VIakw.b gege,nnhntai ) eiv kai. mh. 
sabbati,zousi mhde. perite,mnontai mhde. ta.j evorta.j fula,ssousi) 
389J. B. Tyson, ‘Anti-Judaism in Marcion’ (2005-2006), 204. 
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 VAlla. th/| au`tw/n kaki,a| evgkalei/te( o[ti kai. sukofantei/sqai dunato,j evstin o` qeo.j u`po. tw/n nou/n mh. 
evco,ntwn( w`j ta. auvta. di,kaia mh. pa,ntaj avei. dida,xaj)  
391
 Dial 28.4, 46.2, 47.2, 92.5, 93.1. 
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For Justin, the god of Israel is judge, already a major stumbling block to Marcion, but 
even more so, as he also believes that he judges through Christ Jesus. In Dial 46.1 
Trypho asks: ‘“But,” inquired Trypho, “if some even now desire to live in observance of 
the precepts of the Mosaic Law, and yet believe that the crucified Jesus is the Christ of 
God and that to him it has been given to judge without exception all men, and that his 
kingdom is eternal, could they also be saved?’392 Justin’s eventual answer to this is 
basically yes. The significant points are the acknowledgment that Christ is the Christ of 
god, of the one true god, so that ‘Christians’ can be both non-Law observing, but also 
obedient to the Law. Christ has an ultimate role to be the judge of all people eternally. 
This is not an isolated point. Justin repeats it often. Indeed no less than nine times is 
Christ explicitly referred to as a judge and numerous Old Testament quotations imply 
this view.
393
 Bobichon notes that this belief is omnipresent in the Dial and is completely 
inseparable, in Justin’s theology, from the second coming of Christ.394 As if to drive 
home his point again towards the end of the piece Justin says: ‘I have also shown that 
the prophecy of Isaiah, his burial has been taken away from the midst, referred to 
Christ, who was to be buried and to rise again. I have stated already on many occasions 
that this same Christ will be the Judge of both the living and the dead.’ 395 (Dial 118.1.) 
This would have been a view completely unpalatable to Marcion and strongly 
distinguishes Justin’s theology from his. 
2.4 Prophecies Predict Him 
The question of whether the messiah has come and can be shown to be Jesus Christ is 
the central question of the Dial. It is a belief that Trypho rejects at Dial 8.4: ‘But if the 
Messiah has been born and exists anywhere, he is not known, nor is he conscioius of his 
own existence, nor has he any power until Elijah comes to anoint him and to make him 
manifest to all. But you have believed this foolish rumour, and you have invented 
yourselves a Christ for whom you blindly give up your lives.’ 396  
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 VEa.n de, tinej kai. nu/n zh/n bou,,lwntai fula,ssontej ta. dia. Mwse,wj diatacqe,nta kai. pisteu,swsin 
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 Dial 35.8, 36.1, 46.1, 47.5, 49.2, 96.2, 118.1, 132.1, 141.1. 
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 (Bobichon), II,  680. 
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 Kai. o[ti peri. tou/ qa,ptesqai me,llontoj kai. avni,stasqai Cristou/ h=n h` profhtei,a tou/  `Hsai<ou( 
fh,santoj \  `H tafh. auvtou/ h=|rtai evk tou/ me,sou( proei/pon) Kai. o[ti krith.j zw,ntwn kai. nekrw/n a`pa,ntwn 
auvto.j o-toj o` Cristo,j( ei=pon evn polloi/j) 
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 Cristo.j de,( eiv kai. gege,nhtai kai. e;sti pou( a;;gnwsto,j evsti kai. ouvde. auvto,j pw ea`uto.n evpi,statai ouvde. 
e;cei du,nami,n tina( me,crij a;n evlqw.n `Hli.aj cri,sh| auvto.n kai. fanero.n pa/si poih,sh| \ u`mei/j de,( matai,an 
avkoh.n paradexa,menoi( Cristo.n e`autoi/j tina avnapla,ssete kai. auvtou/ ca,rin ta. nu/n avsko,pwj avpo,llusqw) 
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Trypho does not think it plausible that the Messiah has come which Justin speaks of and 
so Justin expends most of his words on exegesis designed to demonstrate that this 
Christ, his Christ, the son of the one true god, was predicted by the prophets. Indeed by 
over half through the piece Trypho is still asking Justin to justify his claims: ‘“Prove to 
us,” interrupted Trypho, “that this man who you claim was crucified and ascended into 
heaven is the Christ of God. It has indeed been proved sufficiently by your Scriptural 
quotations that it was predicted in the Scriptures that Christ should suffer, and that he 
should come again in glory to accept the eternal kingdom over all nations, and that 
every kingdom should be made subject to him. But what we want you to prove is that 
Jesus is the Messiah spoken of in the Scriptures.’ 397 (Dial 39.7) 
The heart of this central debate was established at the very beginning of the piece in 
Dial 1.3 where Justin asks his new acquaintance why he is interested in philosophy 
when he has his own prophets.  What was unknown but revealed to the reader in Dial 
7.1, and throughout, is that the prophets and not the Gospel which Trypho mentioned to 
have read and admired are the measure of everything for Justin. They are god’s 
messengers who spoke with his Holy Spirit and predicted Christ. That he can 
demonstrate who Christ is by their words is essential because through this he can 
demonstrate that god foreknew (prognw,sthn) and ordained that this Christ would come. 
That is that the god of Israel, the creator, has provided this Christ and he therefore 
cannot be associated with any other god new or old. Marcion could not possibly accept 
this and so in attempting to convince Trypho that this is so, Justin hopes not only to 
enlighten his dialogue partner, but to distance himself from Marcionite understandings 
of the ‘Christian’ philosophy. That these ‘Jewish’ prophets predicted Christ is Justin’s 
strongest defence because it demonstrates that Christ does not come from a new hitherto 
unknown god and establishes a continuity between the OT and NT which the literalism 
of Marcion challenged.
398
 For these reasons Justin is relentless in his insistence upon 
Christ’s prediction in the prophets to Trypho: ‘in Christ, the Son of God, who was 
proclaimed as the future Eternal law and new covenant for the whole world (as the 
above-quoted prophecies clearly show).’ 399 (Dial 43.1) Again he says: ‘Isaiah, indeed, 
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 Kai. o `Tru,fwn \  ;Hdh ou=n to.n lo,gon avpo,doj h`mi/n( o[ti ou-toj( o]n fh/|j evstaurw/sqai kai. avnelhluqe,nai 
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 J. B. Tyson, ‘Anti-Judaism in Marcion’ (2005-2006), 206. 
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foretold that Christ would come forth as a rod from the root of Jesse.’400 (Dial 86.4) A 
denser and bolder declaration is found at Dial 100.2,4: 
‘He revealed, then, to us by his grace all that we have learned from the Scriptures, so 
that we know him as the first-begotten of God before all creatures, and as the Son of the 
patriarchs since he became incarnate by a virgin of their race, and condescended to 
become a man without comeliness or honour, and subject to suffering…and since we 
call him by the same title [Son of God], we have understood that this is really he and 
that he proceeded before all creatures from the Father by his power and will (for in the 
prophetic writings he is called Wisdom, and Day and the East, and Sword, Stone, Rod, 
Jacob, and Israel, in one respect or another); and that he became incarnate of the 
Virgin, in order that the disobedience caused by the serpent might be destroyed in the 
same manner in which it had originated.’ 401 
A cluster of important themes are presented together here. Firstly, as was alluded to in 
Dial 7.1,3; 58.1, Justin perceives what he understands about Christ from the scriptures 
by grace. This is in contrast to the many occasions where Justin counsels Trypho 
against teachers who do not understand what is written and cannot see Christ predicted. 
This is usually explicitly aimed at Rabbis but surely has, as discussed with reference to 
the men of no reputation in Dial 8.3, a wider context in Marcion’s lack of appreciation 
of Christ in the prophets. For Justin grace, the gift of the one true god, is required to 
understand what the scriptures are saying. As we saw above grace as the determining 
agent of understanding is an important theme in the piece, and the main topic of chapter 
fifty-eight and ninty-two. In Justin’s understanding Trypho’s predecessors have failed to 
grasp that the Christ has come because of their hard hearts (sklhroka,rdioj) and inept 
teachers both of which obscure the true proclamation of the kingdom: ‘For he who is 
ignorant of him is likewise ignorant of God’s will; and he who scorns and hates him 
clearly hates and scorns him also who sent him; and he who has no faith in him does 
not believe the words of the prophets, who preached his Gospel and proclaimed him to 
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  vApeka,luyen ou= h`mi/n pa,nta o[sa kai. avpo. tw/n grafw/n dia. th/j ca,ritoj auvtou/ nenoh,kamen( gno,ntej 
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all men.’ 402 (Dial 136.3) By their rejection of Christ Israel proved that they have not 
understood the prophets. But the reverse is also true for Justin. Whoever hates the 
prophets cannot know who Christ truly is and does not know who god truly is. A double 
critique is found here then, Christ, god and the prophets go together so Marcion is as 
much in error as the Trypho, even more so the former, however, since Marcion believes 
himself to be a ‘Christian’. By this then Justin again establishes what is and is not 
‘Christian’ and firmly puts Marcion outside of this definition – other ‘heretical’ or 
‘gnostic’ groups may be isolated for other reasons but none, as far as we know, rejected 
the prophets and the god of Israel which is the fundamental definition of the ‘Christian’ 
philosophy for Justin. The passage from Dial 100 also presents a Christ to have taken 
flesh and be born of a virgin which is a further distinction between Justin and Marcion’s 
beliefs.
403
 This is not just any virgin but a virgin of the family of the patriarchs. Justin 
has drawn a line from Abraham to Christ via Mary.
404
 Justin and Trypho variously 
discuss the issue of the virgin birth; it is frequently peppered throughout the text,
405
 
which points how much Justin wants to emphasize his allegiance to this doctrine. Also, 
as Bobichon notes, this is the first time in the ‘Christian’ tradition that an explicit link 
between Mary and Eve is made which will be carried on by Irenaeus and Tertullian. In 
making this link Justin again places Christ firmly in the context of god’s providence in 
the Old Testament scriptures.
406
 This is a firm marker of Justin’s contra-Marcionite 
theology. Marcion could not and would not accept the virgin birth and so Justin’s 
holding firmly by it strongly distinguishes him from Marcion and establishes Christ as 
part of the history of the people of ‘Israel’. 
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 Two key features of Marcion’s theology conspire to form his denial of the virgin birth. Firstly that 
Christ’s appearance was sudden and unheralded, descended straight from heaven full formed. The second 
his that he was not of genuine human flesh as one born but a phantasm. The former point is detailed by 
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There is a further key element that prophets predict which necessarily separates the 
‘Christian’ philosophy from Marcionism. This is the new covenant (kaninh.n diaqh,khn). 
The prophets have not only announced Christ. They have also announced his new 
covenant, a central aspect of Marcion’s theology. The new covenant is an obvious point 
of dispute between Trypho and Justin – though Trypho comes to accept that the old law 
was given in response to the hardness of heart of the ‘Jews’ – but the place of this new 
covenant in the old is one of the greatest differentiations Justin could offer between 
himself and Marcion. This had to be the case because it is one the issues on which they 
are closest together and may even speak to the influence of Marcion upon Justin at an 
earlier stage in his career. ‘Now, I have read, Trypho, that there will be a final law, and 
a covenant, above of all others, which now binds all men to observe who seek the 
inheritance of God. For the law promulgated on Horeb is now old, and was given to 
yourselves alone; but this law is universally for all. Now, a later law put against the 
older abrogates the older, just so, a covenant coming terminates the older one. An 
eternal and final law – namely, Christ himself – has been given to us, and the covenant 
is trustworthy, after which there shall be no further law, no commandment, no decree.’ 
407
 (Dial 11.2) Following this Justin gives further evidence of this from scripture in the 
shape of Isaiah 51:4-5, Jeremiah 31:31 and Isaiah 55:3 in order to demonstrate that not 
only is this his claim, but it is a scriptural and prophetic claim. This is absolutely 
necessary for Justin because Marcion believed that there was no continuity between the 
gospel of Christ, from the higher god, and the covenant made with the ‘Jews’, by the 
lower god, and that his Antithesis exposed the differences between these two deities. It 
is no surprise then that this claim, followed immediately by scriptural exegesis occurs 
very early on the in Dial, right at the point that Justin is launching into his detailed 
definition of what the ‘Christian’ philosophy is, once Trypho knows he is a ‘Christian’ 
and has made his accusations. This is about the strongest move Justin can make to 
firmly connect the newness of Christ with the continuity of the one true god - which he 
also attempts to do when speaking of god’s eternal decrees (aivw,nia dikaiw,mata( 
aivwni,ouj kai. fu,sei dikaiopaxi,aj)408 for all people. Christ is a radical change but he is 
of god, the one true god, the creator; his newness is a renewal movement in eternal 
righteousness rather than a novel creation or discovery of a world without sin and 
consequences. 
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Prophecies take up the bulk of the Dial traditionally understood as Justin’s rebuttal of 
Trypho and the ‘Jewish’ position. This though it is, and Skarsaune’s contribution in 
detailing the depth and sources of Justin’s understanding of these scriptures is 
invaluable, they are more than this.
409
 Their presence as part of the ‘Christian’ tradition 
is itself a contra-Marcionite move. In claiming the prophets Justin isolates Marcionites 
who see the prophetic tradition as only for the ‘Jews’ and stakes the claim again that 
‘Christians’ are indeed the true ‘Israel’. Furthermore that the prophets predict Christ and 
the new covenant demonstrate most powerfully that Marcion is mistaken by the 
standards of the ‘Christian’ philosophy and has not, as Israel has not, the grace from god 
to understand the scriptures. Israel may be errant and mistaken in this but Marion is 
simply something else by his rejection of the prophets; is not an errant ‘Christian’ but a 
failed candidate for a ‘Christian’; a new and radical superstition with no antiquity, 
merely a doctrine and opinion of one man.  
2.5 Philosophies and ‘Christians’ 
So far we have seen Justin presents his theology via themes which would distinguish his 
‘Christian’ philosophy from Marcionism. This has been quite a subtle enterprise. 
However there is a section in the Dial where Marcion (or rather Marcionites on this 
occasion) appear directly. Marcionites are not the only group to be mentioned, though 
he is the only contemporary, and many of the themes we have observed with reference 
to Marcion in the rest of the text can be seen to concentrate in this section as well as in 
subsequent sections where Marcion is not named but strongly implied. 
After this long and important introductory section where shape of truth and the error of 
philosophical diversity is established Trypho and Justin move on from the topic of 
philosophy for twenty-four chapters in order to discuss the core of the Dial, the correct 
interpretation of the Hebrew scriptures in the light of Justin’s ‘Christian’ claims. The 
subject reappears significantly at Dial 35. ‘This long silence strengthens the argument 
that the discussion of the philosophical schools in the Dialogue has more to do with the 
rhetoric of heresy than with Justin’s actual experience of philosophical theology.’410 
Royalty is right here, the introductory section, as discussion above,  has little to do with 
the philosophies of the time, despite the considerable energy devoted to ascertaining 
what Justin’s philosophical background can be discerned in these pages, and has a great 
deal to do with clarification of who and ‘what’ genuine ‘Christians’ are. Others must be 
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ruled out, most pressingly given the topics discussed and his contemporary threat, 
Marcionites. Lack of uniformity is evidence of lack of rational investigation into truth 
so anything being given or claiming the name ‘Christian’ which does not fit what Jesus 
taught, at least in the manner Justin understands this, cannot and must not be considered 
‘Christian’, and Marcion above all. Dial 35, as pointed out by Royalty, comes on the 
back of two chapters where Justin has exposed his interlocutor’s error and 
misinterpretation, the proclivity to be led by bad human teachers which causes Trypho 
to question how some ‘Christians’ can disagree.411 This is a serious charge given that 
diversity means failure and so it sets Justin up to show that this is not in actual fact the 
case because those who misinterpret are, at least in serious matters, not ‘Christians’ at 
all.  
In the previous section I referred to portions of the Dial which seem not only to have 
Marcionite topics to the fore but more directly feature the problem of Marcionism and 
other Gnostic groups. I will now quote both of these chapters in full because they the 
most explicit portions in this text of Justin’s problem of distinguishing ‘Christians’ from 
Marcionites and others. 
‘At this point, Trypho interrupted me by saying, "I know that there are many who 
profess their faith in Jesus and are considered to be Christians, yet they claim there is 
no harm in their eating meats sacrificed to idols.”  "The fact that there are such men," I 
replied, "who pretend to be Christians and admit the crucified Jesus as their Lord and 
Christ, yet profess not His doctrines, but those of the spirits of error, only tends to make 
us adherents of the true and pure Christian doctrine more ardent in our faith and more 
firm in the hope He announced to us. As we look about us, we see events actually taking 
place which He predicted would happen in His name. Indeed, He foretold: Many will 
come in My name, clothed outwardly in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening 
wolves. And: There will be schisms and heresies. And: 'Beware of false prophets, who 
come to you in clothing of sheep, but inwardly they are ravening wolves. And: There 
will arise many false Christs and false Apostles, and they will deceive many of the 
faithful. My friends, there were, and still are, many men who, in the name of Jesus, 
come and teach others atheistic and blasphemous doctrines and actions; we call them 
by the name of the originator of each false doctrine. (For each has his own peculiar 
method of teaching how to blaspheme the Creator of the universe, and Christ, whose 
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Advent was foretold by Him, and the God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of Jacob. They 
are all outside of our communion, for we know them for what they are, impious atheists 
and wicked sinners, men who profess Jesus with their lips, but do not worship Him in 
their hearts. These men call themselves Christians in much the same way as some 
Gentiles engrave the name of God upon their statues, and then indulge in every kind of 
wicked and atheistic rite.) Some of these heretics are called Marcionites, some 
Valentinians, some Basilidians, and some Saturnilians, and others by still other names, 
each designated by the name of the founder of the system, just as each person who 
deems himself a philosopher, as I stated at the beginning of this discussion, claims that 
he must bear the name of the philosophy he favors from the founder of that particular 
school of philosophy. Not only from these events do we conclude, as I said, that Jesus 
possessed foreknowledge of what would happen to Him, but also from the many other 
happenings which He predicted would befall those who believe and profess that He is 
the Messiah. He even foretold all the suffering we would have to bear when those of our 
own household put us to death. Consequently, we can find no fault with either His 
words or actions. For this reason, too, we pray for you and for everyone else who hates 
us, that you may repent with us, and refrain from blaspheming Jesus Christ, who is 
proved to be totally without blame and reproach by His own deeds and by the miracles 
which even now are wrought in His name by the words of His teaching and the 
prophecies concerning Him. We pray, also, that you may believe in Jesus Christ, and 
thus at His second triumphant coming you will be saved and not be condemned by Him 
to the fire of hell."’ 412 (Dial 35) 
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polloi. oi] a;qea kai. bla,sfhma le,gein kai. pra,ttein evdi,daxan evn ovnomati tou/ VIhsou/ proselqo,ntej \ kai. 
kalou,menoi, eivsin u`fV h`mw/n avpo. th/j prosqnumi,aj tw/n avndrw/n( evx ou-per evka,sth didach. kai. gnw,mh 
h;rxato) :Alloi ga.r katV a;llon tro,pon blasfhmei/n to.n poihth.n tw/n o[lwn kai. to.n u`pV auvtou/ 
profhteuo,menon evleu,sesqai Cristo.n kai. to.n qeo.n VAbraa.m kai. VIsaa.k kai. VIakw.b dida,skousin \ w-n 
ouvdeni. koinwnou/men( oi` gnwri,zontej avqe,ouj kai. avsebei/j kai. avdi,kouj kai. avno,mouj auvtou.j u`pa,rcontaj( 
kai. avnti. Tou/ to.n VIhsou/n se,bein ovno,mati mo,non om`ologei/n) Kai. Cristianou.j ea`utou.j le,gousin( o]n 
tro,pon oi` evn toi/j e;qnesi to. o;noma tou/ qeou/ evpigra,fousi toi/j ceiropoih,toij( kai. avno,moij kai. avqe,oij 
teletai/j koinwnou/si) Kai, eivsin auvtw/n oi` me,n tinej kalou,menoi Markianoi,( oi` de. Ouvalentinianoi,( oi` 
de. Basileidianoi,( oi` de. Satornilianoi,( kai. a;lloi a;llw| ovno,mati( avpo. tou/ avrchge,tou th/j gnw,mhj 
e[kastoj ovnomazo,menoj( o]n pro,pon kai. e[kastoj tw/n filosofei/n nomizo,ntwn( w`j evn avrch/| proei/pon( avpo. 
tou/ patro.j tou/ lo,gou to. o;noma h-j filosofei/ filosofi,aj h`gei/tai fe,rein)  [Wste kai. Evk tou,twn h`mei/j( 
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If Justin is to be taken literally here this reads as though those with whom Justin is 
concerned here positively designated themselves as ‘Christians’ (Cristianou.j e`autou.j 
le,gousin). It seems Justin does indeed say they ‘called themselves’ ‘Christians’ which is 
the first claim of its kind in ‘Christian’ literature. The first group, mentioned here to 
have done this being the Marcionites, though it seems perhaps all use the term – and by 
now perhaps Justin’s group is adopting it too since Justin attempts to give them more 
appropriate alternative names formed from the name of their respective founders. This 
quote comes in response to Trypho’s question about ‘Christian’ diversity where Justin 
outlines the failed candidates for ‘Christians’, those who are ‘outside of our 
communion’ (ouvdeni. koinwnou/men). In this passage we find false prophets and false 
Christs who would teach blasphemously towards the creator and Christ, and unholy 
doctrines in Christ’s name and will be inspired by devils (th/j pla,nhj penuma,twn( h`mei/j).  
Justin says similar in Dial 82.3 also: ‘Many have disseminated atheistic, blasphemous, 
and perverse doctrines, falsely branding them with his name, and they have taught, and 
still do, whatever that unclean spirit of the Devil has suggested to their minds.’413 These 
claims are remarkably similar to what Justin has to say about Marcion in 1A 26.5-6. 
There too blasphemies are taught in the name of the ‘Christians’ in association with 
devils. Even stronger, in 1A 58.2 Marcion is even described as being a wolf which 
directly parallels the imagine quoted here where the wolf steals lambs. The false 
‘Christians’ in this passage teach their own atheistic doctrines rather than those of 
Christ, just as is said of Marcion in the two passages mentioned from 1A. So these 
people reject the god of Israel as their own and pay only lip service to Christ. And 
despite this they have the audacity to call themselves ‘Christians’. If Justin were right, 
then Marcion was not only the first who, as one can read in Tertullian, conceptualized 
‘Christianity’ in antithesis to ‘Judaism’, he may also have been the first, or one of the 
earliest to adopt the name ‘Christian’ for his group and bring about questions of identity 
Justin is trying to lay to rest.
414
 True, others are mentioned also, but these did not reject 
                                                                                                                                                                          
w`j  e[fhn( to.n VIhsou/n kai. tw/n metV auvto.n genhsome,nwn prognw,sthn evpista,meqa( kai. evx a;llwn de. 
pollw/n w-n proei/pe genh,sesqai toi/j pisteu.ousi kai. o`mologou/sin auvto.n Cristo,n) Kai. ga.r a[ pa,scomen 
pa,nta( avnairou,menoi u`po. tw/n oivkeiwn( proei/pen h`mi/n me,llein gene,qai( w`j kata. mhde,na tro,pon 
evpilh,yimon auvtou/ lo,gon h; pra/xin fai,nesqai) Dio. kai. u`pe.r u`mw/n kai. u`pe.r tw/n a;llwn a`pa,ntwn 
avnqrw,pwn tw/n evcqraino,ntwn h`mi/n euvco,meqa( i[na metagno,ntej su.n h`mi/n mh. Blasfhmh/te to.n dia, te tw/n 
e;rgwn kai. tw/n avpo. tou/ ovno,matoj auvtou/ kai. nu/n ginome,nwn duna,mewn kai. avpo. tw/n th/j didach/j lo,gwn 
kai. avpo. tw/n profhteuqeisw/n eivj auvto.n profhteiw/n a;mwmon kai. avne,gklhton kata. pa,nta Cristo/n 
VIhsou/n( avlla. pisteu,santej eivj auvto.n evn th/| pa,lin genhsome,nh| evndo,xw| auvtou/ parousi,a| swqh/te kai. mh. 
katadikasqh/te eivj to. pu/r u`pV auvtou/) 
413
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the God of Israel and the prophets as Marcion did. Furthermore Marcion or Marcionites 
is the only name that keeps coming up in both of Justin’s major texts. It is accompanied 
by others, but these differ from place to place; only Marcion is consistently the 
dangerous threat, it seems.  
Marcion is not the only, but he is the chief propagator, the false prophet that Justin has 
in mind. He Justin, contrasts him with the true prophets of the one true god who profess 
the one and only true Christ. Trust in the prophets of the scriptures and in their Christ 
automatically divorces him from Marcion.  
Justin rounds this section off by again announcing that Christ was prophesied and that 
blasphemy against him ought to cease for fear of judgement from him. As Bobichon 
notes, this is the first explicit mention Justin makes of the eternal and universal 
judgement in relation to Christ. A very long list of references and proof texts (both old 
and new testaments)
415
 appear in both of Justin’s major works on this theme. Bobichon 
goes as far as to call this theme omnipresent and an obsession for Justin.
416
  Why is this 
such a concern for Justin? That Christ was prophesied and that he will pronounce 
eternal judgement represents a direct contradiction of Marcion. Leaning heavily on this 
theme strongly distinguishes Justin’s theology from that of Marcion. Again we have no 
reason to suppose that Valentinus or Basilides had any objection to god’s or Christ’s 
judgement, so we have here a whole chapter where not only are Marcionite themes the 
key topics, but Marcion himself, or his followers, are a central, if not the only, target of 
Justin. This is particularly striking when we take Robert Royalty Jr and his point on 
board about the unique heresiological structure of this passage: ‘The formal difference 
in Dial 35 and these other heresiological passages [Dial 80; 1A 26, 56, 58] is the 
specification of groups rather than the taxonomy of the founders of this group. Dial 35 
is heresiological, but not doxographical. Justin notes the a[llon tro,pon of these 
teachers, but he makes no attempt to describe their teachings or connect them 
genealogically or taxonomically at this point or in this text.’417  
As we have already noted, Justin does here allude, as he has been throughout the text, to 
the teachings of Marcion. Indeed that has been rather the whole point, to escape these 
teachings, not by naming them explicitly but by articulating an alternative that rules 
them out necessarily. Justin does not perform a taxonomy of Marcion at all in this text 
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because, as we have noted, it would not be helpful to do so in front of Trypho. Rather he 
rules him out implicitly. The appearance of Marcionites here then is something of 
smuggled truth. It appears there is no taxonomy and these names are simply equivalent 
and expedient examples, but the passage and the themes of the text, reveal that 
Marcionism is indeed the teaching that is being detailed negatively. 
A companion passage to Dial 35 can be found at Dial 80 and also provides clues that 
Marcionism is the present threat that Justin is trying to rule out and exclude from the 
shape of the ‘Christian’ philosophy in this piece: 
‘Moreover, I indicated to you that some who are called Christians, but are godless, 
impious heretics, teach doctrines that are in every way blasphemous, atheistical, and 
unwise. But that you may know that I am not saying this in front of you alone, I shall put 
together a statement, as best I can, of the debate between us; in which I shall document 
the admission which I have just made to you. For I do not desire to follow men and their 
doctrines but greatly to follow but God and his doctrines. For if you have met any who 
are called Christians, but who do not confess this truth, but boldly blaspheme the God 
of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob; and say there is no 
resurrection of the dead, and that their souls are taken to heaven when they die; do not 
understand them to be Christians, just as one considering rightly, would not confess 
that the Sadducees, or similar sects of Genist, Meristae, Gelilaeans, Hellenists, 
Pharisees, Baptists, are Jews (do not be offended when I say  what I think), but are only 
called Jews and children of Abraham, paying lip service to God, as God Himself 
declared, whose hearts are far from Him. But I and others, who Christians of right 
mind, know that there will be a resurrection of the dead, and a thousand years in 
Jerusalem, which will be rebuilt, adorned, and enlarged, as the prophets Ezekiel and 
Isaiah and others profess.’418 (Dial 80.3-5) 
Although Justin is not saying that he ‘and others, who are right-minded Christians’ will 
be better ‘Jews’ and children of Abraham, he insinuates it by reassuring Trypho that he 
holds strongly to that which the prophets have announced – which Trypho ought also to 
accept.  Right-minded ‘Christians’ are no blasphemers or atheists, but are in relation 
with the god of Abraham and Isaac. The Marcionite profile of this is known by now, as 
also Bobichon has noted.
 419
 And although Basilides and Valentinus could well be part 
of Justin’s criticism, the fact that Marcion and Marcionites appear consistently, whereas 
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the others do not, and that Justin wrote to Marcion makes him seem to be the more 
pressing target also here. Indeed, Marcion had rejected the resurrection of the bodies, 
and only taught an eternal life of the soul.
420
 In addition, the passage is reminiscent of 
1A 26.6 where Justin outlines that the followers of Marcion may be called ‘Christians’, 
just as all philosophers are called philosophers, but really should not be.   
Conclusion 
We’ve seen in this chapter that Justin in his dialogue with Trypho sets out a number of 
key themes to define ‘Christian’ philosophy and that these are particularly notable 
because they speak to areas of disagreement between Justin’s ‘Christian’ philosophy 
and the doctrines of Marcion. The introductory section, frequently viewed as odd or out 
of sorts with the rest of the piece, in this examination presents a succinct distillation of 
the key themes which define the ‘Christian’ philosophy through the speech of Trypho, 
Justin and the presbutes. The purpose and truth of philosophy, in contrast to the 
doctrines of men, is asserted along with a single god who is creator but also providential 
carer for all in the world. Furthermore this god is just and righteous and wishes to 
reward rather than to punish. Finally this god spoke through the prophets and is 
therefore the god of Israel – Trypho’s god. This god is the father of Christ and for all 
people. These points define the shape of the ‘Christian’ philosophy which Justin seeks 
to demonstrate to Trypho and by saying so, he distances himself from having founded 
his belief on empty fables. Fundamentally such an exposition rules out a theology that 
sees Christ as a new phenomenon from a new god, not predicated in the prophets or of 
any antiquity at all. It denies that the god of Israel, the creator, is cruel and 
manipulative, and believes that he is rather merciful and compassionate to all people 
and demonstrably so by the revelation he has given rather than by the opinions of men, 
men like Marcion. The following chapter will turn our attention to Justin’s Apologies 
and consider what evidence can be found for a deeper relevance or influence of Marcion 
there as something or someone Justin seeks to distinguish himself from. 
                                                          
420
 On this point Epiphanius is clear. At Pan. III.3.5. and at III.4.5 he develops it by saying: ‘As I 
indicated, Marcion says resurrection is not of bodies but of souls, and he assigns salvation to these and 
not to bodies. And he similarly claims that there are reincarnations of souls, and transmigrations from 
body to body.’ In the early tradition Tertullian also alludes to Marcion’s denial here in Res. Mort. II.10: 
‘Consequently, forced to assign Christ also to a different  dispensation lest he be considered to belong to 
the Creator, they have first gone astray in respect of his flesh, maintaining either, according to Marcion 
and Basilides, that it had no true existence, or, according to the successors of Valentinus, with Apelles, 
that it was of a quality of its own. And thus it follows that they shut the door against the salvation of that 
substance of which they deny that Christ is partaker: for they are aware that it is equipped with the 
strongest precedent of resurrection if already in Christ the flesh has risen again.’ 
162 
 
Chapter 4: Case by Case 
Introduction 
This chapter will argue that chief among Justin’s purposes in 1A is to distinguish 
‘Christians’ from Marcionites for political purposes. In order to make a case for 
persecution against other ‘Christians’, Justin must distinguish himself from those others, 
restrict the category of ‘Christians’ to only true ‘Christians’ and claim that all others and 
only those others can and should be charged of atheism by the Emperor.  
The argument will proceed in five main parts. Firstly the nature of the Roman 
understanding of ‘Christians’ will be reconsidered as background to the charges brought 
and their context. After this Justin’s case for ‘Christians’ not being atheists, which 
subtly exposes Marcionites as fitting this charge, will be examined. Following this the 
argumentative framework that Justin builds around the demons will be introduced to 
show the distinction between all that is ‘Christian’ and all that is not, which should 
naturally lead the rulers to favour ‘Christian’ truth over any other –this naturally 
establishes Marcionism as other and not to be trusted. Fourthly the case will be made 
that Justin relies heavily on asserting the ‘Christian’s’ relationship with the creator of 
the universe – the  god of the ‘Jews’ - and the concept of this god’s judgement which 
guarantees truthfulness from his followers. This exposes that Marcionites do not follow 
this god, marking Marcionism out as a new superstition, so the rulers have no 
guarantees that they are not liars who will say anything to curry favour. Next we will 
consider how Justin claims ‘Christ’ for the creator and relies on his teaching, suggesting 
that Marcionites must rely on another god because Christ is inseparable from the 
creator, the god of the ‘Jews’. Finally we will examine the manner in which Marcion is 
presented by Justin as a tool of the demons which ought to lead the rulers to persecute 
him and his followers only while finding favour towards ‘Christians’. 
1. Politics 
Justin begins the apology by appealing to the ruler’s sense of justice and fairness and 
asking for investigation on a case by case basis rather than on a general classification 
basis (the class being ‘Christian’). This is important for justice, especially because there 
are those who are called ‘Christian’ who should not be and so the only way to know 
who should be punished is to investigate on a case by case basis. We should not move 
on without noticing the strangeness of Justin’s request however. ‘Christians’ are 
seemingly noticeable enough, whatever degree of understanding those who try them 
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had, to warrant trial. They are no longer simply part of the ‘Jewish’ tradition but stand 
out to some degree. Justin, despite arguing against persecution, is accepting of this and 
is actually requesting a further or deeper judicial process. He does not ask that the trials 
stop, but that there be more probing. 
There is a political dimension to this address, in that the situation for ‘Christians’ has 
changed. Up until relatively recently, ‘Christians’ were tolerated under the protections 
afforded to ‘Judaism’. Such protections included privileges like the right to observe the 
Sabbath and other festivals, tax raising powers to send to the temple, exemptions from 
military service and from sacrifices of the imperial cult. As Zetterholm’s analysis has 
shown, these privileges constituted a strong self-identity with considerable regulatory 
power. In Antioch, at least, this constituted almost a state within a state, a devolved 
parliament and judicial system if you will. In other words, they were considered one of 
the collegia established and protected by ancient tradition.
421
 Indeed, going back as far 
as Julius Caesar, when action was taken against collegia, synagogues and ‘Judaism’ 
were exempted.
422
  With their status as ‘Jews’ seemingly less obvious it is incumbent on 
Justin, as it was in the Dial to present a ‘Christianity’ which demonstrates its ‘Jewish’ 
roots and so can avoid the appearance of atheism.  
Marcion of course represents a clear and present danger to this. Politically speaking the 
problem is the loss of protection or freedom of practice afforded to a ‘Jewish’ sect, once 
as with Marcion, a self-distinction is introduced between ‘Judaism’ and ‘Christianity’. 
By setting up a god for ‘Christians’ distinct from the god of the ‘Jews’ and rejecting the 
care and will of that god for them, Marcion makes ‘Christians’ appear to be atheists. 
Furthermore, this would leave gentile ‘Christians’ – according to Justin by this time the 
majority
423
 – guilty of conversion to a non-native tradition or superstition424: this was 
against Roman law.  
Justin’s response is not, and cannot be, simply that ‘Christians’ are in actual fact a sect 
of the ‘Jews’, hence to revert to a pre-Marcion stage of ‘Christianity’, but in accepting 
the new situation of ‘Christians’ being separate from ‘Jews’, he advocates that 
‘Christians’ are the ‘true Israel’. The ‘Christian’ philosophy, as in the Dial, has ancient 
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‘Jewish’ antecedents but cannot be limited to the ‘Jews’ alone. The ‘Jews’ knew god’s 
law, which for Justin can be split into what was given to them alone and what is 
universal. The universal portion of the law is applicable to all and many pagans have 
demonstrated participation in this. The universal theology Justin puts forward has the 
consequence of claiming ‘Jewish’ privileges for the worship of the one true god and not 
losing the protection given by Roman law. These are the very real political realities 
which are more than incidental to Justin’s rejection of Marcion’s theology. Not only has 
Marcion created a new god over and against the one true god but by doing so he 
imperils all true believers because they all share the one name ‘Christian’. In order to 
counter the political Marcionite threat then Justin has not only to accept judicial 
persecution but turn it to his advantage. He has to ask for more litigation, not less, and 
of a more probing nature. By this acquiescence it might be possible to weed out the 
Marcionites and expose them for the atheists they are whilst affording ‘Christians’ 
tolerance. 
In order to make clear the change represented in what Justin asks for from the rulers, a 
bit more background into the legal status of ‘Christians’ and their interactions with the 
Roman authorities will be helpful. I take Pliny the Younger’s epistle to Trajan 
concerning the Christians as the best available source of information here. Prior to this, 
although ‘Christians’ are mentioned and come up for punishment under Nero and 
Domitian, it is not at all clear that they are being punished as ‘Christians’ qua 
‘Christian’ rather than as an element of ‘Jewish’ fanaticism with no firmly established 
boundary between the ‘Jewish’ and Christian sects.425 With Pliny, however, we meet a 
new era in ‘Christian’ state relations on a general and judicial level.  
1.1 Pliny’s Case Law 
In Pliny’s letter to Trajan concerning ‘Christians’ it is clear that ‘Christians’ represent 
something new to him:  
‘Pliny seems to be under the impression that there have been cognitiones de Christianis, 
somewhere, sometime, somehow, in his adult lifetime. Some such impression must be 
implied by his note that he has not been present at any. But in gaining the impression 
that some such cases have occurred  he seems to have picked up no information as to 
how, no hints to guide him, and no likely sources of information to follow up before 
troubling the emperor Trajan. At least, he claims none.’426  
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This is interesting because it is so unlikely for a man such as Pliny. Pliny had been a 
successful advocate in the centumviral court, acting as judge and assessor
427
, as well 
holding the positions of Tribune, Praetor, consul and finally governor of Bithynia 
where he would have been sole judge across the province.  This is clearly a man of vast 
legal and political experience.  Furthermore, Pliny was a contentious and thorough 
scholar of law. That there is no precedent is reasonably clear from the fact that Pliny 
always mentions what he follows elsewhere even if he is unsure of its status, and where 
he does not act, he tries to show the effort he has gone to in order to find precedent. He 
is only silent on this in this one letter which concerns ‘Christians’ and it is by far his 
longest to Trajan. Clearly he is genuinely unaware of any precedent for how to 
proceed.
428
 Downing is even bolder: 
 
‘There have been no cases of Christians being brought to the courts in his province—
ever. He does not simply fail to refer to them—there  are none, none for him in Bythinia 
and Pontus, but also none in Trajan's archives, and none in any other context that he or 
Trajan might think relevant, no sign that this is what has been done or χ or y, and it 
seems a good idea. There has been no action in the courts against Christians for their 
allegiance in Pontus or Bythinia, and none in the provinces around for his local 
advisers to bring to his attention.’429 
If this is the case, and the evidence of Pliny’s unique collection of letters suggests that it 
is, then this experienced Roman official is genuinely encountering something new, or 
being able to distinguish for the first time something that had blended in before. There 
may have been occasions where ‘Christians’ were involved in disputes, but that Pliny 
cannot refer to them is very surprising. Hardy speculates that such occasions may have 
been local tribunals brought by ‘Jews’ where the offence was not focused on 
Christianity as such.
430
 Up until this point ‘Christians’, though occasionally named in 
persecutions, were under the radar as part of the ‘Jewish’ tradition.431 Something is 
changing in Bythinia. It may not be incidental that Bythinia is the location. Bythinia had 
a large ‘Jewish’ population, although Pliny never mentions ‘Jews’ in his letters. In 
Rome such communities would be diluted by the general populace and blend in, but 
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where they formed a large proportional body they would be more obvious. This being 
the case, any unrest within that community would be more likely to be problematic for 
the authorities. The Romans were wary of the ‘Jews’ following the first war, and 
tensions had been growing steadily for some time; the Fiscus Iudaicus was a fresh and 
humiliating attack by the Romans on all ‘Jews’432 and the Kitos war is imminent. As 
growing numbers of people are anonymously accused of being ‘Christian’, unrest which 
cannot be ignored is clearly present. It is possible, and perhaps likely, that fellow ‘Jews’ 
are those who accuse ‘Christians’ of being ‘Christians’– because they are either 
unhappy with the position of ‘Christians’ towards the ancestral customs or wary that 
‘Christian’  worship of a man risks provoking the Romans to clamp down on the 
community perceived to have a messianic leader. 
Beyond that Pliny cannot cite precedents or suggestions for procedure is the fact that he, 
being the conscientious investigator that he was, embarks on a fact finding mission to 
discover just what it is that these people believe and practice. Up until this point it had 
been unknown to him. As the charges spread Pliny felt the need to ascertain what 
exactly he was dealing with. He questions those named by an informer and the results 
were inconclusive. Various understandings of ‘Christian’ practice and blame or 
innocence were brought before him such that he found it necessary to take further steps 
at investigation. Beyond those charged and brought to him, Pliny tortures
433
 two slave 
women who were deaconesses with the express intention of getting to the bottom of the 
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issue. Pliny’s report on what he discovers, on the more reliable evidence given under 
torture, is that ‘Christianity’ only amounts to superstition, though a very influential one 
that has, as he has discovered, spread far and wide and that threatens traditional Roman 
worship. Clearly something new, or differently understood, is being discovered in 
Bythinia and the scale of this threat to the Roman cult causes Pliny to inform the 
emperor and seek advice. 
What is even more interesting for our purposes here is the practice that Pliny innovates 
and its endorsement by Trajan. The procedure that Pliny institutes is the well-known 
sacrificial test. First he inquires of the accused if they are indeed ‘Christians’, for, as 
Pliny proceeds, the name itself functionally serves as the crime: if they confess this, 
they are taken off to be executed.  Such as these are not a problem for Pliny: the fact 
that they will not deny their faith even though they know this brings death is enough to 
convict them as perverse and vile. Rather it is the other group that present a 
challenge.
434
 Those who deny the charge and prove it by calling upon the Roman gods 
and making sacrifice to them, as well as cursing Christ, are acquitted and set free. 
Trajan endorses this procedure provided it is executed ad hoc rather than as a systematic 
programme. What is most interesting here is the sacrificial test which firmly marks the 
‘Christians’ out as a new tradition. 
Though the ‘Jews’ were atheists, the Romans as a rule tolerated this. It would appear 
that a sacrificial test was not necessary to ascertain whether the ‘Jews’ rejected the gods, 
but Croix does note an earlier example of the sacrificial test being applied to ‘Jews’ in 
A.D. 67 in order to ascertain who was ‘Jewish’. This example is recorded by the reliable 
‘Jewish’ source Josephus in his account of the ‘Jewish’ war, and since it may have 
significant implications for the practice Pliny employs, I will quote much of what 
Josephus says directly: 
‘The Jewish race, densely interspersed among the native populations of every portion of 
the world, is particularly numerous in Syria, where intermingling is due to the 
proximity of the two countries. But it was at Antioch that they specially congregated, 
partly owing to the greatness of that city, but mainly because the successors of King 
Antiochus had enabled them to live there securely. For, although Antiochus surnamed 
Epiphanes sacked Jerusalem and plundered the temple, his successors on the throne 
restored to the Jews of Antioch all such votive offerings as were made of brass, to be 
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laid up in their synagogue, and, moreover, granted them citizen rights on an equality 
with Greeks. Continuing to receive similar treatment from later monarchs, the Jewish 
colony grew in numbers, and their richly designed and costly offerings formed a 
splendid ornament to the temple. Moreover, they were constantly attracting to their 
religious ceremonies multitudes of Greeks and these they had in some measure 
incorporated with themselves. Now just at the time when war had been declared and 
Vespasian had recently landed in Syria, and when hatred of the Jews was everywhere at 
its height, a certain Antiochus, one of their own number and highly respected for the 
sake of his father, who was chief magistrate of the Jews in Antioch, entered the theatre 
during an assembly of the people and denounced his own father and the other Jews, 
accusing them of a design to burn the whole city to the ground one night; he also 
delivered up some foreign Jews as accomplices to the plot. On hearing this, the people, 
in uncontrollable fury, ordered the men who had been delivered up to be instantly 
consigned to the flames, and all were forthwith burnt to death in the theatre. They then 
rushed for the Jewish masses, believing the salvation of their native place to be 
dependent on prompt chastisement. Antiochus further inflamed their fury; for, thinking 
to furnish proof of his conversion and of his detestation of Jewish customs by sacrificing 
after the manner of the Greeks, he recommended that the rest should be compelled to do 
the same, as the conspirators would thus be exposed by their refusal. This test being 
applied by the Antiochenes, a few submitted and the recalcitrant were massacred. 
Antiochus, having next procured the aid of troops from the Roman general, domineered 
with severity over his Jewish fellow-citizens, not permitting them repose on the seventh 
day, but compelling them do everything exactly as on other days, and so strictly did he 
enforce obedience that not only at Antioch was the weekly day of rest abolished, but the 
example having been started there spread for a short time to other cities as well.’435 
The importance difference to note between this and Pliny’s account is that here the test 
is a popular movement, not a state procedure, and importantly a recommendation of the 
‘Jewish’ agitator rather than a state policy designed by a Roman official such as 
Pliny.
436
 The aid of Roman troops given to Antiochus does however suggest Roman 
support for this process (no real surprise given the recent rise in hostilities between 
‘Jews’ and Romans in Judaea). Despite the differences the evidence here of a test 
applied to ascertain whether the accused will sacrifice to the gods and renounce their 
past represents a possible precedent. Pliny usually cites precedent which makes it 
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unusual that he does not mention this, but if he was indeed aware of it, perhaps it was 
more common place than in the time since so that it would not need to be referenced. 
The truly noteworthy point here is that this test is being used in order to establish who is 
‘Jewish’ in a society where the ‘Jewish’ population is large, as much as ten percent 
according to Zetterholm, and has diluted the pagan population.
437
 A demonstration of 
loyalty, among the popular consciousness, is being demanded. The rioting of the ‘Jews’ 
in other places may have been understood to be a clear and present threat at this time 
and in this place. Indeed, as Zetterholm notes, some of the Antiocheans may even have 
seen action in the war in Palestine, as the Romans are known to have supplemented 
their legions with auxiliary forces that were often chiefly constituted of those from 
Syria.
438
 Compared with the Antiochene case, it is less surprising if in both cases the 
accusations were coming from within and also in Pliny’s case we are still dealing with 
an inner-‘Jewish’ debate. At least in Antioch, it was not the pagans who were upset, but 
the ‘Jews’ themselves, though tensions are high as Josephus alludes to; in Pliny’s case, 
it was not the Roman authorities who instigated the process, but the people who 
provoked the authorities to act. Provocation from within the community was a necessary 
accelerator for the Roman authorities to get involved.  
What then is the relationship between this and Pliny’s circumstance? An obvious 
difference is that the test is not suggested as coming from the accusers in Pliny’s case, 
or at least not reported as such. And while the accuser in Josephus was clearly a 
traditional ‘Jew’, it is unclear who the accusers in Pliny’s case were. We don’t know. 
But it is within the realm of possibilities that these accusers were ‘Jews’ as in Antioch, 
who had reason to despise ‘Christians’ as a sect which by its appeal to Christ potentially 
seems to have threatened the ‘Jewish’ customs (Sabbath observance, Torah 
interpretation, circumcision) and by extension the social rest of the province by 
exposing the ‘Jewish’ population to the possibility of losing their political protections. 
Although a speculation, it is a plausible one. If this view were to be taken seriously, 
then it would become possible to suggest that Pliny is not so much innovating a new test 
as applying a loosely established practice of determining who counts as a ‘Jew’, or 
atheist, and using it for ‘Christians’ because he – admitting to not knowing what they 
are – does not see them as a strictly non-‘Jewish’ entity. The fact that he does not 
juxtapose them with ‘Jews’ is also suggestive of this. Such a juxtaposition could 
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establish a former or loose link between ‘Christians’ and ‘Jews’, but the lack of it could 
also suggest that it did not occur to Pliny that these people were beyond ‘Judaism’. 
Another point that might push the evidence in this direction is to ask why Pliny sees fit 
to test whether ‘Christians’ will sacrifice to the gods. Why does he think ‘Christians’ 
exclude the gods from their worship or do not sacrifice? Has his interrogations revealed 
this – his policy is instituted before he widens the scope of his investigation – or is it 
because he makes a natural connection between these people accused of being 
‘Christians’ and ‘Jews’? This cannot be firmly answered but it is a plausible account of 
the evidence. Given that this cannot decide the issue we must consider the alternative, 
that Pliny marks the beginning, or a beginning in a particular location, of starting to see 
‘Christians’ as outside of  ‘Jewishness’ however subtly to begin with. 
The Romans knew the ‘Jews’ were atheists but respected and protected their traditions. 
The ‘Jews’ were, so to speak, licensed atheists.439 Schafer sums up the complexity of 
the ‘Jewish’ association with this term quite well: ‘The charge of “Atheism” (atheotēs 
or asebeia, impietas) was raised by many pagan authors against the ‘Jews’, who did not 
participate in pagan cults. It did not have legal consequences, however, because – 
according to established Roman legislation – the ‘Jews’ were exempted “from 
participation in state cults, including that of the Emperor.” When Domitian used the 
charge of “atheism,” that is, treason (maiestas), in order to eliminate people he deemed 
dangerous to his reign or wanted to get rid of for other reasons, he most certainly did 
not abolish ancient privileges. But privileges were vulnerable and could be 
disregarded…’440 Even though this was the case and the ‘Jews’ were often hated, there 
would be no reason to put ‘Christians’ to death for confessing to being ‘Christians’ if 
they were understood as being ‘Jews’ – even if they were seen as strangers or 
foreigners. Though even in this case the social unrest being caused by great numbers of 
‘Christians’, who are being accused by at least some anonymous people, suggests that a 
threat to Roman social order in the neglect of the state cults was being perceived by 
fellow ‘Jews’. Though it is possible that Pliny assumes a ‘Jewishness’ of ‘Christians’, 
there isn’t enough evidence to be confident in this claim. What is clear is that Pliny is 
using the term ‘Christian’ as a shame name, whether of ‘Jewish’ origin or not, and that 
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over time this distinction will eventually lead to two separate religions; though the 
completion of this process is far from Pliny’s or even Justin’s time.  
It seems then that Pliny and Trajan are taking the first official steps in opening the 
courts to hear cases brought against ‘Christians’ qua ‘Christians’. ‘Christians' have 
already got a bad reputation – clearly, since Pliny thinks them punishable in the first 
instance even if then he did not have any information about what they believed or how 
they lived. Yet, they are becoming more distinguishable from ‘Jews’, who still have 
privileges, however limited these may have been in various locations at various times 
following unrest.
 
‘Christians are vulnerable to local enemies when a governor arrives 
who is intent on imposing order and law. It is very likely appropriate to describe the 
informers as 'trying it on' with the new governor; but this is the first occasion for such a 
'try-on'—or, at least, the first successful attempt.’441 This demonstrates the political 
reality which Justin faced in another part of the empire fifty years later, and after the 
Bar Kokhba revolt. ‘Christians’ are being informed on in a similar manner, it seems, 
and are no longer protected under ‘Jewish’ toleration laws, but stand alone.  
 
If ‘Christians’ no longer had an acceptable stake in the toleration afforded to ‘Judaism’, 
and were seen as at least plausibly distinct, then it is important, from Justin’s 
perspective that the rulers understand who they are dealing with. If they are a new 
thing, they at least ought to be well and fairly defended. There is a further dimension 
here however. Hardy said: ‘while the toleration hitherto enjoyed by the Christians must 
for the future, if granted at all, be granted independently of any supposed connection 
with the Jews’. This is not quite what Justin attempts to do. Marcion might have made a 
plausible attempt at this at the time, though there is no evidence of an apology from 
him, but Justin seeks to demonstrate a legitimate ‘Jewish’ connection with theological 
and political consequences.  
 
It is not open to Justin to claim that his community are in fact ‘Jews’, and his 
theological convictions rule this possibility out. However in his claim to be the true 
spiritual Israel, Justin is making the case against atheism in ‘Christians’. In his claim for 
the universality of ‘Christianity’, his counter-assertion is that ‘Christians’ are not the 
illegal converts but that the pagans are. This is made all the more pressing by the fact of 
Marcion’s theological project, which deepens and solidifies the separation of 
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‘Christian’ and ‘Jew’. The more successful Marcion’s mission, the less chance 
‘Christians’ had staying within the law and not being executed – though Justin claims 
they are not afraid of death if it comes, they still do not court it for that would be 
contrary to god’s law as Justin argues in 2A 4.3. Marcionism is then a very direct 
political, as well as theological, threat to the following of Christ as Justin understands it. 
 
This helps to establish, and make more intelligible, Justin’s project in 1A. Justin is not 
claiming that the trial of ‘Christians’ is ill-founded or denying their legitimacy or that of 
their authorities in any way. Despite the probable futility of doing so, he might still have 
made a protest on these grounds. Rather he not only accepts this procedure but looks to 
extend it. Justin appeals for more investigation on the part of the rulers. The reason he 
wishes for thorough investigation is that, on the strengths of his presentation of 
‘Christian’ truth, the theology of Marcion can be exposed as counter-‘Christian’ and the 
political threat that it represents can be expurgated. The key line in 1A it seems is: ‘but 
we do know that ‘they [Marcionites and potentially other heresies] are neither 
persecuted nor put to death by you, at least on account of their doctrines.’442 (1A 26.7) 
This will be discussed in detail below but it reveals that the rulers are not distinguishing 
between ‘Christians’ who are Marcionites, or others Justin would not consider 
‘Christian’, and are treating all together whilst Justin believes not all ‘Christians’ are 
created equal or even comparable. By deepening his investigations, which go beyond 
the mere name applied to them, but which consider doctrines and style of life, Justin 
hopes to make the distinction clear. If this were successful, which it clearly wasn’t since 
Justin was himself martyred, it would afford ‘Christians’ a share in the toleration given 
to the ‘Jews’ without them having to be, by their own standards, ‘Jews’ – keepers of the 
ancestral practices of the covenant but instead the philosophers who know the truth.
443
 
Having considered the novel and unexpected nature of Justin’s proposal for case by case 
judgements against the background of pattern, begun, if not universally established, by 
Pliny, we are now in a position to look in further detail at the specifics of how Justin 
presents the need for this case and its intended aims. 
 
Being understood as being outside of ‘Judaism’, to whatever degree, can ‘Christians’ be 
seen as being anything other than atheists? If they are not ‘Jews’ they are a new cult, 
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and what they worship is unclear. As Pliny understood, they are a superstitious bunch.  
Though the ‘Jews’ were considered atheists by the Romans,444 they were generally 
accepted. Cut off from this exceptional status Justin has to defend freshly the non-
atheistic beliefs of ‘Christians’, without adopting the Roman cult of gods, hence his 
need to define what true ‘Christianity’ means. Reclaiming the god of the ‘Jews’ as  truly 
‘Christian’ is the central element of this defence which is qualified by alerting the rulers 
to the role of the demons who cause misconceptions of the truth. Each of these points 
isolate Marcion’s theology by contrast to true ‘Christianity’ which can enjoy the same 
toleration as ‘Judaism’, even possibly at its expense, and the latter as a positive example 
of anti-‘Christian’/anti-truth propaganda.  
2. Who are the Atheists? 
In his attempt to explain that not all ‘Christians’ are truly ‘Christian’ and worthy of 
protection or that not all are criminal as some may be Justin points out that some of the 
poets and philosophers were atheistical and yet are loved and lauded by the rulers (4.9). 
Thus, it seems like a contradiction when ‘Christians’ are charged with what sound like 
similar charges and hated on account of them. From Justin’s point of view this is unfair 
but not surprising. Socrates is an example of a similar scenario (5.3) from within the 
Graeco-Roman tradition. He was hated and given the same charge (of inventing new 
divinities) when he exposed the demons. This is also the particular form of atheistic 
charge all ‘Christians’ encounter – they are thought to be atheists chiefly because they 
are thought to invent new divinities. In Justin’s view and presentation, it is the 
Marcionites who are to be distinguished from ‘Christians’ as those who invent new 
divinities. True ‘Christians’, by contrast are worshippers of the one true god, the god of 
the ‘Jews’ and the universal god of all. Justin reiterates the disjunction between 
‘Christians’ and Marcionites (7.3) by pointing out that just as there are many who are 
called by the title philosopher not all are worthy of the title (just as he has already said 
in 4.8) and that there are likewise those who seem or might be thought to be ‘Christians’ 
and yet are not worthy to be called such. This is the background of every claim Justin 
makes for the faith, because not all who claim the name ‘Christian’ are really so. The 
denial of atheism for Justin then is strictly limited to ‘Christians’ and excludes any 
pretenders to this school.  
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Justin makes a further salient connection between ‘Christians’ and Socrates however; 
both Socrates and ‘Christians’ are falsely accused, and this is because they both expose 
the demons (which the poets and philosophers do not do even in their most speculative 
and vulgar moments). In short, both are accused because both speak the truth. Hence 
Justin does not agree that ‘Christians’ are atheists because they speak the truth, reveal 
the demons for what they are and worship the only true god (6.1). As we shall see below 
Marcion is in league with these very same demons, so any contrast between ‘Christian’ 
truth and demonology ensures that Marcion cannot be counted as belonging to the 
‘Christian’ side. Justin admits that ‘Christians’ can be considered atheists in the sense 
that they do not offer worship to that which the rulers call gods.
445
 ‘Christians’ – those 
who truly follow Christ’s doctrines – worship only the one true god and his Son in 
connection with the prophetic Spirit. This puts them in the same position as the ‘Jews’ 
towards the Roman traditions who are also atheists, but tolerated ones, in that they 
refuse to offer sacrifice because they are bound by the one true god.
446
 In their 
investigations then the rulers must judge carefully on a case by case basis who is 
‘Christian’ and who is atheist rather than who is ‘Christian’ and therefore atheist. In 
Justin’s presentation ‘Christians’ cannot by definition be guilty of atheism, and are 
unlikely to be guilty of anything else owing to their good character before god. If 
someone fails the test of being a ‘Christian’, as Justin defines it, and they are not a ‘Jew’ 
or a pagan, then they are guilty of atheism. 
Justin’s next move, after establishing the possibility of hypocrisy, diversity and failed 
candidates in all traditions as much as among ‘Christians’, is to set out the major tenet 
of the ‘Christian’ life, that which if absent guarantees the exponent is not ‘Christian’ 
whatever they claim and virtually assures all that they are atheists: ‘And we confess that 
we are atheists, so far as gods of this sort are concerned, but not in regard to the most 
true God, the Father of righteousness and temperance and the other virtues, who is 
unalloyed with evil.’447 (1A 6.1)‘Christians’ then may appear atheists but once under 
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investigation this cannot be sustained because they worship an ancient and venerable 
god. He is not only pure and temperate – qualities which the rulers should appreciate 
and expect to see echoed in his followers – but as Justin will frequently mention he is 
also the maker and father of all and thus all are already in relationship to him, as he is 
the god of the universe. Justin calls God creator or maker – and once begetter of all – 
nine times in 1A in total. It is clear enough as in Dial, that he has the god of the ‘Jews’ 
in mind, the one whom Marcion also calls the Creator but who he does not think is the 
god of ‘Christians’ and the Father of Jesus Christ. That the creator god is the god of the 
‘Jews’ is taken as witnessed by the Old Testament. In 8.2 Justin says: ‘…for we desire 
the eternal, pure life, and we seek after communion with God the Father and maker of 
all, and we are eager to confess we are Christians.’ Justin here is plainly and closely 
associating a pure life, communion with this god and life under Christ. These 
necessarily go together in the definition of ‘Christianity’ as it is emerging. There can be 
no confusion then as to the identity of the god in question. Osborn has drawn attention 
to the Platonic phrase from Timaeus 28c as Justin was using Platonic doctrine against 
Marcion specifically.
448
 Widdicombe has criticised this reading of the text but the fact 
remains, as Widdicombe agrees, that Justin’s pattern of usage of the Father reflects a 
biblical picture and that he sees the creator and this father as one and the same entity; 
this in itself is a denial of the Marcionite position.
449
  
Both parties believe this god is the maker of the universe and sustains it. They differ as 
to how, Marcion thinking his care fickle, weak and not for all, while Justin thinks it 
universal care - but there can be no question that the same god is in question. Marcion’s 
other, transcendent god, would not have created this world in the first place, but wants 
to rescue its citizens from the cruelty of the creator god who did make it. For Justin 
however the maker of the world offers good things; indeed Justin twice claims that god 
cares for this world
450
 - a parallel to Dial 1.4 where Trypho poses the question as to 
whether or not all philosophy concerns god and his providence and Justin replies that 
there are some who attempt to teach that god does not care for humanity. In 1A 28.4 
Justin, in the context of explaining how evil can exist and why god has not extinguished 
it, asserts that to deny god cares for humanity is to deny he exists or suggest he delights 
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in evil – the latter of which being precisely the charge that Marcion brought against the 
god of the ‘Jews’. Returning to 1A 8.2 Justin has expressed that those who believe in 
this god are eager to be known as ‘Christians’, which is to say: “Those who are 
‘Christians’ by definition believe in this god. All other candidates should be treated as 
something other than ‘Christian.’” 
The reasons for Marcion’s rejection of this god have been much debated and naturally 
centre on Marcion’s understanding of materiality and the presence of evil in the world: 
‘That the God described in the Old Testament is the Creator of the world is his  
foremost feature, and it is at the same time the feature which more than anything else 
makes Marcion detest him. Besides Marcion’s Biblicism, the only real premise of his 
theology is the fact that he had nothing but disgust and hatred for the world and for life 
itself, hatred so huge that he even refused to promote the continuation of mankind… 
This irrational hatred apparently was the one unifying thought of all Marcionites 
throughout the centuries. As much as the scholars’ wish to find an explanation for this 
hostility to the world is understandable, it is simply beyond explanation. It is not for us 
to look into a man’s soul. What we can do is to comprehend Marcion’s logic starting 
from this point of view, a logic we have already discovered above. Having realised that 
the world is a terrible place, Marcion needed to blame someone for this status, and 
there could be no doubt that it was the Creator’s fault, a God who even admitted 
himself: “It is I who create evil.”451 
The last quote comes from Isa. 45.7 and Tertullian attributed to it a special significance 
with regard to Marcion.
452
 This very same god, the god of the Old Testament, is 
accepted by Justin as the only god and certainly the only god of those who are 
understood to be ‘Christians’: not the author of evil but the source of righteousness and 
truth. Service to this one ancient god is the first marker of the ‘Christian’ life and 
defence against atheism.  
In stating that ‘Christians’ follow this god, Justin takes steps to make it clear that this 
god exists in contrast to man-made deities: ‘And neither do we honour with many 
sacrifices and garlands of flowers such deities as men have formed and set in shrines 
and called gods; since we see that these are soulless and dead, and have not the form of 
God’ (1A 9.1) The principle related above, and in the rest of that chapter, about the 
                                                          
451
 S. Moll, ‘Marcion’ (2010), 59. 
452
 Tert.,  Adv.Marc. I:2.2, 7. 
177 
 
unreality of idol worship is not simply inserted so as to castigate paganism but to set up 
the contrast between invented deities and the ineffable one true god of the ‘Christians’. 
This is done as a way of reinforcing the non-negotiable tenet that the god of the ‘Jews’, 
known to the Romans from ancient times, is the only god ‘Christians’ worship. 
Anything man-made cannot be god, anything that takes a form other than that of the one 
true god is an idol, is atheism. This tenet of worship of the one true god for ‘Christians’ 
is the foundation for Justin’s exclusion of Marcion’s theological and political threat.  
‘Christians’ not only worship the one true god but do so rightly. Justin contrasts the 
sober worship of ‘Christians’ with irrational and superstitious tendencies of the rulers 
(the rulers are said not to judge well but with senseless passion – ouv kri,sei evxeta,zete 
avlla avlo,gw| pa,qei – at 1A 5.1 whereas the ‘Christians’ honour god with reason and 
truth – lo,gw| kai. avlqhei,a| – at 1A 6.2 and worship rationally – lo,gou timw/men – at 1A 
13.3). ‘Christians’ do not indulge in libations and other trappings of idol worship 
because this is ‘religious’ superstition, nor do they follow the opinions of men. Rather 
they follow the teachings of the teacher who is the Son of god, creator of all  - the 
teacher of the universal divine philosophy (This is sober, plain and true teaching rather 
than superstition - deisidaimo,nwn). Later, in 1A 58.3, Justin will explicitly contrast 
sobriety and purity with Marcionite doctrine and the irrationality of demon-influenced 
tradition. Christian virtue, too, has a political dimension. Vice, intemperance and 
corruption go hand in hand with idol worship and the creation of, as Justin sees it, false 
deities (1A 9.). ‘Christians’ are not taken in by these but live in gratitude and holiness 
which lead them away from human or evil concerns.  They live in ways they have been 
taught, and they are reliable: modelling always temperance, justice and kindness. Justin 
is using the rulers’ own fears and justifications against them. New superstitions were 
perceived as threats to the Roman order. Justin is repeating this back to them, ensuring 
when Marcion is recognised as such, his group will be under threat, but also turning it 
against them by suggesting that their gods are the new deities in contrast with the one 
true god. And yet the rulers see ‘Christians’ as the political threat believing they seek an 
alternative human kingdom as that would stand as a threat to Rome: 
‘But you, when you heard that we were awaiting a kingdom, rashly supposed that we 
were talking about one that was human, though we were talking about the one that is 
with God. This is apparent also from our confessing, when we are examined by you, 
that we are Christians, though we know that the penalty appointed for a confessor is 
death. For if we were awaiting a human kingdom we would have denied, in order to 
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avoid being killed, and we would have tried to escape detection, in order to obtain what 
we were waiting for. But since our hopes are not for this present time, killers have not 
been of concern to us. In any case, all are obliged to die.’453 (1A 11.1-2). 
We must not forget the background here. As in Pliny’s time, there had been a recent and 
bloody war involving the ‘Jews’ which led to a change of relations with the Romans. 
‘Jews’ were still tolerated but the patience of the Romans had been challenged. As 
Hardy suggested, the state religion would be more consciously asserted at this time and 
any new or questionable superstition could expect to be viewed with the highest 
suspicion. It is quite natural then that the rulers might think ‘Christians’ an imminent 
threat. Indeed Janssen has pointed out that ‘Christian’ eschatological beliefs about the 
end of empire and the eternal reign of peace bore a striking resemblance to the beliefs of 
the Gauls and other peoples the Romans considered a dangerous superstitio on account 
of sounding as if they wish to over throw Rome.
454
 Justin not only denies their threat 
but also the basis for it by denying the threatening novelty of ‘Christians’ in asserting 
that they are part of the ancient and venerable, or at least accepted, worship of the god 
of the ‘Jews’.455 That the Romans are a superstitious bunch in contrast to ‘Christians’ is 
part of the argument, but the subtler and more incisive point is that if ‘Christians’ are 
not this political threat on account of their worship of the god of the ‘Jews’ then 
anybody who claims to be ‘Christian’ but does not worship this god is not only a failed 
candidate for being a ‘Christian’ but poses just the threat that the rulers consider 
‘Christians’ to pose. In short Marcionites are not ‘Christians’ but a new superstition 
with a newly invented deity and with all the attendant risks. 
2.1 Demonology 
It is impossible to discuss atheism in 1A without discussing the demons which are the 
conceptual frame which drive the entire argument. The demons feature in Dial and in 
2A but the argument of 1A relies on an understanding of their practices to vindicate 
‘Christians’ and expose imposters. By building the argument around the demons, Justin 
is able to expose Marcion as an anti-‘Christian’ – in fact, as I will argue below, it may 
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be possible that Justin is presenting Marcion even more strongly as actually being one 
of the demons himself , rather than merely a failed candidate for a ‘Christian’. This also 
suggests that the rulers are truly atheists themselves; this may be why they cannot 
clearly see the true non-atheists when they are presented with them. Demonology is 
central to the whole enterprise, without it the politics of atheism remains unclear and an 
insurmountable challenge to Justin. 
Minns and Parvis provide a succinct summary of the role of the demons in 1A that I 
shall quote in full: 
‘Especially in view of Justin’s claim to be a philosopher, the modern reader cannot fail 
to be struck by the frequency with which he makes reference to the ‘wicked demons’ 
(dai,monej fau/loi). Paradoxically, it is precisely because he is a philosopher that he 
does this. The demons are brought in to explain how it is that things go wrong in a 
world designed by a good and rational creator. They cause human beings to prefer 
what is irrational to what is rational,  good people to be persecuted, and lifeless gods to 
be worshipped. They spread lies about Christian behaviour, provoke truth of the 
prophecies by inventing myths about the pagan gods that have superficial similarities to 
Christian doctrines and practices. They are the result of sexual union between women 
and angels to whom God assigned the providential care of human beings and ‘things 
beneath the firmament.’ The origin of this seems to be Jewish speculation based upon 
Gen 6: 1-4. Justin’s views about the demons might not be universally scorned by pagan 
contemporaries. According to Plutarch (De Stoicorum Repugnantiiis 105IC = 
SVFII.1178), Chrysippus had also considered the possibility that it was because of 
wicked demons (daimoni,a fau/la) that evil befell good human beings.’456 
Even in this presentation there is obvious a counter-Marcionite sub-content. Not only is 
there an apologetic function for evil in a world created by a good creator but more 
incisively the idea that the myths created are superficial imitations of ‘Christian’ 
doctrine and practice. This is precisely what Justin is trying to show of Marcion, 
contextualising Marcion within the demonology that highlights his charlatanry.  Though 
pagan contemporaries might not have despised such a framework, Minns and Parvis are 
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correct in highlighting its Jewish origin.
457
 Vinzent has spelt this out further with 
reference to Justin’s claims in Dial: 
‘demons are objects of worship of false prophets in the ancient times, [D7] are equated 
with ‘wicked men’, Jews, who are said to persecute the Christians for not observing 
‘fleshly circumcision, and the Sabbaths’. [D18, 1A57] Jews, the ones ‘of old time 
served’ the demons, [D30] and are accused to even have sacrificed their children ‘to 
demons’. [D19,73] In addition, the ‘gods of the nations’ are called ‘idols of demons’. 
[D55,73] Thus, Justin’s demonology is not part of pagan mythology, but is based on 
Jewish thinking, and yet turned against them. Jewish belief has become the foundation 
of pagan mythology. Especially magicians are held captive by demons, [D78] and 
Christians will be misled and persecuted by them. In our passage on Marcion [1A 26], 
Justin does not hint at pagan mythology, but at Jewish demonology.’458 
So the demons prey upon and encourage the irrationality that prevents the rulers, and 
anyone else, from seeing the sober truth, setting up imitations of god, just as idol 
worship took the Israelites away from god (1A 57.1, 58.2).
459
 Those who live without 
reason, who cannot assert their passionless and rational power, are taken under the 
power of the demons. It is sensible to see that ‘Christians’ are not atheists (1A 13.1) 
because they are the ones who worship the god that is real, but this sense is only 
accessible to those not duped by the demons. To those under the spell of the demons 
this appears as illogical rather than sensible, and thus Justin issues a warning to the 
rulers to be on their guard against the demons. ‘Christians’ flee from the influence of 
the demons by relying on Christ who is the very word of the unbegotten god (1A 14.2) 
rather than being the son of another god. The demons, and those under their influence, 
are tricksters:  
‘But in order that we might not appear to be tricking you we thought it worthwhile, 
before the demonstration, to make mention of a few of the teachings of Christ himself, 
and let it be for you, as powerful kings, to examine whether we have been taught and do 
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ourselves teach these things truthfully. And his words are brief and concise, for he was 
not a sophist, but his speech was the Power of God.’ (1A 14.4-5).  
Below we will examine the specific teaching of Christ that Justin thereafter elaborates, 
noticing some strong contra-Marcionite presentation. Immediately, however, it is 
pertinent to note how Justin has framed the debate. The demons are charlatans leading 
people away from god by pale imitation, but ‘Christians’ are truth-tellers because they 
know the true god and rely on his son’s teaching. Furthermore the rulers will get to 
judge this for themselves, openly and honestly presented before them as a case rather 
than being manipulated unawares by demons and their servants.  
Plausibility, or recognition, is an important part of this thesis. In order to show that the 
demons and their followers imitate and distort ‘Christian’, godly, doctrine he needs to 
be able to show there is a plausible similarity between them. If Justin could not show 
this then Marcion’s part in this as the present and most threatening imitator of 
‘Christian’ doctrine would be hollow and would fail to expose him as an anti-
‘Christian’. Consequently the political threat that Marcionism posed would remain 
dangerous as Marcionites would still be confused with ‘Christians’ making 
‘Christianity’ seem like a new and illegal superstition. 
Justin then asks the rulers to reflect upon the claims ‘Christians’ make: are they really 
any less plausible than the things the poets and philosophers of their own tradition say? 
Justin is quite subtle in his purposes here: ‘On the one hand, Justin highlights the 
affinities between pagans and ‘Christians’ in order to question why the latter are singled 
out for persecution. On the other hand, these commonalities lay the groundwork for his 
subsequent explanation of ‘Christianity’, fostering sympathy among non-‘Christian’ 
readers by suggesting that ‘Christian’ doctrines are not as bizarre as they may have been 
misled to believe.’460 So some of the things ‘Christians’ say sound as if they are very 
similar to the beliefs of the poets and philosophers (Dial 20, 21, 22 list many such 
similarities) Yet these might not seem so bizarre upon reflection, as they believe but in 
many ways the things ‘Christians’ say seem less incredible (avpisto,teron) than some of 
those of the poets and philosophers (Dial 18,19). Some of the things ‘Christians’ say 
sound as if they are very similar to the beliefs of the poets and philosophers (Dial 20, 
21, 22); Plato is particularly noted as similar. Justin again points out the inconsistency 
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of persecuting ‘Christians’ if their doctrines are not, as it seems, abhorrent to Graeco-
Roman culture.   
 
‘...and the teachings of writers, Empedocles and Pythagoras, Plato and Xenocrates, and 
those who say the same sort of things. Receive us, at least like these, since we believe in 
God not less, but rather more, than they do…461 If therefore we say some things 
similarly to the poets and philosophers whom you respect, and some things that exceed 
them and are divine, and for which we alone offer proof, why are we unjustly hated 
more than all?
462
...And when we say that the Logos, which is the first offspring of God, 
was born without sexual intercourse as Jesus Christ our teacher, and that after his 
crucifixion, death, and resurrection he went up to heaven, we introduce nothing 
stranger than those who call the sons of Zeus.
463
 …But in fact we say that, in a special 
manner, and not in the manner of an ordinary birth, he was born from God, as we said 
before, as Logos of God, consider the same as your calling Hermes the logos who 
announces the things that come from god.
464
 
‘Christian’ teachings are not without resonance in the pagan world then and Justin 
offers other examples beyond these. Some of the things ‘Christians’ say may even be 
strikingly similar to things said in pagan myths. A key part of Justin’s argument is that 
the ‘Christian’ beliefs are demonstrable by the prophets, in contrast to the pagan myths, 
but prior to this is the point that the pagan mythology is itself a work of the demons: 
‘But what was foretold by these evil demons, myth-making through the poets, spoke of 
as having happened. In the same way they brought about the allegation of infamous and 
impious deeds against us, of which there is neither witness nor demonstration, and of 
this we shall make proof.’ (1A 23.3)… But those who hand down the myths invented by 
the poets supply no demonstration at all for the youths who learn them by heart. These 
things we demonstrate to have been said by the working of the evil demon for the 
deception and misdirection of the human race. For when they heard through the 
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prophets that the future coming of Christ was proclaimed and that the impious among 
human beings were going to be punished by fire, they threw many so-called sons of 
Zeus into the discussion, considering they would be able to bring it about that human 
beings would consider the things said about Christ to be marvellous fable, and similar 
to things said by the poets.’ (1A 54.1-2) 465 
Greco-Roman culture then is built on a deception which, as Socrates did within their 
own tradition, Justin is exposing; this provokes the ire of the demons and causes a 
redoubling of their efforts – which we shall see below is the context into which Justin 
directly places Marcion. At 21.4 he speaks of the myths about Zeus being written to 
persuade to corruption those who are being taught – those who get the privilege of 
education, and thus power, in the Graeco-Roman world. The first time the demons are 
mentioned by Justin they appear as apparitions which was the standard term of the 
manifestations of the gods in Graeco-Roman religion
466
 and is followed by the naming 
of the demons, unknowingly, by humanity as the gods of that very culture.
467
 Minns and 
Parvis point out that, ‘Tatian accused the Greeks of having established poetry ‘only in 
order to describe battles and the amours of the gods and spiritual corruption.’468 Which 
is again to say that the works of Graeco-Roman culture are deceptive by nature. In 
Justin’s view, things said by the poets are counter-versions of the prophetic witness 
which lack demonstration. These poetic and philosophical narratives constitute Graeco-
Roman culture itself though, as a parody of the revelation of god through the prophets 
and Christ. By this line of argument Justin hopes to persuade the rulers to throw off 
deception, not only so that they may follow Christ, but also so that they can clearly see 
what is true of god, and what is not – this so that they could clearly see the imitations of 
‘Christian’ doctrine and practice contemporaneous in Marcion and recognise in this a 
new superstition separate from ‘Christianity’ which worships the same god as the 
‘Jews’ and does so legitimately. Below we will discuss the significant way in which 
Marcion is presented explicitly as a tool of the demons. Presently it is sufficient to know 
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that Justin considers this to be the case, and that this creates a juxtaposition between 
truth - from god - and deception – imitation and invention of new deities. The case by 
case judgement Justin is appealing for, then, is between legitimate worship of the god of 
the ‘Jews’, the one true god, and the illegitimate worship of an invented deity in the 
name of Christ by Marcionites. 
3. Evidence of True Worship 
The opposite of demonology is true worship of god. That is, the opposite of deception is 
truth, and the opposite of deception is reliability and trustworthiness. Just like the 
distinction Justin made of ‘Christians’ seeking a heavenly kingdom rather than an 
alternative earthly kingdom (1A 11) drew attention to the good citizenship of true 
‘Christians’, Justin draws out that it is their relationship to the true god that guarantees 
‘Christians’ are not a political threat to the Roman rulers.  Implicitly anything that does 
not show itself to be the truth, to be of god, is potentially a new and suspect superstition 
whose intentions are unknown. Moreover Justin makes this argument in terms loaded 
with particular contra-Marcionite distinctions.  
 
‘Christians’ do not wish to live by lying because purity of life, that which god 
commands, is their goal. They do not fear death but do fear losing their righteousness 
before god so their trustworthiness is a logical corollary of their worship of god (the one 
true god who is judge of all). Right away it should be clear that Marcion fails as a 
candidate for a ‘Christian’ on this score because he does not expect anything from this 
god at all let alone worship him.  Indeed in 1A 8.2 Justin suggests that ‘Christians’ have 
to convince god as much as man that they are ‘Christian’: ‘For we who have been 
persuaded and believe that these things [eternal and pure lives] can be obtained by 
those who have persuaded God through their actions that they were his followers…’469  
The means of persuading (pei,santaj) god is through one’s actions, the shape of one’s 
life. As Dial made clear, doctrines and behaviour are not separate enterprises. 
Philosophy for Justin was a way of life, the divine philosophy is the life lived in the way 
Jesus taught just as a Platonist lived a life after the shape of Plato’s doctrines or that 
Stoic philosophical practitioners lived in certain ways as predicated by their doctrines – 
their views on fate as it pertains to how to live cannot be avoided by Justin either. They 
stand, like Marcion, as an alternative position to his. The doctrines Marcionites follow 
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do not issue from the ancient god of the ‘Jews’ and cannot be said to aim at 
righteousness before him. The purity of life and trustworthiness of these doctrines 
cannot be said to be theirs either, and they ought to be seen as a new and suspect 
superstition. 
Further evidence of such a distinction can be seen by the ‘Christian’ motivation to serve 
god. This motivation does not come from a desire to conform to doctrines as such, but 
of seeking to do so because this is what god wills. Building on 1A 8.2 and 10.1 Justin 
suggests that god only allows into his presence those who imitate his good attributes 
and in 1A 21.6 says that ‘Christians’ ‘have been taught that only those who live holy 
and virtuous lives close to god (evggu,j qew|/) are made divine.’ Naturally, Platonists 
thought they would attain the ability to see god (as Justin testifies in Dial 4.1) through 
their life lived according to Plato’s doctrines but it is not clear that they would come to 
know god (Dial 10.4 - qeo.n de. ginw,skousin Dial 141.2) or be close to him or made 
divine as Justin and Trypho understand what it is to be in relation to god. Justin believes 
god himself has clearly laid out the shape of the life he desires for humanity, and that it 
is his authority that determines their life, along with knowing the truth. ‘Christians’ 
need to persuade god that they embody this truth rather than merely paying lip service 
to it, which brings them close to him and makes them divine.
470
 That which has come 
from god is true, the doctrines of the ‘Christians’ are then the divine philosophy.  
Persuading god that one is ‘Christian’ is intimately tied to following his ways (doctrine, 
teaching, shape of life) which are Christ’s ways: this is precisely what Justin disputes 
with Marcion and what, if it can be demonstrated to the rulers, extinguishes Marcion’s 
political threat by isolating his community from the trustworthy and venerable 
‘Christian’ community. 
The desire to please god is why ‘Christians’ should be thought trustworthy. Furthermore 
they should not be thought flatterers because their trustworthiness is not predicated on 
flattery or pretension but on the nature of their relationship with god. Justin twice claims 
that his appeal should not be misunderstood as flattery (2.2, 8.1): ‘For it was not to 
flatter you with this document nor to win your favour by our speech that we appeared 
before you. It was rather to demand that you give judgement in accordance with careful 
and exacting reason, instead of being held fast by preconception  or the desire to please 
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superstitious men and, prompted by irrational impulse and long-entrenched ill-
repute…’471 (1A 2.3) The close association here of the irrational impulse with 
superstition alludes to the work of the demons and contrasts ‘Christian’ claims with 
demonically inspired ones which, it seems, flatter to deceive, saying anything to take 
people further away from the truth. And this is exactly the claim that is made of 
Marcion in 58.2: that he leads away the irrational just as demons do. ‘Christian’ claims 
are to be opposed to these because Justin gives his appeal for the rulers rather than for 
their own sakes. The advantage is to them to be corrected, and there is no advantage to 
the ‘Christian’ in deception. God only allows the righteous into his presence so 
‘Christians’ must be righteous. ‘But we do not wish to avoid death by telling lies, for we 
desire the eternal, pure life, and we seek after communion with God the Father and 
maker of all.’472 (1A 8.2) ‘Christians’ have no desire to lie, and seek to give the truth 
only because the truth reveals god. If ‘Christians’ lie they imperil themselves, so it is to 
be assumed that they tell the truth, having no excuse before god, just as the rulers do not 
if they follow superstition over the truth having heard it (1A 3.5). This is why no one 
can harm ‘Christians’ by death or insult unless they can genuinely convict them of any 
wrong (1A 2.4). For ‘Christians’ are innocent before god: to them that is all that matters. 
Conversely, anyone who cannot appeal to this god, who is the motivation and cause of 
their trustworthiness, appears by contrast a flatterer: such people are associated with 
irrationality which is a clue to their servility to the demons.  
The contrast then between ‘Christians’ and others the rulers may come into contact with 
is that ‘Christians’ are good citizens, rational and not politically threatening. The 
necessary condition of this is worship of the true god and those without this condition, 
of whom Marcion is the only one to propose an alternative, cannot be ‘Christians’ nor 
can they enjoy the benefits and virtue Justin claims for ‘Christians’. As Alasdair 
MacIntyre said when recounting the nature of virtues ‘We cannot be genuinely 
courageous or truthful and be so only on occasion.’473 It is because of their relationship 
to god that ‘Christians’ are always truthful. They are truthful without regard to 
consequences, even when this may cause death, because the immediate circumstances 
are secondary to the will and judgement of god. ‘Christians’ have no reason to cheat or 
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lie because they are held to a universal standard.
474
 Marcionites however cannot be said 
to have a reason not to lie or cheat and so cannot be trusted. All others, which naturally 
includes Marcion, should not enjoy the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. 
‘Christians’ will never be found guilty on the basis of the truth of their doctrines which 
come from god and who will decide if they are genuinely observed or wrongfully 
imitated.  
3.1 Judgement of a loving God acts as a Guarantee 
The trustworthiness of ‘Christians’ which is predicated on the condition of the worship 
of the one true god undermines any notion of a political threat they may pose by 
depicting them as rational, and compulsive truth-tellers. There is a further stage to this: 
it presupposes that this god is a judge and specifically a universal judge, which 
immediately brings to mind the contrast between Justin on Marcion on this very point: 
‘Yet we more than all people are your allies and fellow soldiers for peace, since we 
think that it is impossible for one who does evil, or is grasping, or a schemer, to escape 
God’s notice and that each goes to eternal punishment or salvation just as his actions 
deserve. For if all people knew this no one would choose evil even for a little, knowing 
that he is going to be condemned to eternal fire, but he would restrain himself in every 
way and adorn himself with virtue so that he might obtain good things from God and be 
saved from the regions of punishment. For those who seek to escape notice when they 
do evil, because of the laws and punishments imposed by you, do evil knowing that it is 
possible to escape your notice because you are human beings. But if they were to learn 
and were to be persuaded that it is not possible for anything to escape notice, not only 
anything done, but even anything planned – they would be decent in every way at least 
because of the laws and punishments imposed, as you yourselves will agree.’475 (1A 
12.1-3.) 
Nothing can escape the notice of god. The rulers may charge and try suspects, who of 
course do their best to conceal their actions. For god, however, there are no suspects by 




 VArwgoi. dV u`mi/n kai. su,mmacoi pro.j evirh,nhn evsme.n pa,ntwn ma/llon avnqrw,pwn( oi] tau/ta doxa,zomen( 
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definition of who god is – he knows always the guilty from the innocent, no trials are 
required. Thus the provisional and limited nature of the ruler’s authority and judicial 
power is brought into relief against god’s.476 Justin says if all knew this there would be 
no wickedness. All who know god sees them act rightly, those who do not and or reject 
this are thus the only possible candidates for criminal or other evil actions. Because 
Marcion rejects that the judgement of this god is pertinent to ‘Christians’ and reserved 
only for the ‘Jews’,  he and his followers are made suspicious by not being able to claim 
this knowledge which naturally causes ‘Christians’ to be trustworthy. The rulers cannot 
necessarily discern flatterers and liars who seek to evade them, but they cannot fool 
god. Any dishonest group could potentially conceal their true identity from the rulers – 
which in this context suggests the possible sub-text that this is precisely what 
Marcionites do or could be understood to be doing – but their true identity cannot be 
hidden from god. There is a positive element to god’s omniscience also. Punishment 
comes of evil, but a life lived well, according to god’s ways and doctrines, results in 
blessings. This god is not simply an angry tyrant, but a god who gives good gifts.  
In highlighting that god sees all things Justin is attempting to inspire the rulers to be 
thorough in their investigations so that they are not deceived by the irrational and 
superstitious as they are presently vulnerable to being. god sees the shape of the whole 
life, all actions and moods of the heart, which the rulers cannot possibly see - but they 
could at least look beyond the charge, the name, brought against the individual at that 
moment. They ought, as Justin said in 1A 4.1, to examine actions, and how they live, as 
well as whether they will make an offering to the Roman gods. Judgement along these 
lines is fair and ought to reveal that ‘Christians’ are trustworthy. Whether Marcionites 
are shown to be untrustworthy – though Justin does not rule this out – is not necessarily 
the point. The main point is that there is a necessary condition of ‘Christian’ life – the 
worship of the one true god – which guarantees that true ‘Christians’ are trustworthy 
because they want to please god and gain his blessing rather than punishment. It is 
sufficient to realize that Marcionites do not share this necessary condition because 
Marcion thinks of god as a cruel judge.  Furthermore, he rejects jurisdiction as 
pertaining to ‘Christians’ – as Marcion thought of himself being – which Justin is 
disputing. Thus, though some Marcionites may be trustworthy, they cannot be 
considered necessarily so as ‘Christians’, or as part of an ancient and venerable tradition 
– they must be considered as belonging to a fundamentally novel superstition. 
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3.2 Merciful judge 
The function of this god, the true god, as judge is something Justin emphasises greatly.  
1A 6.1 also alludes to god’s function as judge by calling him the ‘Father of Justice’ 
(patro.j dikaioju,nhj). It is not simply that he is a judge or a just judge that Justin wants 
to emphasize however. At 1A 10.1 this god’s justice is also combined with god’s 
‘loving kindness’ (filanqrwpi,an) to highlight that he is not a cruel judge – cruelty is 
not a feature of the  judge if the justice is truthful. For the sake of clarity, it is worth 
recalling how Marcion thought of this god. As was discussed in chapter one Löhr and 
Moll have both argued it is unlikely that Marcion himself made a distinction between a 
just and a good god. Rather he thought of the god of the ‘Jews’, the creator and maker 
of all, as a judge, which Justin concurs with, but as a particularly cruel, limited and 
petulant one. The contrast between ‘Christians’ and Marcionites here then is not 
whether this god is a judge but whether ‘Christians’ are subject to his judgement and 
what character this has. There is a disjunction between the two as to the character of this 
god: this is the route which leads to Marcion’s dissent from him and Justin’s following 
of him. As we saw above, this god, for Justin, not only cares for the world by sustaining 
it but cares for all who are in it universally and consistently in contrast to Marcion’s 
view of him as weak and fickle, and as opposed to his other god who seeks to rescue 
humanity from this god. Not only this but Justin cannot conceive of this god as cruel 
judge but only as a merciful one who delays his judgement in order that more may have 
the chance to repent and come round to his path for human flourishing (1A 28.2). 
Not only is this god just and merciful and caring – which Marcion would consider 
oxymoronic where the god of the ‘Jews’ is concerned – he is also ‘unalloyed with evil’ 
(1A 6.1) - avvnepimi,ktou te kaki,aj (unmixed up with evil) - which is a strikingly contra-
Marcionite phrase since Marcion believed that the god of the ‘Jews’ was the author and 
explanation of evil in the world and rejects him because of it. Justin’s phrase here 
makes most sense as a response to and denial of that very notion. Also at 1A 6.1 (quoted 
above) Justin issues a declaration of what ‘Christians’ reject and what they do not reject. 
The one true god, as detailed here, is the Father of all good things (all virtues), just and 
temperate as well as having nothing to do with evil. As Minns and Parvis note, justice 
and temperance are the two cardinal virtues for Justin though the latter usually means 
chastity in Justin’s usage.477 Marcion could not think of a god who required in the Old 
Testament sacrifices and libations as temperate, but Justin of course has a different 
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reading of the Old Testament and does not understand the commands for such things as 
part of this god’s universal decree but rather as limiting and containment exercises for 
the sinfulness of the ‘Jews’. Temperance (or chastity) is also one of the virtues that 
Justin cannot defend on behalf of pseudo-‘Christians’. In 1A 26.7 – directly after 
Marcion is mentioned – Justin says he does not know if the accusations of intemperance 
made of ‘Christians’ are true of those just mentioned. This is because he cannot speak 
for them, as they are not part of his group (and he immediately announces in 1A 26.8   
his Syntagma where the rulers can learn more about Marcion and others if they wish).
478
 
This god is merciful also. The mercy of god is an agreed topic in Dial – where the 
question concerns who receives it rather than whether it exists – appearing ten times 
from both protagonists and from scripture. Explicitly it is mentioned only once in 1A 
but it carries a lot of weight because it comes from the words of Christ himself: ‘And: 
“Be kind and merciful just as your Father is kind and merciful, and causes the sun to 
rise on the sinful and unjust and evil.”’ (1A 15.13).479 Christ himself here has declared 
his Father, the god of the ‘Jews’ for Justin, to be kind and merciful which as we know is 
a stark contrast with the view of Marcion of this god and of the sonship of his Christ.  
Though mercy itself is mentioned once directly in 1A its corollary in repentance appears 
more frequently. The god of the ‘Christians’, the Father of all, creator and god of the 
‘Jews’, is a god who forgives and seeks a good relationship with his creatures. At 1A 
40.7 Justin asserts that god the Father calls everyone to repentance before the day of 
judgement. At 1A 61 he says:  
‘all those who are persuaded and believe that these things which we teach and say are 
true, and who give an undertaking that they are able so to live, are taught to pray and 
ask with fasting for forgiveness from God for their past sins, and we pray and fast for 
them. Then they are led by us to where there is water and they are reborn in the kind of 
rebirth in which we ourselves were also reborn… and should attain the forgiveness of 
sins, that is, those committed previously, there is pronounced, in water, over the one 
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choosing to be reborn and who repents of sins committed, the name of the Father of all 
and the Lord God.’ 480 (1A 61.2, 3, 10) 
So this god accepts those who repent and ask to be forgiven. He allows them to be 
reborn as his children. God’s mercy here is contrary to Marcion’s theology which did 
not believe this god to be a forgiving god nor found a place for repentance in his 
theology where the higher other god rescued those unfairly under the judgement and 
punishment of the creator god.
481
 Justin’s most striking rebuttal of this comes in the 
form of the very words of Christ: 
‘For Christ did not call the just or the chaste to repentance, but the irreligious, and 
licentious, and unjust. And he spoke thus: ‘I did not come to call the just but sinners to 
repentance, for the heavenly Father desires the repentance of the sinner rather than his 
punishment’482. (1A 15.7,8). Here Christ himself defends the Father who desires 
repentance, which Marcion’s god does not, and does not wish punishment upon people, 
contrary to the beliefs of Marcion. Furthermore Justin believes Christ has a part in the 
judging endeavour of this god. He is part of the very same god, the Father of all. 1A 8.4 
states: ‘In similar fashion, Plato said that Rhadamanthus and Minis would punish the 
unrighteous who came into their presence. We say that the same thing will happen, but 
that it will be done by Christ and to their bodies, they will be punished everlastingly, not 
just for a period of a thousand years, as he said.’483 Justin’s reporting of Plato’s account 
from Phaedrus 249a may be loose but the point that matters here is that Christ is not 
separate or independent from the god who judges, the god of the ‘Jews’. Christ is a part 
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of the naming of unrighteousness and the unwillingness to let it stand. Marcion could 
not abide this by any means. His Christ and higher god have nothing to do with 
judgement – he only sweeps in to save people from the judgement of the creator god.  
The notion that Jesus Christ could be part of the same judging endeavour as this god 
would be anathema to Marcion. Of course Marcion’s image of the creator is for Justin 
highly unsatisfactory and blasphemous. For Justin, god is a god, the only true god, who 
is righteous and merciful. The identification of Christ as part of the judgement process, 
and therefore part of and a witness to his mercy also, is then a quite fundamental 
difference between Justin and Marcion. If ‘Christians’ follow the teachings of Christ, 
which come from the one true god and are the truth, then Marcion differs fundamentally 
from this and his doctrines cannot be considered ‘Christian’. Consequently they are not 
from the one true god they must be atheist and thus the work of the demons and untrue. 
Justin has presented a ‘Christian’ theology that may seem obvious and natural, but most 
significantly it is one that Marcion could not possibly assent to at a time when 
‘Christians’ are ill-defined. If this is what ‘Christianity’ is then Marcionism by virtue of 
rejecting it must be an atheistic superstition and thus not subject to the protection due to 
‘Christians’ who worship the ancient and venerable true god, and do so rightly, unlike 
the ‘Jews’ who cause so much trouble for the Romans. 
4. Different Teacher, Different Confession 
Presenting Christ as in league with the creator and part of his judgement would have 
been completely unacceptable to Marcion and so this ‘Christianity’ that Justin presents 
can have no room for Marcionites. This claim is essential to Justin, his entire political 
plea relies on ‘Christians’ being legitimate worshippers of the one true god and thus 
trustworthy. But they are not ‘Jews’ but are called ‘Christians’. Justin must repeatedly 
emphasize then that their route to this god is through Christ and that Christ and his 
teaching is necessarily bound up with this god, which of course casts Marcion out of the 
‘Christian’ circle. The teaching of the ‘Christians’ must be demonstrably that of the 
creator god, rather than a superstition invented by human ingenuity – and likely hidden 
agenda - coming not via the law but via Christ. Furthermore it must be made clear to the 
rulers that Justin’s group are the only ones who spring or originate from Christ, and who 
have a right to his name: any others who are commonly referred to by, or use, his name 
are in actual fact part of a completely different school or ‘religion’.  
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In 1A 8.2 Justin uses the phrase ‘persuaded and believe’ (pepeisme,noi kai pisteu,ontej). 
Minns and Parvis point out that this is a doublet that Justin is quite fond of. It occurs 
five times in 1A,
484
 and emphasises that the way of life Justin and others practice is not 
something they have created, not something novel but is rather something passed on: 
passed on from a singular source, the Father himself through the prophets (of the Spirit) 
and Christ. The making of this point is not limited to this favoured doublet however. 1A 
10.1 repeats the above phrase as well as saying they have been taught (dedida,gmeqa)  1A 
10.2 continues the point by out-lining what it is that ‘Christians’ have been taught 
(dedida,gmeqa) and 1A 10.4 claims that ‘Christians’ are persuaded and led into faith by 
Christ (pei,qei te kai. eivj pi,stin).  In 1A 4.7 Justin speaks of people having learnt or 
received from Christ. The word Justin uses (paralabo,ntej) is the same word Paul uses 
for the reception of teaching in 1 Cor. 15:33 and Phil. 4:9 (1A 13.1 uses this as well as 
10.1,2 already noted).
485
 Justin has in mind that his way of life, the ‘Christian’ life, has 
been passed on to him – it is, so to speak, received wisdom. 1A 12.9 and 6.2 both make 
a similar point: ‘That all these things would happen, our teacher, I say, foretold. He is 
Jesus Christ, who is the Son and apostle of the Father of all and Lord God, and from it 
is that we have the name Christians.’; ‘This God we do venerate and worship, and also 
the Son who came from him and taught us these things, and the company of the other 
good angels who follow him and are like him, and also the prophetic Spirit.’486 (1A 
12.9; 6.2) In both of these passages
487
 Justin is leaving no room at all for error as to the 
source of what he has learnt. His way of life is received but it is not received from any 
men of old or teachers whose opinions are of no value (1A 2.1). The provenance of his 
teaching is clear, there is one source, and one source alone, of this way of life and that is 
from the Father via Christ, and the prophetic Spirit (the angel is admittedly confusing 
here but this is one of the names of Christ listed in Dial 61.1; 127.4 and does not 
necessarily rank Christ among the angels as Minns and Parvis note).
488
  
The Son and the Spirit here are singled out for worship too and tied as closely as they 
can be to the Father, the most true god; there can therefore be no confusion for Justin as 
to whose Christ provides the teaching of the ‘Christians’. We know that the prophetic 
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486genh,sesqai tau/ta pa,nta pro ei/pe( fhmi,( o` h`me,teroj dida,skaloj kai. tou/ patro.j pa,ntwn kai. despo,tou 
qeou/ ui`o.j kai. avpo,stoloj w;n  vIhsou/j Cristo,j( avfV ou- kai. to. Cristianoi. evponoma,zesqai evsch,kamen … 
avllV evkei/no,n te kai. to.n parV auvtou/ ui`o.n evlqo,nta kai. dida,canta h`ma/j tau/ta( kai. to.n tw/n a;llwn 
ep`omen,wn kai. evxomoioume,nwn avgaqw/n avgge,lwn strato,n( pneu/ma, te to. profhtiko.n) 
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 1A 12.10 also makes a similar point to these. 
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 (Minns and Parvis), 93, n.2. 
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Spirit – about whom Justin will surprisingly fill most of the pages of 1A despite its 
ostensible concern for pagan mythology - demonstrates for Justin the action and word of 
god throughout history from eternity and necessitates that Christ and all he speaks is 
bound up inseparably with the one true god (the god of Abraham and Isaac) the kind, 
merciful and caring judge. The prophetic Spirit, here tied to Christ and the Father, 
demonstrates the consistency of the work of this god now and forever. In 1A 8.3 Justin 
outlines what ‘Christians’ have learnt from Christ, which they now pass on and teach 
themselves.
489
 He is arguing for a single unbroken line of revelation, definitive truth, 
which is first and foremost a way of life rather than cosmic speculations, a sort of proto-
apostolic succession which includes the prophets.  
In denying the maker of all and Christ’s sonship in him Marcion designates himself as 
part of something else entirely. Justin said directly at 26.6: ‘All who spring from them 
are, as we said, called Christians, just as among the philosophers those who do not 
share the same doctrines do have the common name of philosophy predicated of 
them.’490 The point made here, that those grouped under a common category are very 
often not the same thing at all, has been previously made by Justin in 1A also. At 1A 4.8 
he said: ‘For, indeed, some assume the name and appearance of philosophers who 
behave in no way worthily of their profession. And you know that among the men of 
ancient times those who contradicted one another in their thought and teaching are 
nevertheless called by one name of philosopher.’491 The purpose here is not to 
legitimise the diversity of the category ‘Christian’ but to draw attention to its 
inadequacy as a tool for judgement. This is very clearly the case in 1A 7.2 where Justin 
is prepared to admit in general terms that it may be possible for some ‘Christians’ to be 
found guilty of crimes and that this should legitimise summary judgements on the basis 
of the name alone.
492
 The justification Justin gives for his general admission of the 
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 Minns and Parvis consider Justin’s admonition of guilt on behalf of ‘Christians’ inconsistent and 
potential evidence of corruption in the text. See (Minns and Parvis), 93, n.3. Also if Justin were to be read 
as saying ‘Christians’ have been found guilty he would not be undermining his appeal against the 
presumption of guilt in name because it should be read as implicit that he would be referring to pseudo-
‘Christians’, as a genuine ‘Christian’ would not be found guilty of any crime because they fear god more 
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possibility of guilt among ‘Christians’ is that philosophers can teach whatever they 
please and contradict one another seemingly without risk to the title or category of 
philosophy.
493
 The same may well be true of those who go under the title ‘Christian’ – 
but this is followed by an immediate appeal for the rules necessary to investigate 
beyond the name and see who really follows the doctrines of Christ. Clearly the guilty 
‘Christians’ could only be heretics for Justin here, true ‘Christians’ fear and love the one 
true god too much to be criminal in any sense.  
The category of ‘Christian’ itself is highlighted by Justin then as somewhat useless to 
the rulers in making judgements. The only way to know who has been persuaded by and 
follows the Christ of the one true god is by attention to how they live and whether they 
keep his doctrines. It is apt then that he details the teaching of Christ directly in chapters 
fifteen, sixteen and seventeen to distinguish ‘Christians’ from Marcionites and relieve 
‘Christians’ of any political threat: 
‘But in order that we might not appear to be tricking you we thought it worthwhile, 
before the demonstration, to make mention of some few of the teachings of Christ 
himself, and let it be for you, as powerful kings, to examine whether we have been 
taught and do ourselves teach these things truthfully. And his words are brief and 
concise, for he was not a sophist, but his speech was the Power of God.’494 (1A 14.4-5). 
The teaching of ‘Christians’ are the doctrines of Christ. As chapter two showed, Justin 
specifies Christ most commonly as a teacher, something which was also true for 
Marcion,
495
 in order to distinguish his doctrines from those who take the names of other 
men.
496
 This final portion of 1A 14 introduces three chapters worth of quotations from 
Jesus dedicated to detailing some of his directly given teaching in order to support his 
claims, previously made, for the trustworthiness and non-threatening nature of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
than human authority. This is supported by his immediate appeal that some are only called ‘Christians’ in 
the same passage – these are those who have been found guilty but they are not ‘Christians’. Admittedly 
the claim that conviction follows genuine investigation seems to run counter to Justin’s claim, and 
perhaps corruption is in evidence here, but the sense that guilt is on the part of imposter ‘Christians’ is 
plain. 
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 And we can tell that this is something of a ruse since precisely this point is used to deny the veracity of 
philosophy in the pagan world in Dial. 
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 See titles used for Christ in Marcion’s gospel, reconstruction forthcoming from Matthias Klinghardt. 
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As we saw in the previous chapter, Dial 35.6 details that those who claim Christ but follow the 
doctrines of other men are, or ought to be, known by the names of these other men, by the founders of 
their specific – non-‘Christian’ by definition – doctrines. 
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‘Christian’ lives. This teaching is reliable because a. Christ is no sophist like those 
under the power of the demons trying to trick them and b. to reiterate the point, what he 
says has the power of god (du,namij qeou/ o` lo,goj auvtou/ h-n), that he is closely connected 
with god, the creator. In each of the three following chapters Christ demonstrates the 
ethical shape of ‘Christian’ life which should be admirable and non-threatening to the 
rulers and ties it necessarily to the Father of all. The question put to the rulers here is to 
ascertain whether Justin’s community, the ‘Christians’, teach these same things – and 
thus can be considered ‘Christians’ – and implicitly that any group who can be seen not 
to be in line with these sayings must not be ‘Christians’ and therefore not subject to the 
defence of ‘Christian’ morality and civility made by Justin in the opening chapters.  
Christ taught temperance (1A 15.1) tying him to a virtue of the Father found in 1A 6.1. 
Jesus speaks of his own mission, in a way necessarily related to that of the Father. We 
have already noted that Jesus claimed (1A 15.8) that the Father prefers repentance of the 
sinner: following naturally from this, is what he uses in countering Marcion’s claim that 
the father of all is a merciless tyrant. Justin can be understood to be asserting the 
different provenance of his teaching from Christ from that of Marcion in a very subtle 
way, by utilising the words of Christ speaking directly to establish his true teaching and 
his true followers. Again at 1A 16.2 Justin quotes Jesus’ words, from Matt 5:16497 
saying: ‘Let your good works shine before people, so that seeing them they may honour 
your Father in heaven.’ Once more he has successfully demonstrated to the rulers that 
Christ’s teaching is ethical and honourable (good works) and that it is naturally and 
essentially related to the Father of all – the one true god. The later part of 1A 16 is 
particularly illuminating as to the provenance of genuine ‘Christian’ teaching. There 
Justin quotes a collection of Jesus’ sayings about who his followers are:  
‘And when someone approached him and said, “Good teacher”, he replied: “No one is 
good except God alone, who made all things.” And whoever are not found living as he 
taught are not to be recognised as Christians, even if they speak the teachings of Christ 
with their tongues. For he said that not those who only speak but those who also do the 
works will be saved. For he said this: “Not everyone who says to me “Lord, Lord”, will 
enter into the Kingdom of Heaven, but the one who does the will of my Father who is in 
Heaven. For he who hears me and does what I say hears the one who sent me. And 
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many will say to me, “Lord, Lord, did we not eat and drink and work miracles in your 
name?” and then I will say to them, “depart from me, workers of wickedness”. Then 
there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth, while the just shine like the sun, and the 
unjust are sent to the eternal fire. For many will come in my name outwardly clothed in 
the skins of sheep but inwardly being ravenous wolves; from their works you will know 
them. And every tree which does not produce fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire.” 
And we request that those who do not live according to his teaching, and are only 
called Christians, be punished by you as well.’498 (1A 16.7-14) 
This is a particularly clever and subtle set of quotations which reflect the synoptic 
tradition Justin presents here.
 499
 Justin gets so much into this. Jesus again emphasises 
the connection between himself and the Father of all. Jesus says that only god is good 
where Justin adds the words ‘maker of all things’ (o` poih,saj ta. pa,nta) to the synoptic 
quotation in order to make absolutely clear who this god is, that he is the god of Jesus, 
the one true god, and not just a god of the ‘Jews’ but father of the entire creation.500 
Justin points out again that there exist those who appear to pay reverence to Christ but 
do not truly hold to what Christ taught - those who do not live according to his teaching, 
and are only called ‘Christians’ (legome,nouj de. mo,non Cristianou.j) - those who appear 
to follow his doctrines but do not, whose teaching does not come from Christ in the 
final analysis  and are therefore not trustworthy and are guilty of being imposters. Of 
course Justin does not rule out that such as these might speak some of the genuine 
teachings of Christ, even if they speak the teachings of Christ with their tongues. He is 
outlining these people as imposters; such imposters could not be plausible, judged as 
they are by the confusion which abounds as to who and what is ‘Christian’, if they did 
not successfully imitate some of the form of the real thing, as Justin understood it. 
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kai. u`fV u`mw/n avxiou/men) 
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Somewhat like the demons hearing what was said of Christ by the prophets (1A 54.4) 
and imitating them without understanding, so these imposters may speak some of 
Christ’s words but show by their actions that they do not understand them, that they are 
not ‘Christians’. Any who appear to be followers of Christ but whose actions betray 
them are, in the words of Jesus, workers of wickedness. Following this, Justin has Jesus 
introduce the imposters in his name as not only false candidates for ‘Christians’ but as 
scheming and dangerous tricksters. Those who are not truly ‘Christian’ are therefore 
wicked and duplicitous. Here in particular we find an obvious allusion to Marcion, who 
is described as a wolf and his followers like lambs led away from the truth: ‘Many, 
believing him [Marcion] as if he alone knew the truth, laugh at us, though they have no 
demonstration for the things they say, but, being irrational, they are snatched away, like 
lambs by a wolf, and become fodder for godless doctrines and demons’501 (1A 58.2) The 
demons prey on the irrational; through Marcion, many have come under their spell. He 
has come forward in the name of Christ (those who spring from him are called 
‘Christians’ (1A 26.6) and has snatched sheep as a wolf does, just as Justin records 
Christ warning. Justin then requests that those who do not live according to the 
teachings of Christ but are merely called ‘Christians’ – just as those who spring from 
Marcion are called ‘Christians’ – be punished. That is that they be singled out for 
punishment as guilty non-‘Christians’. At 1A 3.1 and 7.4 Justin had requested proper 
judgement of actions by the rulers where criminality can be exposed for what it is rather 
than confused with ‘Christianity’: ‘so that a person who is found guilty might be 
punished as a wrongdoer, rather than as a Christian; while if anyone is seen to be 
guiltless he might be acquitted as a Christian who does no wrong.’ (1A 7.4). Justin is 
therefore requesting that these people, who are seemingly Marcionites by the allusion to 
sheep and wolves repeated at 1A 58.2 where Marcion is the main topic, be punished as 
wicked deceivers attempting to mislead the rulers in contrast to the reliable ‘Christians’ 
who follow Christ and his universal Father of all whom they seek to please. 
4.1 Another Confession 
Apart from the Marcionite denial of the source of the teaching of Christ, Justin has 
another way of isolating Marcionites from the true Christ. This is that, though they may 
confess Christ by the standards of their own belief, this cannot be counted as a genuine 
‘Christian’ confession but as something which means something very different in their 
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minds. At 26.5 Justin says that Marcion has made those he has persuaded to ‘deny God 
the Maker of this universe and confess some other who is greater, beyond him.’502 At 
face value it seems that Justin is simply declaring that Marcion believes in a different 
god to ‘Christians’ but the language used here is more suggestive than that. Naturally 
Justin does not say Marcion has persuaded these many people to deny Christ, since 
Marcion believes in Christ. Rather he has persuaded them to deny the maker of all who 
for Justin is the Father of Christ and for Marcion the lower, creator, god. This denial for 
Justin is tantamount to denying Christ because in denying the Father Marcion is 
denying that Christ is from this god. Crucially this means that at trial the difference 
between ‘Christians’ and Marcionites would be far from obvious if the only test was to 
deny Christ, since both claim Christ. The essential point is that though Marcionites are 
called ‘Christians’ they worship another Christ, the son of another god, which Justin 
declares explicitly at 1A 58.1. 
Minns and Parvis have pointed out that Justin uses highly charged judicial language of 
confession (o`mologia) and denying (avrneomai), where ‘denier’ seems to have become 
something of a technical term to describe an apostate,
503
 1A 26.5 is again pertinent: 
‘…and he has made them [those he has persuaded] deny god the maker of this universe 
and confess some other who is greater, beyond him.’504 This brings to mind Justin’s use 
of such judicious language when discussing the rulers’ practice of convicting confessors 
of Christ and freeing deniers without investigation at 1A 4.6.
505
 There Justin asks that 
all should be investigated for how they behave, this being indicative of what they really 
believe, rather than what they claim. More than the name should be taken into account - 
both Pliny, in his letter to Trajan
506
, and Urbicus in 2A 2 failed to do this. Justin’s use of 
the language of confessing and denying (which is in the process of becoming technical 
‘religious’ language beyond its primary judicious origin) is designed here to evoke just 
this association and to demonstrate that Marcionites, by denying the Father, deny that 
they are ‘Christians’ and confess something else, another son. Even then, if they confess 
Christ at trial before the rulers, they should be counted among those who are freed for 
denying him – though they should be punished as liars and atheists who follow the 
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demons perpetuating the deception that rules over the whole pagan world. At 1A 4.6 
Justin requested careful judicious investigation into the lives of defendants because 
what people say is not sufficient testimony to secure a reliable judgement on what they 
believe. In short, actions speak louder than words.  
That Marcionites did not deny Christ at trial is attested by Eusebius citing an 
anonymous writer: ‘For some of the other heresies have innumerable martyrs, but I do 
not suppose that we shall accept them for that reason, nor admit that they have the 
truth. In the first place, indeed, the so-called Marcianists of the heresy of Marcion say 
that they have innumerable martyrs to Chirst…’ 507 Of course this is later than the 
current period; secondly the claim for many martyrs is one made by Marcionites 
themselves rather than given as a direct external report. Still the author does not seem to 
doubt it rather he argues that martyrdom is no security for the truth. Had he wanted to 
deny it presumably he would have done so. Yet he goes on to say: ‘but nevertheless 
Christ himself they do not confess according to truth.’508 That is, there may well be 
many martyrs for the Marcionite heresy but they do not confess Christ in spirit and 
truth, they do not mean it the way ‘Christians’ do. So Marcionites may well confess 
Christ before the rulers and be killed for it, but Justin’s argument has been trying to say 
what the anonymous writer said, that they don’t actually confess the same thing as 
‘Christians’. They do not confess the same Christ. Eusebius also records that three 
Christians were martyred in Caesarea under the persecution of Valerian for their 
conspicuous confession of Christ, and that a woman in the same city was martyred but 
that she was a Marcionite.
509
 He actually does not say she was martyred but that she 
endured to the end, so as to deny her the title of martyr. He is clearly making a similar 
distinction between ‘Christians’ and Marcionites whilst not denying that Marcionites 
have been killed for their beliefs, or (more likely and accurately) taken for ‘Christians’ 
and executed accordingly. 
Indeed, that Marcionites are killed as ‘Christians’ but should not be, seems to be 
precisely the force of what Justin is trying to say in chapter 1A 26.7 There he says: ‘But 
that they are not persecuted nor killed by you – at least because of their doctrines-we 
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are sure.’510 This comes after him saying that he does not know if they are guilty of the 
infamous deeds that he himself has denied ‘Christians’ perform – another clue that they 
ought to be counted as a separate group, because Justin does not feel qualified to allow 
his defence to apply to them also. Clearly the rulers do not know either, since they 
punish without the proper investigation Justin has been appealing for. The fact that 
these ‘Christians’ are not killed by the rulers on account of their doctrines is 
fundamental to Justin’s case for theological and political distinction from them. Yet 
Minns and Parvis find this point puzzling in a quite vital and illuminating way for our 
purposes. Minns and Parvis believe Justin risks undermining his case with this point so 
I will quote them in full: 
‘This is a strange argument if part of an apology intended for the emperors. Justin 
seems to be prepared to admit that the heretics are killed, but not for their doctrines. 
The implication would have to be that the authorities discriminated amongst persons 
accused of being Christians, and prosecuted some for reasons other than their beliefs, 
perhaps because of the suspicion of flagitia. But it is a large part of his own case that 
orthodox Christians are unjustly suspected of flagitia, and therefore, presumably, it 
could be claimed that they are not persecuted for their beliefs either.’511 
Minns and Parvis go on to suggest that this passage may therefore be explained as a 
later addition to 1A by established orthodox Christians looking for resources against 
heretics. This does not seem necessary however. In fact it seems that Minns and Parvis 
have read the passage correctly but come to the wrong conclusion. It is indeed Justin’s 
implication that the rulers are prosecuting ‘Christians’ for some reason other than their 
doctrines. This has been his argument all along: that they do not examine their way of 
life, which comes from the teaching of Christ. For Justin the doctrine – philosophy – 
and the life lived ought to be inseparable. This being the case any conviction of 
‘Christians’ which assumes flagitia of them does not convict according to their 
doctrines but according to the valueless and irrational opinions of superstitious men – 
which Justin is arguing they are not. Exactly the same is true of Marcionites who are 
punished according to the name of Christ  rather than that of Marcion – this is the point 
which Justin is trying to address. The rulers are not discriminating among persons being 
accused of being ‘Christians’ and prosecuting for some other reason as Minns and 
Parvis suggest. Rather they are not discriminating in any way, they do not pay attention 
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to doctrines but simply note the name and persecute all indiscriminately: this is what 
Justin’s whole appeal has been trying to change. This claim is absolutely central then 
because not killing Marcionites on account of their doctrines means they are classed 
alongside Justin as ‘Christians’, when, in his view, they ought not be because the 
provenance of their teaching is different. It comes from Marcion, not from the Christ of 
the one true god: this the rulers would appreciate if they practiced genuine case by case 
investigation instead of summary convictions simply on the basis of the misapplied title 
‘Christian’. If this were understood by the rulers, Marcionites would be punished for the 
atheists and political dissidents that they are, and ‘Christians’ would be tolerated as the 
loyal, traditional and truthful people that they are before the one true god. 
Summary 
In presenting Christ as bound up, and necessarily so, with the creator as a teacher of his 
doctrines, Justin shifts the ground available to Marcion to claim Christ for his god. 
According to Justin, Marcionites have not only another god but another son, one who is 
not the ‘Jewish’ messiah and who preaches different doctrines from those of the creator.  
‘Christians’ are those who are persuaded by and follow the doctrines of Christ, which 
are the doctrines of the one true god, who is the ancient and venerable god of the ‘Jews’ 
– who always was and is in fact universal. This naturally isolates Marcionites as a 
politically novel sect with an invented deity and a teacher who preaches new doctrines; 
this in turn should of course make Marcionism appear as an illegal superstition to the 
Romans. ‘Christians’ are martyred for confessing Christ, they are prepared to die for his 
doctrines because, as we have seen, their relationship with god, which does not cease at 
death, is guaranteed by them. Marcionites might too be prepared to die for what they 
believe (indeed there are reports of Marcionite martyrs) but as far Justin is concerned, 
they are not and should not be considered ‘Christian’ martyrs. They may well confess 
Christ’s name at trial, but the name means something very different to them because 
they do not believe he is the son of the one true god – he is a different Christ to the 
‘Jewish’ messiah. So though they die for what they believe, that which they believe is 
something other than ‘Christian’ and they die in vain rather than as ‘Christian’ martyrs. 
This knowledge should reveal to the rulers that they are far more dangerous. 
‘Christians’ seek no earthly kingdom and always tell the truth because of their love and 
fear of god. Marcionites however have an invented god and so are deceivers who do not 
love or fear god and thus have no relevant check on their behaviour, they have no 
motivation not to lie in their theology. For Justin any guilty ‘Christian’ is in fact no 
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‘Christian’ at all. ‘Christians’ are trustworthy because of their relationship with god: 
anyone who claims to be ‘Christian’ but does not worship god threatens the case Justin 
is making in order to end persecution. The particularity of the doctrines, the content of 
the truth - this is what matters. It is simply not negotiable. The only teaching and 
confession that can absolve ‘Christians’ of being atheists or illegal converts is the 
teaching of Christ from the one true ancient and universal god. Marcion must then be 
exposed as alien to this because he and his followers worship a different and invented 
new god whilst still calling on the name of Christ. 
4.2 Marcion: tool of the demons or one of the demons? 
The strongest manner in which Justin excludes Marcionites from the fold of the political 
non-threatening ‘Christians’ is where he does so explicitly, by twice presenting Marcion 
as a cog in the demonic machine. Presenting him thus, as a tool of the demons, is 
intended to strongly emphasise that this group are not ‘Christians’. We have seen that 
this is not the sole allusion to Marcionism in 1A but it is the high point where the 
argument for differentiation cannot be mistaken.  
Justin says, at 1A 26 and 58, that the demons have been putting forward (proeba,llonto) 
- produce, bring forward, present - certain men which include Simon, Menander and 
Marcion. All three of these represent (if 1A 26.8 can be taken as subsuming all) heresies 
– though it is well established that care with that term is need when dealing with second 
century material. Are all three the same? What kind of company is Justin being 
described as keeping? Simon and Menander are described as Samaritans – a people and 
place Justin knew intimately – and sorcerers.  Being sorcerers they fit one of the marks 
of the action of the demons which Justin relates in 2A 5.4. There the demons, who are 
the progeny of fallen angels, mislead humanity by magical changes,
512
 fear of 
punishment and the teaching of improper worship - libations and sacrifices.
513
 All of 
these are tactics are designed to deceive. Beyond this the demons were taken by 
humanity to be gods, the gods of the pagan gods of the nations, which Justin denies at 
1A 5.4 by saying that ‘Christians’ deny not only that these gods are gods at all but assert 
that they are unholy demons. While Simon was taken to be a god by his followers, and 
according to Justin by the Senate and Roman people, Marcion is not described as a 
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magician or one who takes divinity upon himself. So is he out of place here? Difference 
need not be tantamount to inequality. Minns and Parvis, also puzzled by Marcion’s 
bedfellows here, have recently argued that Marcion seems out of place in this passage 
because he does not seem to fit Justin’s purposes of exposing those who have pretended 
to be gods. This is said of Simon and can be presumed of Menander, who was his 
disciple, but we do not know this of Marcion. Minns and Parvis believe that material on 
Marcion may have migrated into its present position from the Syntagma, this triggered 
by Justin’s mention of the previous ‘heretics’.514  This is possible but I don’t think 
necessary. Sebastian Moll has a simpler and more compelling explanation. Moll points 
out that Harnack found this juxtaposition most distasteful and that this, given Harnack’s 
prejudices, is illuminating for Justin’s purposes: 
 
‘”the juxtaposition of Marcion with the founders of sects who posed as gods is 
completely inappropriate and particularly spiteful, but it does show how dangerous 
Marcion appeared to Justin…and in what great esteem Marcion was held in his 
church.” We can leave it open as to whether his grouping of these people is indeed 
malicious and unfounded; in Justin’s view it certainly was not. Nevertheless, it seems 
confusing at first that he would mention his contemporary Marcion, with his apparently 
large number of followers, in connection with other heretics who must have been dead 
for decades…Therefore,  Harnack’s statement gives us a good hint at the reasons for 
Justin’s choice. He is not after a particular heretical system or movement; he is after 
the “big names” in heresy, after those men who are worshipped by their followers and 
who claim alone to know the truth.’515  
 
For Moll then Marcion appears not accidently in a general stream of ‘heretics’ but 
rather deliberately in a stream of specific ‘heretics’; the reader is given a clue as to how 
to understand Marcion. That is, he is contextualised, by the company he is presented 
with. Each of these presented were, in Justin’s view at least, people who attracted 
acclaim to themselves. They are after all for Justin alternative founders (avpcnge,thj) to 
Christ, thereby denigrating the uniqueness and universality of Christ and the divine 
‘Christian’ philosophy.  This is, chiefly, what Marcion has in common with Simon and 
Menander, whether he called himself divine or not, or whether he performed magical 
deeds.  
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Secondly his commonality with Simon and Menander is a direct result of his collusion 
with the demons rather than only a coincidence of drawing attention to themselves. 1A 
58.1 says that the demons put Marcion forward much in the same way as they inspire 
the misdirection of the worship of god in idols named after them.
516
 Justin says of 
Menander that he was worked on by the demons, which was usually understood to 
imply demonic possession. 26.5 however says that Marcion works with the help or 
assistance of the demons, which strongly links Marcion with the work of the demons, 
perhaps even as a willing participant. Caution is advisable here however as, as Minns 
and Parvis note, sllamba,nw is not used by Justin in this sense elsewhere, and his speech 
at 1A 44.12; 54.1; 2A 6(7).3, where he speaks of evne,rgeian of the demons, more readily 
suggests being caught up or ensnared in the demons’ activity.517 Whichever sense is 
preferred, Marcion is being presented as a dangerous individual on account of his 
association with the demons, whether it be as ally or as instrument. In this regard at 
least, he is in the company of Simon and Menander. Indeed Justin’s point in 57.1 
(following further discussion of Simon and Menander), that the demons were, still, not 
able to persuade all by their schemes but only able to effect the persecution of 
‘Christians’, is followed immediately with the re-introduction of Marcion: this reads as 
a new and redoubled effort by the demons in the present time to dissuade humanity 
from the worship of the one true god using him as a tool. This is all the more pertinent if 
it is accepted that the Syntagma seems in the text to refer to past heresies rather than the 
present Marcionite one, which is their successor and the present danger. This being the 
case Marcion is not out of place among Simon and Menander, but yet another attempt 
by the demons to deceive humanity. 
 
In the knowledge of this the rulers should see matters clearly. If Marcion is under the 
power of, or collaborating with, the demons – the same demons who have been 
attempting to lead humanity away from the truth and placate them with false gods all 
along – then Marcion and his followers must be atheists because they are part of the 
enterprise designed to conceal the one true universal god that Justin has been 
presenting. At the very least the rulers ought to see that such people cannot be 
                                                          
516
 See 1A 9.1. Justin does not, strictly speaking, say here that the demons created the idols but rather that 
they are the inspiration for them. However, given that we know that demons actively imitate and deceive 
in other ways for Justin it seems that we should take it as implicit that they are not merely passive muses 
in this operation as far as Justin is concerned. 
517
 (Minns and Parvis), 151. n. 2. 
206 
 
‘Christian’ if they are under the power of those dedicated to concealing the true god of 
the ‘Christians’. This should lead them to recognise Marcionites as not only as 
unreliable ‘Christian’ witnesses or benignly mistitled ‘Christians’. Not only are they not 
‘Christians’ – which is sufficient to cast them as a novel superstitious threat – but they 
are positively anti-‘Christian’ and by extension anti-truth – by virtue of their association 
and possession by the demons. As Rebecca Lyman said when discussing the principle 
of multiplicity proving falsity: ‘Just as the pagan sacrifices were demonic counterfeits 
of the sacraments, so hairesis was the demonic counterfeit of the truth, characterized by 
innovation, human ingenuity, and multiplicity.’518 They are dangerous as a new thing in 
their own right, but they ought to be even more dangerous and hated because they are 
active and deliberate deceivers who must have a hidden and pernicious agenda.
519
 
Justin’s task has been to outline who and what true ‘Christians’ are and to isolate 
Marcionites from this in order to secure the legal protections he is arguing for 
‘Christians’. Presenting Marcion and his followers as demoniacs is the high point of this 
enterprise – so important he does it twice for emphasis – which ought to leave the rulers 
in no doubt as to their independent and untrustworthy status.    
Conclusion 
Marcion is more than a fringe figure in Justin’s texts. The above analysis has shown that 
his influence exceeds the two references to him in 1A and to Marcionites in Dial. These 
are only the surface, the obvious clues to the threat he posed to Justin’s ‘Christian’ 
community are revealed by deeper analysis of the text, which gives further evidence of 
his spectre in Justin’s project. 
In chapter two it was demonstrated that Justin wrote in a period where what it meant to 
be a ‘Christian’ was far from decided internally and when it was also not obviously 
clear to the Romans who or what ‘Christians’ were. It was shown that the extent to 
which ‘Christians’ were a separate community to ‘Jews’ is a complicated question with 
an unclear answer. The answer depends on how one defines ‘Jews’, which recent 
scholarship has demonstrated is just as complicated as defining ‘Christians’ in this 
period. Justin’s writing in Dial firmly situates ‘Christians’ within a ‘Jewish’ milieu but 
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separated from it. His desire is to demonstrate the critical nature of their rootedness 
within this tradition. Aside from the story he tells about the persecution at the hands of 
Trypho’s teachers, the obvious unstated threat is that of Marcion who actively wanted to 
remove ‘Christians’ from the ‘Jewish’ community and deny that their god and prophets 
had any relevance for ‘Christians’. Chapter one demonstrated then that Justin’s chief 
task in all of his work is to clarify ‘what’ a ‘Christian’ is and to do so in a way that 
secures their heritage as part of ‘Israel’. In executing this task Justin sets out that his 
faith is a philosophy under Christ who is consistent with the witness of the prophets. 
This needs to be understood in contrast to philosophers, or any kind of school, who 
follow a leader who puts forward his own opinions rather than the ‘truth’, the prophetic 
words of god; Justin notes that there are many who are called or seem to be ‘Christians’ 
but who fail to live by the words of god through Christ, who in fact follow a different 
philosophy. The strongest possible way to pay lip service to Christ but to betray him 
simultaneously would be to deny his Father, to blaspheme against the one who sent him. 
Even if other ‘heretical’ groups can be considered threatening to Justin also, which I do 
not deny, Marcion, the one he calls a contemporary, is the most prominent of these and 
the only one to whom he dedicated an entire piece in itself, the now lost  pro.j 
Marki,wna) 
Chapter three considered the evidence from Dial for Marcion’s significance to Justin. 
This proceeded in a thematic manner demonstrating that the topics Justin discussed and 
the way he discussed them were frequently suggestive of a contra-Marcionite agenda; 
that the things he affirmed were more than coincidently things which Marcion, and 
sometimes only Marcion among ‘heretics’, would most strongly want to deny. This 
began with the sometimes overlooked introductory section to Dial which deals with the 
concept of philosophy and introduces the prophets. In this section we saw that, in 
addition to establishing the notion of novel and vain human teaching in contrast to true 
inspired and demonstrable philosophy, Justin introduced major themes, themes which 
are resonantly contra-Marcionite, evidenced  throughout the text. These themes include 
the number of gods there are, the creator - the god of the ‘Jews’ as the one true god - the 
providence, mercy and compassion of this god towards humankind, his justice and 
righteousness, and the prophets who predicted that Christ would come forward from 
this god. These themes are established in the introduction, and define the rest of the 
work, outlining a vision of the ‘Christian’ philosophy which strongly contradicts the 
Marcionite vision. This contra-Marcionite agenda is confirmed by the extended 
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attention Justin gives to ‘heretical’ ‘Christians’ in Dial 35 and 80 both of which overlap 
considerably with things said explicitly of Marcion, most notably the words of Jesus 
himself that there will be deceivers who are wolves in sheep’s clothing (in Dial 35.3 
and 1A 16.13): this resonates with Justin’s description of Marcion at 1A 58.2 as a wolf 
who deceives and carries away the lambs who are Christ’s followers and does so with 
the help of devils. Therefore, despite only mentioning Marcionites once, the form of 
Dial itself as well its specific descriptions of those who should not be considered 
‘Christians’ is strongly suggestive of an implicit contra-Marcionite agenda. 
Chapter four turned our attention to 1A and the political dimension of Justin’s trying to 
distinguish the followers of Christ from Marcion before the Roman rulers. Further 
examination of the rulers’ understanding of ‘Christians’ here confirmed what had been 
raised in chapter two, that the rulers did not have a clear or focused understanding of 
‘what’ ‘Christians’ were, nor necessarily distinguished them completely from ‘Jews’ in 
this period. This of course made Justin’s case of distinction from Marcionites more 
pressing because Marcion’s vision of following Christ surrendered the heritage of Israel 
due to ‘Christians’ and therefore presented them to the Romans as following a novel 
superstition worshipping an unknown or invented god, thereby running the risk of being 
seen as an atheistic, secretive and political threat to the Roman order. Added to this, 
these people would be seen as converts from their native traditions to this new 
superstition, which would also have been to the distaste of the Roman authorities. Only 
the universality of Justin’s basic and true philosophy can avoid this later suspicion and 
maintain links with Israel in an at least potentially legitimate way for the Romans. In 
this chapter we saw Justin’s efforts to convince the rulers that ‘Christians’ are not 
atheists, and thus his implicit condemnation of Marcionites as atheists. This was 
because the non-atheistic status of ‘Christians’ is predicated only on the worship of the 
one true god, which Marcion – and no other heretic – denies is part of the ‘Christian’ 
faith. Carrying his case forward it was shown how Justin presented the work and role of 
the demons in this world to frustrate and conceal the work and love of the one true god, 
the god of Israel. This was the reason the rulers had failed to recognise the fundamental 
and universal philosophy which comes from god. The crucial point for our purposes, 
however, is that in both occasions where Justin mentions Marcion by name in 1A he is 
presented as working with or under the influence of the demons. This being the case he 
could not possibly be a ‘Christian’ because his life and work is to frustrate the work of 
the one true god and keep others away from the truth. The strong implication then is that 
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any who deny the creator as god and claim to be ‘Christians’ are agents of the demons 
and ought to be punished, or at least avoided, as demoniacs not ‘Christians’. 
Marcionites may well confess Christ at trial, but it is Justin’s contention that they 
confess another Christ and another god different to those of the ‘Christians’. In a 
different way to Dial, but no less significant, 1A establishes the worship of the one true 
god, the god of Israel, as the central and minimum tenet of being a follower of Christ. 
These texts together argue strongly for this in order to define this philosophy so that it 
can be distinguished from the novel and politically suspect Marcionite philosophy. 
Justin may well only mention Marcion and his followers on a few occasions but his 
agenda is so focused on asserting what Marcion denied and what his community 
threatened to undermine that the spectre of Marcion in these texts has to be recognised 
as greater than the few direct references Justin gives. For our purposes it is very 
unfortunate that pro.j Marki,wna, known to Justin’s successors, is unavailable to us in 
order to see what detail Justin went into and what additional claims he might have made 
in making this agenda more explicit. Despite this however there is more than enough 
evidence in Dial and 1A to discern how and why Justin sought to clarify and define 
what it is to follow Christ and to do so in a way that clearly separates ‘Christians’ from 
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Appendix: Two Texts or One? 
Whether there is one apology or two by Justin is a perennial question. In the interests of 
clarity Paul Parvis has pointed out that Justin never wrote an Apology of any kind but 
rather an “‘address and petition,’ prosfw,vnsij kai. e[gteuxij, in more than one version, 
but no apologies.”520  Of course the nature of this more than one version is precisely 
what is at issue. Whatever Justin was doing, did he do it once or twice? Whether 2A is a 
part of 1A or a separate text affects this thesis in one of two ways: 
 Either a. If 2A is considered somehow part of 1A then it can be used in support of 
arguments made in the much longer form in 1A where appropriate. Or b. if it is a 
separate text it is of less relevance to this thesis given the almost total lack of thematic 
material that pertains to Marcion/ism (though this itself may pose a further question for 
another study as to why Justin avoided in 2A what is such an important agenda for him 
in other texts).  
Unlike Justin’s other texts, 2A contains no direct reference to Marcion or Marcionites,  
and many of the themes that have been highlighted as pertinent to a  differentiation of 
Justin from Marcion are missing or much less prevalent. 2A has no interest in the Jewish 
Scriptures, and no elaboration of the prophets (though the prophets do make cameo 
appearances): these are central planks of 1A and Dial and of the differentiation from 
Marcion. Instead it devotes a lot of room to The Logos Spermatikos, in which Justin’s 
other texts show no interest. However there are themes and material that overlap. 2A is 
interested in questions of philosophy: (who counts as a philosopher and whose 
teachings they follow) as well as repeating the ‘Christian’ connection to Socrates. 
Demonology and the importance of justice also feature, and the setting, the accusation 
against the woman and other ‘Christians’, reads very much like an elaboration of what 
Justin states he is addressing in 1A. God’s providential care for His creation is another 
area where overlap between 1A and 2A is discernable. This short section will briefly 
outline two recent arguments for the nature of 2A: one defends the traditional view that 
it is in some way part of 1A and the other claims it to be a separate text. Both have 
strengths, no definitive answer seems possible, but this section will highlight the issues 
in order to justify the interpretation of 2A as being within 1A for the purposes of this 
thesis.  
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Two traditional views exist: the two text theory and the one text theory. The strengths of 
the two text theory are that a. the manuscript presents them in this way and b. the tone 
of each is quite different (especially since 2A lacks gospel and prophet references and 
includes much more of the tradition of the Graeco-Roman poets). However, the lateness 
of this manuscript tradition (twelve centuries between its composition and our earliest 
manuscripts) makes it difficult to evaluate this ordering. Eusebius speaks of two 
Apologies but provides inconsistent references to both texts, and it is not clear that by 
these references he means 1A and 2A as we know them.
521
 The disadvantage of this 
theory is that 2A begins abruptly (in a way not befitting a petition – libellus) without 
asking for anything specific, other than  that it be published (Contrast this with 1A, 
which has an appropriate form of beginning for a petition and asks for justice and 
correct understanding of what constitutes a Christian). Also, 2A seems to be driven in its 
argument by three imaginary objections, the answers to which can often be found to 
have very close parallels in 1A suggesting a certain unity of purpose.
522
   
The one text theory, proposed first by Boll and the more popular of the two, notes the 
internal references from 2A back to 1A but fails to account for the strangeness of the 
structure that this solution creates.
523
  There is a third mainline option: the ‘one-and-a-
half’ theory first postulated by Grabe in 1703 and endorsed by such giants as Harnack, 
Goodspeed and Marcovich since.
524
 Seeing 2A as an appendix, supplement or postscript 
to 1A has the advantage of diminishing the importance of the tonal differences (since 2A 
would not then be considered a piece of work in its own right) and allows 1A to be seen 
as a proper petition. However Minns and Parvis and Thorsteinsson (who shall be our 
interlocutors below) share an objection (though not a solution) to this, namely that it is 
unclear on the basis of this theory alone precisely what kind of literary reality 2A is in 
relation to 1A. ‘Appendix’ and ‘postscript’ are all very well as vague holding labels but 
they don’t provide much clarity as to what kind of thing Justin thought he was creating 
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when he wrote it. It is hard to work out precisely what the aim is and why Justin didn’t 
elaborate or expand more on the key points.  
Minns and Parvis' recent solution seeks to see the Apologies as closely related, but not 
to treat them as one, two or one and a half works. Minns and Parvis see 2A as neither a 
separate text nor a post-script. Their analysis casts it rather as working notes that 
became attached to a particular draft – perhaps seized at the time of Justin’s capture and 
Martyrdom. This they call the ‘cutting-room floor’ theory.525 This assumes, not 
unreasonably, that Justin was continuously editing the apology and that he would have 
kept a notebook of materials and exchanges to draw upon as required, or a notebook of 
passages and points removed from his apology that would still be useful in other 
contexts – perhaps in public debates.  
Runar Thorsteinsson has recently challenged the one text view and Minns and Parvis’ 
theory with a renewed case for a two text solution. Thorsteinsson sees 2A as a more 
specific, locally, or personally motivated address compared to a more widely applicable 
appeal in 1A: ‘I will argue that Justin wrote 2 Apol. as a private petition to the Roman 
authorities due to some recent repression of Christians, with the main purpose of 
preventing further affliction, particularly of Justin himself. The study suggests that the 
composition of 2 Apol. was even more firmly rooted in Justin’s own situation at the time 
of writing than most scholars have hitherto thought.’526 His evidence for this relies on 
the difference in tone and the apparent reason for writing, namely the case of the 
accused woman at 2.1. Thorsteinsson suggests that this marks the reason of composition 
for much of the material that makes up 2A. ‘His stated purpose, then, is to persuade the 
Romans to change their opinion about Christians and their attitude toward them, which 
appears in fact to agree very well with the content of 2 Apol’.527 The suggestion  that the 
court case is the motivation for such a piece, further to 1A, is built upon the statements 
14.1 and 15.2 where Justin asks for the publication of his address in order that it might 
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change minds about Christians. The theory of Minns and Parvis moves the key chapters 
here, so this point stands or falls on how persuaded the reader is by their argument for 




Thorsteinsson also thinks 2A is more resonant with a private petition which has Justin’s 
own fate close to its heart as much as that of Christians and Christianity in general. 
Thorsteinsson thinks Justin has also been personally motivated by fear for his own life, 
as he records his expectation of being plotted against by the likes of Crescens. Moreover 
there is a difference in grammar between 1A and 2A; which suggests that Justin is trying 
to avoid the same fate as Lucius et al. In 2A, as Thorsteinsson notes, Justin greatly 
prefers the use of the first person singular. Thorsteinsson takes this to mean that Justin 
has his own concerns more at the heart of 2A whereas in 1A he is concerned more with 
Christians or Christianity in general. This deserves to be taken seriously, and does 
suggest what seems to be a genuine difference between the texts.  
For his case to proceed, Thorsteinsson needs to show that the independence of 2A from 
1A need not be ruled out by the back references in 2A to 1A, noted by Boll as evidence 
for the close relation of the two texts. Thorsteinsson understands that Justin explains 
what was said before in these instances rather than expecting the readers to know or 
refer to them, suggesting that 2A has its own integrity as a piece which can, if necessary, 
stand alone.
529
 This seems reasonable, but if the reader is more inclined to see the two 
texts as more closely related it will not be a winning argument. To further support the 
lack of inter-textuality Thorsteinsson also argues that Justin, by using the word 
‘Christians’ , as in ‘we mean, those who have become Christians’ (2A 1.2), wishes to 
make clear exactly to whom he is referring when he speaks of ‘those who have accepted 
that the unjust and licentious will be punished in eternal fire and that the virtuous and 
those who lived like Christ come to dwell with God in absence of suffering…’530 (Ibid): 
this would appear superfluous if the text was once part of or closely related to 1A. To 
explain specifically that the people referred to here are known as ‘Christians’ would be 
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quite unnecessary if the writing concerned  was originally either a part of or even an 
‘appendix’ to 1A, in which it was, of course, perfectly clear of whom the author was 
speaking in these terms. Here it appears Thorsteinsson is mistaken in thinking that it 
was perfectly clear in 1A to whom Justin referred in these terms, whom he considered 
‘Christians’. It has been an argument of this thesis that this precisely was something that 
the rulers did not know and the thing that Justin is trying to make clear. If that is correct, 
then this detail concerning of whom he speaks would be quite at home with the 
argument of 1A and does not exclude 2A necessarily from 1A as a separate composition. 
‘Christian’ is not a clarification of those about whom he is talking but rather of those 
who are virtuous and appear like Christ, and who therefore qualify  to be considered 
‘Christian’; contrast  other heretical groups who claim to follow Christ yet fail to  live 
according to his doctrines. This cannot be evidence, even minor evidence, then for the 
two text theory. 
The most compelling reason for Thorsteinsson’s argument is ‘…the fact that whereas 1 
Apol. is replete with “proofs” from the Christian scriptures, sometimes in the form of 
endless repetitions of the same passages, there is no quotation whatsoever from the 
Christian scriptures in 2 Apol. The latter work contains quotations from “pagan” 
writings only. Such a sharp and fundamental difference seems best explained if 2A is 
understood as an independent work.’531 This is a clear difference between the two texts 
and one also that brings into question the relevance of Marcion to 2A since scripture 
(prophecy in particular) is such a central means of establishing the difference between 
‘Christians’ and Marcionites elsewhere. It is certainly striking that Justin does not 
appeal to scripture in 2A. However, if we take seriously Minns and Parvis’ ‘cutting-
room floor’ theory, then this would likely be because in the editing of his notes into 1A 
Justin chose not to leave any of his Scriptural evidence out, only leaving the less 
important story of the woman and Urbicus and further examples of demonology out of 
1A. This is not all Justin left out though, since the Logos Spermatikos is also found in 
2A but not 1A. These two differences do further the case for 2A being separate. but this 
author still finds it difficult to believe that Justin would deliberately jettison scripture 
entirely when he relies so heavily on it elsewhere. Furthermore, the prophets are not 
ignored in or irrelevant to 2A. Their contribution is noted in 2A 8.5 and 10.8 as having 
foretold things relating to Jesus. With no reference to who these prophets are, neither to 
scripture nor the Jews whose tradition they are routed in, to qualify such references 
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these prophets seem to appear rather from nowhere. Justin does not risk relying on the 
reader’s prior knowledge of the prophets as individuals, or of scripture, in either of his 
other texts so it seems strange that he would not elaborate on them here. The ‘cutting-
room floor’ theory diminishes this anomaly by taking 2A as left-overs, which therefore 
assumes the same background and purposes as 1A. The references to the prophets in 2A 
are thus explained by their elaboration in 1A. Of course there is material in 2A that is 
sufficiently explained not to need to rely on 1A. The demons in 2A are accounted for 
independently of 1A.5.2. The 1A reads like a truncated version of the 2A story, however, 
so the ‘cutting-room floor’ theory maintains its plausibility.  
Ultimately neither position is totally satisfactory but the lack of scripture/memoirs and 
the messiness of 2A make the ‘cutting-room floor’ theory more attractive. One text or 
‘cutting-room floor’ seems to lack the explanatory power to account for the tonal 
differences, 2A being so direct on the matter of persecution. The two text solution has a 
difficult job dealing with the apparent inter-textuality between 1A and 2A. Although the 
lack of scripture in 2A for Thorsteinsson suggests a separate text to 1A, the present 
author also finds it hard to believe that something so central to Justin could be 
dispensed with completely by him and so the ‘cutting-room floor’ theory seems a more 
adequate explanation - though not without rightful challenge.  This being the case the 
portions of 2A relevant to this argument have been treated alongside 1A as having the 
same aims rather than as a separate and rather strange text in Justin’s oeuvre. This 
means that Marcion is taken to be a relevant figure, who affects the way Justin makes 
his arguments, for the material in 2A as well as 1A. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that 
the much shorter length of 2A and its lack of scripture make it a less important text for 
this thesis. 
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